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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Predatory lending is today’s most pressing consumer protection 
issue, costing American families over an estimated $9 billion a year.1 
Predatory lending is particularly rampant in the subprime home eq-
uity loan market—inhabited largely by unsophisticated borrowers—
where lenders have made billions upon billions of dollars of loans 
with abusive terms.2 After years of legislative and regulatory neglect, 
state governments have, in recent years, produced a variety of re-
forms and regulations on the terms and methods of lending in the 
subprime market, in an attempt to ameliorate the worst aspects of 
predatory lending. 
 Specifically, in the last few years, many states have enacted laws 
to limit abusive home lending practices within their own jurisdic-
tions.3 Large segments of the lending industry opposed these laws, 
claiming that the resulting regulatory patchwork increases their 
compliance costs, exposes even the most law-abiding lender to liabil-
ity, and thereby ultimately increases loan costs for consumers.4 
 In large part as a result of these complaints, momentum is build-
ing on three fronts to standardize the operations of the subprime 
mortgage market. First, federal banking regulators in the Office of 
                                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Williams College; J.D., New York 
University School of Law. This Article was granted an award as the best academic article 
on a topic addressing consumer financial services law in 2006 by the American Academy of 
Consumer Financial Services Lawyers.  The author would like to thank the following peo-
ple for helpful comments on earlier drafts: Baher Azmy, Larry Barnett, Susan Block-Lieb, 
Dana Brakman-Reiser, Michael Cahill, Neil Cohen, Nestor Davidson, Steven Dean, Jenny 
Diamond Cheng, James Fanto, Linda Fisher, Claire Hill, Edward Janger, Heidi Kitrosser, 
Claire Kelly, Rufina Lee, Ronald Mann, Lisa Nicholson, Arthur Pinto, Larry Solan, Ken 
Zimmerman, and workshop participants at Brooklyn Law School and the AALS 2005 
Clinical Conference. The author also acknowledges the support of the Brooklyn Law School 
Summer Research Stipend Program. Thanks also to Lawrence Hansen and Michael 
Freedman for excellent research assistance and to the Brooklyn Law School librarians for 
tirelessly tracking down numerous hard-to-find items. 
 1. ERIC STEIN, COAL. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMIC COST 
OF PREDATORY LENDING 3 (2001), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf 
(estimating the annual economic cost of predatory lending to be $9.1 billion); Christopher 
A. Richardson, Predatory Lending and Housing Disinvestment, Presentation at Syracuse 
University, Center for Policy Research 19 (May 17-18, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=338660) (estimating annual cost of predatory lending to be $9.53 
billion). 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. See infra Part V. 
 4. See id. 
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the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion (OTS) have already preempted the application of state predatory 
lending laws to a broad array of lending institutions.5 Following the 
regulators’ lead, Congress is also considering legislation to preempt 
more broadly their application to the remaining financial institutions 
still subject to state laws.6 
 Second, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),7—Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest purchasers of residential 
mortgages on the secondary mortgage market (“secondary market”)8 
—indicated that they would not purchase loans from loan originators 
that contain certain terms they deem abusive, such as harsh pre-
payment penalties, as well as those loans that are most heavily regu-
lated by predatory lending laws.9 
 Finally, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Services and Fitch 
Ratings, the three major bond and securities rating agencies (collec-
tively, the “privileged raters”), indicated that they will not rate securi-
ties10 backed by pools of residential mortgages if any of those mort-
gages violate their rating guidelines relating to acceptable liability risk 
stemming from state predatory lending laws.11 Rating agencies are in 
                                                                                                                     
 5. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Labora-
tories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 358-60 (2005). 
 6. See infra Part VI.A. 
 7. The term “GSE” refers to “a federally chartered, privately owned, privately man-
aged financial institution that has only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that 
bond-market investors perceive as implicitly backed by the federal government.” Richard 
Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. 
REV. 565, 570 (2005). Some use the term “Government-Sponsored Entity” instead of “enter-
prise.” See, e.g., note 504 infra. There is no material distinction between these two terms. I 
use the term “GSEs” as shorthand for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, unless otherwise 
noted, notwithstanding the fact that other entities, such as the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System, are also GSEs. Carnell, supra, at 573. 
 8. The market for mortgage-backed securities is known as the “secondary mortgage 
market,” or “secondary market” for short. Amy Crews Cutts et al., Adverse Selection, Licens-
ing and the Role of Securitization in Financial Market Evolution, Structure and Pricing 2 n.1 
(July 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=280388. The sec-
ondary mortgage market is easiest to visualize as “a network of lenders who sell and inves-
tors who buy existing mortgages or mortgage-backed securities. This infusion of capital from 
investors provides mortgage lenders such as banks, thrifts, mortgage bankers and other loan 
originators with a market for their interests.” KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.1 (2005). 
 9. See infra Part VI.B.  
 10. There is no single legal definition of a “security.” For the purposes of this Article, 
“security” shall mean “any instrument,” such as a mortgage note, “that might be sold as an 
investment.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (defining “security” for pur-
poses of the Securities Acts). 
 11. See infra Part VI.C. 
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the business of providing credit ratings12 for pools13 of mortgages that 
are sold to investors throughout the world, a process known as securi-
tization. The lack of a rating from at least one of the privileged raters, 
which effectively grant regulatory licenses to institutions that wish to 
issue securities,14 is the financial equivalent of a death sentence for a 
residential mortgage-backed securities15 offering. 
 Advocates for the lending industry frequently promote the in-
creased standardization of the secondary market as an approach that 
will reduce predatory behavior without hurting legitimate lenders.16 
But each of the three methods of standardization described above 
must be independently evaluated to determine whether it is desirable. 
 As a preliminary matter, one should also consider the legitimacy 
of the entity promoting each method of standardization. Obviously, 
the federal government has broad constitutional authority to regu-
late financial institutions.17 This legitimacy, however, must be bal-
anced against the significant role in banking, consumer protection, 
and real estate law that is granted to the states in our federal system 
of governance. While GSEs are private companies, they are federally 
chartered to provide ongoing assistance to the secondary market so 
as to help low- and moderate-income individuals become homeown-
ers.18 Thus, GSEs have been granted some legitimacy in setting pol-
icy in this sphere. 
 The privileged raters, however, have no similar mandate. They 
define their role first and foremost as protectors of investors.19 And 
                                                                                                                     
 12. Generally, a credit rating is an evaluation of creditworthiness. Philippe Jorion et 
al., Informational Effects of Regulation FD: Evidence from Rating Agencies, 76 J. FIN. 
ECON. 309, 313 (2005).  Moody’s has defined it as an “opinion of the future ability, legal ob-
ligation, and willingness of a bond issuer or other obligor to make full and timely payments 
on principal and interest due to investors.” Id. 
 13. “A pool is a group of related financial instruments combined for resale to investors 
on the secondary market.” LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 1.1. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. “Mortgage-backed security” is the general term for “any investment security rep-
resenting an interest in, or secured by, one or more pools of mortgage loans.” LORE & 
COWAN, supra note 8, § 1.1. “The term ‘mortgage-backed security’ is often used to describe 
securities backed by a wide variety of mortgage interests in almost every conceivable form 
of real property.” Id.  By some historical accident, securities backed by home equity loans 
(HELs) and home equity line of credit (HELOCs) are sometimes referred to as asset-backed 
securities. See W. Alexander Roever et al., Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) Securiti-
zations, in THE HANDBOOK OF NONAGENCY MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 115, 115 
(Frank J. Fabozzi et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Securities backed by 
any other asset (such as credit card receivables) are referred to as “asset-backed securi-
ties.” GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS 451 (David Stimpson ed., 1991). 
 16. See, e.g., Letter from Mortgage Bankers Association to The Honorable Jon Husted, 
Speaker, Ohio House of Representatives 2 (Mar. 21, 2006) (on file with author) (“A national 
standard is the better way to achieve our common goal of combating predatory lending.”).  
 17. N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 706-07 (1946) (stating that federal regulation of 
securities derives from the Commerce Clause).  
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. See infra Part IV.C. 
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while they have been granted a privileged regulatory status by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other government 
regulators,20 they have not been assigned a reciprocal responsibility 
to the public, as GSEs have been. As a result of this mismatch be-
tween privilege and responsibility, those concerned with the rights of 
homeowners should meet the privileged raters’ efforts to impose 
standardization on the mortgage market with greater skepticism. 
 The most significant criticism of the federal preemption of state 
predatory lending laws is that it is too soon to do so.21 Predatory lend-
ing has only arisen as a significant problem in the last decade,  and 
not enough time has passed to say whether legislators and regulators 
have come up with the best solution to the problem.22 States, playing 
their traditional role as laboratories for policy experimentation,23 
should be left alone until the relative merits of different approaches 
to the problem can be compared.24 
 The GSE approach is probably the most limited of the three and 
the one least likely to harm homeowners. This is because GSEs must 
balance their profit-seeking with the effectuation of their public pur-
pose.25 Because Congress and the media watch them carefully and 
because they have competitors in the secondary market, the GSEs’ 
incremental approach is likely to do some good: it should reduce the 
number of loans with abusive terms without exercising an effective 
veto over state predatory lending laws.26  
 Unsurprisingly, the most worrisome of the three approaches to 
standardization is that of the privileged raters. The privileged raters 
have implemented guidelines relating to predatory lending legisla-
tion that do not accurately measure the risk that such statutes pose 
to investors. In particular, they exaggerate the risk posed by as-
signee liability and punitive damages provisions in such legislation.27 
Ultimately, these guidelines have had two major impacts: (1) they 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See infra Part IV.B. 
 21. See infra Part VI.A. 
 22. See id. 
 23. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .”). 
 24.  See WEI LI & KEITH S. ERNST, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE BEST 
VALUE IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET: STATE PREDATORY LENDING REFORMS 12, 17 (2006), 
http://responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr010-State_Effects-0206.pdf. This study, analyzing data 
from 1998-2004, finds that states with strong predatory lending laws have been successful 
at reducing the number of subprime loans with abusive terms, while not reducing the 
amount of capital available or raising interests rates for subprime consumers. Id. For ex-
ample, subprime loans with abusive terms in New Jersey declined thirty-seven percent 
lower than states without strong predatory lending laws, and interest rates fell approxi-
mately thirty-two basis points on those loans. 
 25. See infra Part III.C. 
 26. See infra Part VI.B. 
 27. See infra Part V. 
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promote the interests of issuers and investors over those of home-
owners, and (2) they promote the growth of the residential mortgage-
backed securities market.28 Not coincidentally, the privileged raters 
make more money in such a growing market because they charge is-
suers for their work in rating new securities.  Thus, it is in the privi-
leged raters’ self-interest to keep states from passing laws that slow 
secondary market growth and cut into their income.29 
 There is no way to formally or informally appeal the decisions of the 
privileged raters. And because there is no adequate way to exercise 
public pressure on them, their misjudgments interfere with legitimate 
state policies to the benefit of the privileged raters themselves, which 
amounts to an abuse of the privileges that they have been granted by 
government regulators. The privileged raters’ actions have caused 
some state legislatures to water down predatory lending bills under 
consideration and have caused others to amend and dilute existing 
predatory lending laws so that the privileged raters will continue to 
rate pools containing loans from states with such laws.30 This is be-
cause funds for loans can dry up in a jurisdiction that has enacted a 
tough predatory lending law that falls afoul of the privileged raters’ 
guidelines. As this catastrophic scenario has already occurred in one 
state, others have quickly learned that the privileged raters have an 
effective veto over their predatory lending laws.31 
 This Article reviews all three efforts to standardize the subprime 
mortgage market, but it focuses on the privileged raters’ actions be-
cause they present a serious and unjustified impediment to the 
remediation of serious abuses in the home mortgage market that has 
not yet received thorough scholarly attention. 
 In order to understand how privileged raters became so enmeshed 
with predatory lending, we must first understand how two related 
processes work: (1) the marketing of subprime loans to consumers 
and (2) the role of the privileged raters in the expansion of the sub-
prime mortgage market.  
 To explain these processes, this Article builds on a growing body of 
predatory lending and rating agency literature. Professors Kurt 
Eggert, Kathleen Engel, and Patricia McCoy have documented and 
explained the link between predatory lending and the secondary mar-
ket.32 Professors Claire Hill, Frank Partnoy, and Steven Schwarcz 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See infra Part VI.C. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See infra Part V. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of 
Form over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 363-68 (2002) 
[hereinafter Eggert, Codification]; Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lend-
ing, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 
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have documented and explained the role of rating agencies in the 
broader financial markets.33 Building on these two bodies of work 
and on the significant economics and finance literature relating to 
rating agencies, the aim of this Article is to demonstrate that privi-
leged raters are playing an active, albeit hidden, role in permitting 
predatory lending to thrive. A limitation of the existing rating agency 
literature, at least for my purposes, is that it has not evaluated privi-
leged raters’ impact on predatory lending and, thus, on the public in-
terest. The term “public interest,” for the purposes of this Article, re-
fers to the expressed preferences of a political entity, such as one 
might find in a law passed by a state legislature. As far as this body 
of literature is concerned, the only relevant parties are investors, is-
suers and the agencies themselves. I add the public to that list. 
 Part II of this Article describes the process of marketing subprime 
loans to consumers and describes the way predatory lending grew 
alongside the extraordinary and rapid expansion of the subprime 
lending market. Part III explains how mortgages are securitized and 
sold. Part III also describes how GSEs created a standardized secon-
dary market for prime loans and how they are in the process of stan-
dardizing aspects of the subprime secondary market. Part IV de-
scribes the function of rating agencies in the securitization process as 
well as the process by which they arrive at their ratings. Part IV also 
describes how the privileged raters have been granted a privileged 
regulatory status by financial services regulators. Finally, this Part 
reviews recent finance scholarship that suggests that the privileged 
raters are biased against the public interest in general and the inter-
est of homeowners in particular. 
 Part V outlines existing remedies for predatory lending and de-
scribes in detail the impact of the privileged raters on the structure 
of three state predatory lending laws enacted in North Carolina, 
Georgia, and New Jersey. Part V also documents how the privileged 
raters overreacted—and continue to overreact—to those statutes. The 
state-specific detail of Part V is necessary for my argument for two 
reasons. First, states are the battleground upon which financial com-
panies like the privileged raters have fought against increased regu-
                                                                                                                     
511-22 (2002) [hereinafter Eggert, Predatory Lending]; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 1255, 1270-98 (2002) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Three Markets]; Kathleen C. Engel 
& Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What Does Wall Street Have to Do with It?, 15 
HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715, 715-20 (2004) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Wall Street]. 
 33. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 46-64 
(2004); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for 
the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 627-54 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private 
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15; see also 
Arthur Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, AM. 
J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2006) (providing an overview of U.S. credit rating industry). 
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lation of the secondary market. Second, the events in each state are 
merely battles in a broader war between local control and interna-
tional capital market standardization, and this intangible and ongo-
ing war cannot be understood without those details. In sum, Part V 
provides a case study of how the privileged raters’ privileged regula-
tory status distorts the efficient functioning of the financial markets 
to the advantage of financial market participants and to the detri-
ment of the public interest. 
 Part VI is a review of the impact that federal preemption, the 
GSEs, and the privileged raters have on the healthy standardization 
of the subprime secondary market. I conclude that federal preemp-
tion is premature; GSEs are having an incremental and beneficial 
impact on the subprime market, and the privileged raters are having 
a negative impact. Part VII builds on various reforms suggested in 
the rating agency literature to propose public policy responses to the 
standardization imposed by rating agencies on the secondary market. 
A thorough exploration of such proposed solutions must be left to a 
later article. Nonetheless, by applying the insights of the predatory 
lending and rating agency literature to the events surrounding the 
adoption of recent state predatory lending legislation, this Article 
makes visible the distortions that the privileged raters have caused 
in the secondary market, particularly as it affects the public interest. 
II.   THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING 
A.   The Explosive Growth of the Subprime Mortgage Market 
 The way that Americans borrow money to buy homes has changed 
radically since the 1980s.34 Before that time, Americans who wanted 
to buy a home would typically walk into their local savings and loan 
and speak to a loan officer who would evaluate their application.35 
Depending on income, wealth, and ties to the community, the loan of-
ficer might have approved a loan. And typically, only those with a 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See Michael J. Lea, Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical Per-
spective, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 147, 166-72 (1996) [hereinafter Lea, Historical Perspec-
tive] (describing the history of mortgage lending in United States from 1980s to the mid-
1990s); Michael J. Lea, Sources of Funds for Mortgage Finance, 1 J. HOUSING RES. 139, 
150-53 (1990) [hereinafter Lea, Sources of Funds] (describing the role of government in 
mortgage lending from the Great Depression through the 1980s); Amy Crews Cutts & 
Robert Van Order, On the Economics of Subprime Lending 1 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper 
No. 04-01, 2004), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/news/pdf/subprime_012704.pdf. 
 35. See Robert Van Order, The U.S. Mortgage Market: A Model of Dueling Charters, 
11 J. HOUSING RES. 233, 233 (2000) (“Between the end of World War II and the 1970s, U.S. 
residential mortgage markets were dominated by the primary market, which was com-
prised primarily of specialized depository institutions (mainly savings and loan associa-
tions [S&Ls], more broadly ‘thrifts’), which both by regulation and tax incentive were in-
duced to hold most (about 80 percent) of their assets in mortgages.”). 
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healthy, or “prime,” profile were approved.36 That is, they had a 
steady work history, a large down payment, and no problems with 
their credit.37 
 Thrifts38 were not only the dominant type of lender, but they also 
vertically dominated the residential mortgage market. They origi-
nated and serviced the mortgage typically holding it until it was paid 
off by the borrower.39 Now, technological,40 financial41 and legal42 in-
novations allow global finance companies to offer a range of mortgage 
                                                                                                                     
 36. “Prime” mortgages share certain characteristics relating to their “type, duration, 
age, performance, and other specific criteria.” SECURITIZATION: ASSET-BACKED AND 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 9.04, at 9-21 (Ronald S. Borod ed., 2003) [hereinafter 
SECURITIZATION].  In order to determine the “necessary level of credit enhancements for fi-
nancing,” rating agencies have developed a “list of the characteristics [that] a ‘prime pool’ 
of residential mortgages” would include. This list includes the following:  
ITEM CHARACTERISTIC 
Mortgage Security First lien on single family de-
tached properties for use as a 
primary residence located in 
the United States 
Amortization Fixed-rate level fully amortiz-
ing payments 
Loan to Value Ratio 80% loan to value, as estab-
lished by a competent ap-
praiser 
Maximum Mortgage Size $400,000 (Standard & Poor’s.  
Some rating agencies limit size 
of loan to Fannie Mae loan 
limit size) 
Loan Documentation Standard, complete 
FHLMC/FNMA documentation 
Minimum Number of Loans 300, with geographical disper-
sion 
Id. at 9-21 to 9-22. 
 37. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing: A 
Legislative Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 131-32 & n.10 (2005) (describing 
typical post-World War II loan application process). 
 38. The term “thrifts” is a catchall that includes savings and loans, savings banks, 
and mutual savings banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(i) (2000) (defining “thrift institutions” for the 
purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956).  
 39. Van Order, supra note 35, at 233. 
 40. See, e.g., Andrea Heuson et al., Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Im-
plications for Mortgage Rates and Credit Availability, 23 J. REAL EST. FIN. &  ECON. 337, 
338 (2001) (“With the recent advent of automated underwriting, much of the informational 
advantage [of mortgage originators] has disappeared. As the argument goes, computerized 
credit scoring gives the securitizer more accurate and timely information about borrower 
creditworthiness.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Cutts & Van Order, supra note 34, at 1 (“U.S. mortgage markets have 
evolved radically in recent years. Innovations in underwriting, mortgage products, and 
mortgage funding have expanded mortgage lending and reduced costs.”). 
 42. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND 
STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 21 (2004), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf [hereinafter GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION] 
(“Several factors account for the growth of the subprime market, including changes in tax law 
that increased the tax advantages of home equity loans . . . .”).  
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products to a broad array of potential residential borrowers. As a re-
sult of these innovations, there has been an unbundling of the sub-
markets of the mortgage industry.  
A mortgage now can be:  
(1) originated by a mortgage broker who makes money only 
from origination; 
(2) serviced by a mortgage banker who did not originate the 
loan and may have bought the right to service the loan 
from another mortgage banker; 
(3)  originated with the credit risk taken by one of the sec-
ondary market institutions, perhaps along with a mort-
gage insurance company; and  
(4)  funded by a mortgage-backed security (MBS) sold into 
the capital markets, and the MBS can be packaged as a 
bundle of derivative securities that separate interest 
rate and prepayment risk among different investors.43 
A highly beneficial consequence of this change has been the econo-
mies of scale that specialized firms have been able to achieve, which 
has resulted in rated MBS transactions trading at only a small dis-
count to Treasury securities of comparable maturity.44 This has 
driven down the average interest rate paid by homeowners.45 In part 
because of those changes, in 2004, American homeownership had 
reached a historic high of 69%, and Americans had $9.6 trillion in 
home equity.46 Indeed, lenders refinanced trillions of dollars of mort-
gages in 2003 and 2004.47 
 “Subprime” lending has been a significant and growing portion of 
this activity, reaching nearly 20% of all originations in 2004.48 Sub-
prime lending is the extension of credit to those with lower incomes, 
less wealth, and riskier credit profiles than traditional, “prime” bor-
rowers.49 A negative consequence of the change in the mortgage in-
                                                                                                                     
 43. Van Order, supra note 35, at 233-34. 
 44. Id. at 234 (“Pools of mortgages (MBS and their derivatives) and debt backed by 
pools of mortgages now trade in national and international markets, almost as efficiently 
as Treasury securities.”). 
 45. See id. 
 46. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD U., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2005, at 1, 5 (2005). 
 47. Id. at 5. 
 48. See id. at 17. 
 49. See Cutts & Van Order, supra note 34, at 4-5; see also KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL., 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-
BASED PRICING 8 (2002) (“[The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act and the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act] provide the legal framework for 
subprime lending, except in states that opt out of the legislation.”); Baher Azmy & David 
Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Secu-
rity Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645, 652 (2004) (discussing a range of factors that have 
led to increase of subprime lending). 
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dustry away from dominance by thrifts and toward relatively un-
regulated specialty firms has resulted in a variety of abuses in the 
subprime portion of the secondary market. 
 Subprime lenders typically offer three types of products to bor-
rowers.50 First, refinance and purchase mortgages are offered to bor-
rowers with poor credit histories.51 In many cases, borrowers refi-
nance mortgages for an amount greater than the balance of the 
original mortgage, thereby taking “cash out” of their homes.52 Second, 
“Alt-A” mortgages are made to borrowers with FICO scores similar to 
those in the prime market.53 Alt-A mortgages are typically made to 
borrowers who cannot document all of the information in their loan 
application (“low doc” or “no-doc” loans); Alt-A mortgages can be used 
either for a purchase or a refinance.54 Third, high loan-to-value 
(LTV)55 refinance mortgages are originated to borrowers with rela-
tively good credit but who have LTV ratios that sometimes are as 
high as 150%.56 
 Subprime loans have higher interest rates than prime loans, a 
fact that lenders ascribe to the subprime borrowers’ greater risk of 
default.57 A number of studies have estimated that subprime interest 
rates for C and D subprime loans are on average four percentage 
points higher than those for prime loans.58 Generally, subprime lend-
ers also charge higher points and fees, that is, charges assessed at 
                                                                                                                     
 50. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 4. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. The FICO ratings system, created by the Fair Isaac Corporation, gives individual 
consumers credit scores that are meant to predict whether they will pay their debt obligations 
as expected by lenders. See FairIsaac, Credit Bureau Risk Scores, http://www.fairisaac.com/ 
Fairisaac/Solutions/Scoring++Predictive+Modeling/Credit+Bureau+Risk+Scores.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 10, 2006). Some argue that Alt-A mortgages are not as safe as genuine “A” mort-
gages. See Cutts & Van Order, supra note 34, at 4. 
 54. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 4. “No document” loans are made to borrowers 
who have irregular income, such as those working on commission. Id. Because their recent 
income statements may not reflect their income accurately, lenders will rely on high credit 
scores and a higher interest rate to ensure that they are adequately protected against the 
additional risk of lending to such individuals. Id. 
 55. That is, the principal amount of the loan is very high in relation to the value of 
the house that is mortgaged to secure that loan. Until the 1990s, residential lenders typi-
cally limited the LTV to 80%. Rick Grant, Subprime Mortgage Lending Comes of Age, 
NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Dec. 29, 1997, at 12 (“In the not-so-distant past, high LTV meant 
anything above what the GSEs would accept (70-80% of appraised value), but in today’s 
marketplace it can mean up to 150% or more of the home’s value.”). 
 56. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 4. 
 57. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY 
HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 27-28 (2000) [hereinafter JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT]. 
 58. Id. at 28. Within the subprime market, grades of A-, B, C, and D are assigned to rep-
resent progressively higher credit risks carrying correspondingly higher interest rates. See 
Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime & Prime Mortgages: Loss Distributions 1 (OFHEO 
Working Papers, Working Paper No. 03-1, 2003), available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/ 
pdf/03-1subprime.pdf. 
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the outset of the loan and paid either in cash or financed into the 
overall loan proceeds, to compensate for higher origination and ser-
vicing costs that lenders claim subprime loans have.59 In the aggre-
gate, loan performance data appears to support the view that a sig-
nificant portion of the excess spread60 covers the higher risk of de-
fault among subprime loans: as of September 2000, only 3.36% of 
subprime mortgages in the A- range, while 21% of D mortgages were 
seriously delinquent.61 These rates of delinquency were far higher 
than those in the prime market, where only 0.54% of loans were seri-
ously delinquent.62  
 Most subprime loans are now originated by mortgage and con-
sumer finance companies, with a smaller amount issued by banks 
and thrifts.63 And only 16% of subprime mortgages are used for home 
purchases.64 That is, most subprime mortgages are used to refinance 
existing mortgages.65 The growth of subprime lending has been ut-
terly explosive. In 1994, subprime mortgage originations were $34 
billion; in 2002 they represented 8.6% of all originations, over $213 
billion.66 The secondary market provides much of the liquidity and 
capacity for growth for the subprime market.67 Indeed, in 2003, “ap-
proximately two-thirds of the outstanding subprime/home equity 
loans in the United States were securitized.”68 
 This growth has allowed many people who had not been able to 
access the prime market to access the equity in their homes. This 
greater access to credit in the subprime market has come at the cost 
                                                                                                                     
 59. JOHN C. WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY 68 (1997). It remains 
unclear, however, the extent to which subprime loan terms accurately reflect an inherent 
market risk of default associated with their borrowers. See Cutts & Van Order, supra note 
34, at 5-6. (noting that differences in subprime loans “broadly justify higher rates” but do 
not “indicate how much higher the rates should be”). 
 60. “Excess spread is the difference between (1) interest received at the weighted av-
erage interest rate on the mortgage collateral and (2) the sum of interest paid at the 
passthrough rate on the bonds and any monthly fees.” Abner Figueroa, The Evaluation of 
Excess Spread in Sub-Prime Transactions, in HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 209, 209. For 
instance, if the weighted average interest rate of a pool of mortgages was 7% and the sum 
of interest paid (including fees) was 6%, the excess spread would be one percentage point. 
That excess spread may be used to cover the higher costs of subprime lending and any re-
mainder may be kept by the issuer and/or shared with investors.  
 61. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 19. 
 62. Id.  
 63. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 22. In 2001, “178 lenders concen-
trated primarily on subprime mortgage lending.” Id. “Fifty-nine percent of these lenders 
were independent mortgage companies (mortgage bankers and finance companies), 20 per-
cent were nonbank subsidiaries of financial or bank holding companies, and the remainder 
were other types of financial institutions. Only 10 percent were federally regulated banks 
and thrifts.” Id. 
 64. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 5. 
 65. Id. 
 66. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 21. 
 67. See TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 9. 
 68. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 719 n.5. 
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of significantly higher fees and interest rates than a prime borrower 
would face.69 It has also come at the cost of significantly higher fees 
and interest rates for minority borrowers as compared to white bor-
rowers, and these higher costs are not efficiently related to the com-
parative credit risk of white and minority borrowers.70 In other 
words, the subprime market in the aggregate appears to discriminate 
to some extent against communities of color. 
 Communities of color have been disproportionately represented in 
the subprime market in contrast to their representation in the prime 
market. African Americans and Hispanics combined made up less 
than 8% of the prime home purchase mortgage market in 1998, but 
such borrowers made up nearly 20% of subprime home purchase 
mortgage market in that same year.71 Similarly, African-American 
and Hispanic borrowers together make up about 6% of all prime con-
ventional refinance mortgages and 17% of subprime refinance mort-
gages.72 And more than half of all loans in predominantly African-
American communities are subprime, compared to only 9% of loans 
in predominantly white communities.73 
B.   Predatory Lending in the Subprime Market 
 The subprime market is far less regulated and standardized than 
the prime market. As such, it presents an opportunity for those seek-
ing to separate financially unsophisticated borrowers from the equity 
that they have in their homes. That is, it presents an opportunity to 
engage in predatory lending.74 Most predatory behavior takes place 
between a mortgage broker or mortgage banker and the borrower.75 
                                                                                                                     
 69. See Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING ASSETS, 
BUILDING WEALTH: CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES (Nicolas P. Retsinas 
& Eric S. Belsky eds., 2005) (reviewing credit market price discrimination literature). 
 70. Azmy, supra note 5, at 321-26. 
 71. TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 5. 
 72. Id.  
 73. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL 
DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000), http://hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/ 
pressrel/subprime.html [hereinafter HUD, UNEQUAL BURDEN].  In 1998, 26% of refinance 
loans in low-income communities were subprime, compared to a national average of 11% 
and 7% in upper-income communities. Id.  This may partially be the result of the lower in-
come-to-asset ratios and shorter or weaker credit histories found among such borrowers.  
 74. See Eggert, Predatory Lending, supra note 32, at 511-13 (surveying a variety of 
definitions of predatory lending proposed by scholars and regulators); see also Engel & 
McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 32, at 1260 (suggesting that predatory lending includes 
“(1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers, (2) 
harmful rent seeking, (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices, (4) other forms of 
lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as fraud, and (5) loans that require 
borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress”). 
 75. See generally Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust—Mortgage Licensing Stat-
utes Address Predatory Lending, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 332  
(2005) (describing predatory practices by originators). 
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But such thinly funded entities could not exist with funding from 
secondary market investors. This Article focuses on how states have 
attempted to make secondary market investors accountable for their 
role in propagating predatory lending, thereby incentivizing them to 
stop it.76 
 While the extent to which predatory lending has infiltrated the 
subprime market cannot be known precisely,77 “it is rare to find a 
case of a predatory lending that does not involve a subprime lender,” 
as opposed to a prime lender.78 Predatory lending is also far more 
common in the “refinance” or “home equity” market79 than in the 
home purchase market because home equity borrowers have much 
more equity in their home than purchasers: the existing home equity 
gives predatory lenders a greater opportunity to pack a loan with ex-
cessive fees that might not be readily identifiable by the borrower 
who needs not pay such increased out-of-pocket costs as a new home-
owner would.80 
 While there is no generally accepted comprehensive definition of 
predatory lending,81 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has 
cobbled together a good working description: “an umbrella term that 
                                                                                                                     
 76. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 716 (“If the secondary market 
has the incentive and ability to deter predatory lending through such market devices as pric-
ing, contract provisions, due diligence, and monitoring, then the market for subprime mort-
gages arguably will self-correct.”). 
 77. There is no systematic data on predatory lending in large part because the “prin-
ciple source of information on mortgage lending is data reported under [the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (HMDA)], but HMDA does not include information on interest rates, 
fees, points, or other costs that might be indicative of predatory lending practices.” Harold 
L. Bunce et al., Subprime Foreclosures: The Smoking Gun of Predatory Lending?, in  
HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 257, 259 (Susan M. 
Wachter & R. Leo Penne eds., 2001). Notwithstanding these limitations, “HMDA data is 
the most comprehensive source of information on primary mortgage originations and sec-
ondary market loan purchases.” Randall M. Scheessele, HMDA Coverage of the Mortgage 
Market 4 (Hous. Fin. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. HF-007, 1998). HMDA 
data does provide information on the borrower, such as income, race, ethnicity and sex, as 
well as information regarding the property to be mortgaged, such as location. Id. 
 78. Dan Immergluck, Stark Differences: Explosion of the Subprime Industry and Ra-
cial Hypersegmentation in Home Equity Lending, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 77, at 237.  
 79. Charles Schorin et al., Home Equity Loans, in HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 79, 
83. The term “home equity loan” covers many different products; it includes the traditional 
second lien mortgage, but “it more commonly today refers to first liens to borrowers with 
impaired credit histories” and/or high debt-to-income ratios. Id. at 79. Home equity loans 
are typically used to “consolidate consumer debt in a lower, tax deductible form[;] reduce a 
homeowner’s monthly mortgage payment by extending the loan’s term[;] finance home im-
provements[;] monetize equity in the home[;] finance temporary liquidity needs, such as for 
education or medical expenses.” Id. at 84-85. 
 80. See GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 20 (“According to federal and 
industry officials, most predatory mortgage lending involves home equity loans or loan re-
financings rather than loans for home purchases.”). 
 81. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 49, at 649 & nn.8-10 (discussing difficulties of com-
prehensively defining predatory lending). 
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is generally used to describe cases in which a broker or originating 
lender takes unfair advantage of a borrower, often through decep-
tion, fraud, or manipulation, to make a loan that contains terms that 
are disadvantageous to the borrower.”82 Accordingly, the GAO has de-
fined predatory lending so as to include the following abusive prac-
tices and loan terms: 
(1)  Excessive fees. Abusive loans may include fees that 
greatly exceed the amounts justified by the costs of 
the services provided and the credit and interest 
rate risks involved. Lenders may add these fees to 
the loan amounts rather than requiring payment up 
front, so the borrowers may not know the exact 
amount of the fees they are paying. 
(2) Excessive interest rates. . . . [L]enders may charge 
interest rates that far exceed what would be justi-
fied by any risk-based pricing calculation, or lenders 
may “steer” a borrower with an excellent credit re-
cord to a higher-rate loan intended for borrowers 
with poor credit histories.  
(3)  Single-premium credit insurance. Credit insurance is 
a loan product that repays the lender should the bor-
rower die or become disabled. In the case of single-
premium credit insurance, the full premium is paid 
all at once—by being added to the amount financed 
in the loan—rather than on a monthly basis. . . . 
(4) Lending without regard to ability to repay. Loans 
may be made without regard to a borrower’s ability 
to repay the loan. In these cases, the loan is approved 
based on the value of the asset (the home) that is 
used as collateral. In particularly egregious cases, 
monthly loan payments have equaled or exceeded the 
borrower’s total monthly income. Such lending can 
quickly lead to foreclosure of the property. 
(5) Loan flipping. Mortgage originators may refinance 
borrowers’ loans repeatedly in a short period of time 
without any economic gain for the borrower. With 
each successive refinancing, these originators 
charge high fees that “strip” borrowers’ equity in 
their homes.  
(6) Fraud and deception. Predatory lenders may perpe-
trate outright fraud through actions such as inflating 
property appraisals and doctoring loan applications 
and settlement documents. Lenders may also deceive 
borrowers by using “bait and switch” tactics that mis-
                                                                                                                     
 82. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 18. Independent mortgage bro-
kers typically sell loans that they originate to lenders for premiums ranging from 2-5%. 
FITCH IBCA, SUBPRIME HOME EQUITY: WHAT NEXT? 8 (Apr. 27, 1999). 
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lead borrowers about the terms of their loan. Un-
scrupulous lenders may fail to disclose items as re-
quired by law or in other ways may take advantage 
of borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication. 
(7) Prepayment penalties. Penalties for prepaying a 
loan are not necessarily abusive, but predatory 
lenders may use them to trap borrowers in high-cost 
loans. 
(8) Balloon payments. Loans with balloon payments are 
structured so that monthly payments are lower but 
one large payment (the balloon payment) is due 
when the loan matures. Predatory loans may con-
tain a balloon payment that the borrower is unlikely 
to be able to afford, resulting in foreclosure or refi-
nancing with additional high costs and fees. Some-
times, lenders market a low monthly payment with-
out adequate disclosure of the balloon payment.83 
 Predatory practices are not typically present in the prime market. 
Indeed, they are present in much of the subprime market,84 where 
low- and moderate-income borrowers are concentrated.85 But they are 
used to prey on unsophisticated homeowners, typically those who are 
not integrated in the sphere of mainstream financial institutions 
such as banks and credit unions.86 
 According to the Senate hearing testimony of an anonymous 
employee of a predatory lender, the  
perfect customer [for a predatory finance company] would be an 
uneducated widow who is on a fixed income—hopefully from her 
deceased husband’s pension and Social Security, who has her 
house paid off, is living off of credit cards, but having a difficult 
time keeping up her payments and who must make a car payment 
in addition to her credit card payments.87 
 Such predatory practices lead to foreclosure: from January 1998 
through September 1999, “the foreclosure rate for subprime loans 
was more than [ten] times the foreclosure rate for prime loans.”88 
                                                                                                                     
 83. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 18-19. 
 84. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 49, at 655-56 (discussing tactics of predatory lenders).  
 85. HUD, UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 73. 
 86. See James H. Carr & Jenny Schuetz., Financial Services in Distressed Communi-
ties: Framing the Issue, Finding Solutions, in FINANCIAL SERVICES IN DISTRESSED 
COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 5, 6 (Fannie Mae Found. 2001) (“As many as 12 
million households in the United States either have no relationship with traditional 
financial institutions or depend on fringe lenders for financial services. These households 
are disproportionately poor and minority.”). 
 87. Equity Predators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing Their Way to Profits: Hearing 
Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 105th Cong. 31 (1998) (statement of “Jim Dough,” 
Former Employee of a Predatory Lender).  
 88. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 24. 
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While the increased credit risk of subprime borrowers explains part 
of this extraordinary differential, it also appears to be the result, in 
large part, of predatory lending.89 
III.   THE ROLE OF SECURITIZATION IN THE PREDATORY               
LENDING CRISIS 
 Real estate has always been considered good collateral because it 
needs little monitoring compared to other types of collateral, such as 
inventory, equipment, and other personal property.90 Yet, Wall Street 
investors have historically viewed mortgages as riskier investments 
than those assets because they were regulated by a patchwork of lo-
cal and state laws.91 It is in large part because of this aversion that, 
prior to the 1970s, all real estate lending, like all politics, was local.92 
Local lenders lent to local borrowers.93 Wall Street had ceded these 
local mortgage markets to local lenders for these reasons and be-
cause of the common belief that local lenders had more insight into 
local conditions.94 This state of affairs was to change with the birth of 
securitization and the growth of the secondary market. 
A.   Securitization Explained 
 Most simply put, securitization “refers to the aggregation and 
pooling of assets with similar characteristics in such a way that in-
vestors may purchase interests or securities backed by those as-
sets.”95 A more complex picture of securitization would add the ap-
praisals done to ensure the value of the collateral, the third-party 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Id.  
 90. Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient? 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1134 (2002).  
 91. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 1.11. They were also viewed as riskier because 
mortgages were necessarily tied to local economies and a local recession or natural disaster 
could increase defaults and decrease the value of a pool of geographically concentrated 
mortgages. Id. 
 92. See Joseph Philip Forte, Capital Markets Mortgage: A Ratable Model for Main 
Street and Wall Street, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE LAWYERS REAL 
ESTATE FINANCE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS: RISKS AND REWARDS 4-6 (ALI–ABA CLE, 2004) 
[hereinafter COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION]. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 4-6.  
 95. SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 1.01, at 1-3; see also Thomas E. Plank, The Se-
curity of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1656 n.1, 
1657 n.6 (2004) (providing thorough, albeit not comprehensive, review of securitization lit-
erature). The terms “securitization,” “asset securitization,” and “structured finance” are of-
ten used interchangeably. Randall D. Luke & Louis F. Burke, United States, in 
SECURITIZATION 205, 205 (David G. Glennie et al. eds., 1998); see also 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, 
SECURITIZATION § 1.1, at 3 (1991) (stating that securitization transforms “illiquid debt into 
securities”). 
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credit enhancements offered by entities such as insurance compa-
nies, and the complex structures of the securities themselves.96 
 Given this complexity, it is not surprising that the typical investor 
in a securitized pool is an institutional investor which is purchasing 
such securities either in the secondary market or through a private 
placement.97 Securitizations are carefully structured to achieve pre-
cise tax, accounting and regulatory treatment to make them attrac-
tive to such investors.98 The net result of the securitization process is 
that the investors in asset-backed securities come to own “the rights 
to the present and future economic value of the assets.”99 
 Typically, securitizations are designed to result in “securities that 
are of high quality, as evidenced by a high rating, and saleable on the 
capital markets.”100 The process of securitization thereby allows a 
firm with a less-than-perfect credit rating to spin off some of its re-
ceivables, such as mortgages, into an instrument that is capable of 
having a higher rating than the firm itself.101 An additional benefit of 
securitization is that it allows investors to manage various forms of 
risk that are inherent in the underlying receivables. Thus, the under-
lying credit risk of the receivables can be managed through credit 
enhancements and due diligence, prepayment risk can be managed 
through pricing, and litigation risk (bankruptcy consolidation, origi-
nator fraud) can be managed by choice of securitization structure.102 
 The basic market requirements for securitizations to thrive are 
the following: standardized contracts, grading of risk via underwrit-
ing, historical statistics of performance of similar assets, standardi-
zation of applicable laws, standardization of servicer, quality reliable 
supply of quality, credit enhancers, and computers to handle the 
complexity of the necessary analyses.103 
                                                                                                                     
 96. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1061, 1073 (1996); see also JOHN FRANCIS HILSON & JEFFREY S. TURNER, ASSET-
BASED LENDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING § 2:6.2 (2000) (describing 
various forms of credit enhancements); LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 1.4 (identifying 
typical third-party providers of credit enhancements as banks and insurance companies 
that offer various complex products to meet the needs of proposed securities issuances).  
 97. See Hill, supra note 90, at 1131. 
 98. Id. at 1130. 
 99. SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 1.01, at 1-3.  
 100. Hill, supra note 96, at 1073. 
 101. See id. 
 102. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 728-39.  
 103. Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION 1, 7 tbl.1.3 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996).  For a dis-
cussion on how actuarial data increases credit quality, see Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of 
Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION, supra, at 31, 40 (discussing how actuarial information increases credit 
quality). See also Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 721 (“[S]ubprime securiti-
zations are a fairly new phenomenon relative to their prime counterparts, meaning that the 
performance of subprime loan pools over time is not yet well understood.” (footnote omit-
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 Borrowing from Professor Hill,104 a typical securitization involves 
the following steps: 
(1) selection (“pooling”) of the receivables to be 
conveyed [by the company originating the 
transaction (the “originator”)];  
(2) [creation of a special purpose entity (“SPE”) which 
buys rights to payment from the selected 
receivables from the originator]; 
(3) creation of [a second SPE] (the “pool”) to which the 
[rights to the selected] receivables will be conveyed;  
(4) establishment of the terms of the securities to be 
issued by the pool;105 
(5) conveyance of the receivables [to the pool];  
(6) issuance of the pool securities [in a public offering 
or by private placement]; 
(7) establishment of mechanisms by which the 
receivables will be serviced (collected), and the 
amounts collected held until payment to the pool’s 
securities holders; and  
(8)  . . . issuance of the rating agency’s rating and the 
insurer’s guaranty.106 
The conveyance of the receivables through two SPEs is done to pro-
tect them from being consolidated with the potential bankruptcy es-
tate of the originator of the pool, which could interrupt the flow of 
payments to the investors.107 This disaggregation of the risk inherent 
in the receivables and the risk inherent in the issuer lowers the effec-
tive cost of a securitization and thereby increases the value of the re-
ceivables to the issuer.108 
 Once the securitization is complete, the second SPE uses the pro-
ceeds of the issuance to pay the first SPE for the transferred assets, 
which in turn uses the proceeds to pay the originator.109 The inves-
                                                                                                                     
ted)). For a discussion on credit enhancement, see Richard Roll, Benefits to Homeowners 
from Mortgage Portfolios Retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 23 J. FIN. SERVICES 
RES. 29, 29 (2003) (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of credit enhancement in 
the process of mortgage securitization, one of the most prominent and striking features of 
the secondary market.”). 
 104. See Hill, supra note 96, at 1068.  
 105. The terms (the interest rate, for instance) of the securities are typically different 
from the terms of the underlying mortgages. Id. at 1068. 
 106. See id. at 1077-78. 
 107. Plank, supra note 95, at 1661-64. 
 108. See id. at 1662. This lowering of the cost of securitization effectively comes at the 
expense of potential creditors of the originator should it file for bankruptcy. See id. at 1657 
n.6 (reviewing literature that suggests that securitization is detrimental to the unsecured 
creditors of the originator and that securitization can be a technique for judgment proofing). 
 109. Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1540 
(2004) (describing the process of securitization).  
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tors are repaid over time from the principal and interest payments 
made by the mortgagors (the borrowers in the underlying loan trans-
actions).110 The resulting securities may be either debt or equity secu-
rities, depending on the structure of the transaction and the per-
ceived needs of the potential investors.111 
 While an individual securitization of receivables can easily top a 
billion dollars,112 the securitization process is conceptually much the 
same as any financing or receivables purchase transaction that could 
be obtained from a bank or finance company.113 Indeed, nearly any 
type of asset with a regular stream of cash payments can be securi-
tized114—although certain assets, such as residential mortgages, have 
turned out to be particularly attractive candidates. 
 The key attraction of investing in asset-backed securities, as op-
posed to individual assets, is that it allows an investor to simultane-
ously choose a narrow type of investment that is likely to meet its in-
vestment criteria while (1) reducing due diligence costs by delegating 
a large portion of such tasks to specialized third parties such as rat-
ing agencies;115 (2) spreading interest rate, credit, and geographic- 
and sector-concentration risk116 over a number of similar assets; (3) 
reducing the likelihood of interruptions of cash flows by the systemi-
zation of cash flows from a large pool of assets; and (4) providing 
greatly improved liquidity over that of the individual assets that are 
securitized.117  
 Issuers obviously incur certain transaction costs in securitiza-
tions, such as rating agency fees and insurance premiums, that they 
would not incur by holding the mortgages in their own investment 
portfolios.118 However, securitization also allows for certain cost-
savings that frequently outweigh the additional costs; indeed, ra-
                                                                                                                     
 110. Id. 
 111. Joseph Philip Forte, Solving the Mortgage Tax Barrier to Defeasance, in 
COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION, supra note 92, at 416. 
 112. See, e.g., WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY TRUST 2004-1. 
 113. See HILSON & TURNER, supra note 96, § 2:6.1, at 2; see also 1 FRANKEL, supra note 
95, § 1.1, at 4 (arguing that a security is much like a debt, albeit one that is very liquid). 
 114. Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City 
of N.Y., Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 532 (1995).  
 115. See Ranieri, supra note 103, at 38 (“Securitization starts to break down as a con-
cept when the issuer imposes on the investor the responsibility of analyzing the underlying 
collateral.”). 
 116. See SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 1.02, at 1-7 to 1-8. For instance, by pooling 
mortgages from across the country, the pool reduces risks associated with changes in local 
economic conditions as well as risks associated with natural disasters. Id. § 1.02, at 1-8. 
 117. See id. §§ 1.01-.02 (outlining the benefits of securitization); LORE & COWAN, supra 
note 8, § 1.19 (same); see also Michael C. McGrath, Structural and Legal Issues in Securiti-
zation Transactions, in ASSET-BASED FINANCING 2004, at 609, 612-13 (describing additional 
benefits of securitization); Alan C. Hess & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Elements of Mortgage Se-
curitization, 1 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 331, 337-38 (1988) (same). 
  118. See Plank, supra note 95, at 1668-69.  
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tional issuers will only securitize receivables where they believe that 
the benefits of securitization exceed the transactional costs.119 
 The securitization of residential mortgages, in particular, is at-
tractive to loan originators because these mortgages themselves are 
not easily traded in a secondary market.120 To be attractive to inves-
tors, each mortgage would require its own extensive and expensive 
evaluation and monitoring, as each typically has its own unique 
terms and risks. These unique characteristics would make mortgages 
of limited interest on secondary markets that rely on standardization 
to reduce the transaction costs associated with conveying assets from 
one party to another.121 Since the 1970s, investors have become quite 
comfortable investing in residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS) because the standardization of mortgage terms overcame 
these problems.122 And the securitization of subprime mortgages, in 
particular, took off when RMBS were designed with characteristics 
that insulate them from the increased level of credit risk from the 
underlying subprime mortgage collateral pool.123  
B.   Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Create the Secondary 
Market 
 Mortgages have always been bought and sold by investors, but un-
til recently, the secondary market has been an informal arrange-
ment.124 The introduction of RMBS changed that: once RMBS are is-
sued, they can be easily traded on the secondary market with com-
paratively few transaction costs.125 
 The most important factor in the development of the secondary 
market has been the creation of two government-sponsored enter-
prises by the federal government: the Federal National Mortgage As-
sociation (now known as “Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan 
                                                                                                                     
 119. Id. at 1669. 
 120. See Hill, supra note 96, at 1073-74; cf. Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American 
Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary 
Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 778 (2005) (“Without a standardized 
mortgage document and uniform lending techniques, the secondary market never would 
have gotten off the ground.”). 
 121. See Hill, supra note 96, at 1074; see also Eric Bruskin et al., The Nonagency Mort-
gage Market: Background and Overview, in HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 5, 20 (“Stan-
dardization of loan programs nationwide has been a key element facilitating the develop-
ment and evolution of today’s massive MBS market.”). 
 122. LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 1.11. RMBS standardization in the 1970s was 
driven by secondary market purchasing standards set by government-sponsored enter-
prises. Carrozzo, supra note 120, at 797 (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac agreed 
that first order of business was development of standard mortgage). 
 123. See TEMKIN ET AL., supra note 49, at 9-10. 
 124. Van Order, supra note 35, at 236.  
  125. Id.  
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Mortgage Corporation (now known as “Freddie Mac”).126 Indeed, 
these two entities, along with the Government National Mortgage 
Association127 (GNMA and often referred to as “Ginnie Mae”), have 
made the U.S. secondary residential mortgage market “the envy of 
every other country,”128 one that has driven down the cost of mort-
gage credit for tens of millions of borrowers.129 While these entities 
had created a secondary market for certain loans prior to 1970, the 
broad secondary market began in earnest with the passage of the 
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (EHFA), which allowed GSEs 
to purchase and securitize conforming mortgages.130 
 In this section, I outline the growth of the secondary market in 
more general terms. In Part III.C, I take a closer look at the role of 
GSEs in the creation of the secondary market. 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Id. Fannie Mae is the oldest of the GSEs, created in the 1930s as a government-
owned secondary market for loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration. Id. At 
first it operated by issuing its debt and purchasing mortgages that it held in its portfolio. 
Id. In 1954, it was reorganized to allow private capital to replace federal funds. Lea, His-
torical Perspective, supra note 34, at 164. In 1968, it was moved off the federal budget and 
converted into a GSE. Van Order, supra note 35, at 236. In the 1970s, it switched its focus 
to conventional loans. Id. 
 Freddie Mac was formed in 1970 to create a secondary market for the S&Ls. When it 
was first created: 
  [Freddie Mac] dealt only with S&Ls, and Fannie Mae dealt with mortgage 
bankers. Now both institutions deal with the same originators. Like Fannie 
Mae, it is a private GSE and also is off-budget. It initiated the first MBS pro-
gram for conventional loans in 1971, while Fannie Mae began its conventional 
MBS program in 1981. Both GSEs’ MBS are similar to GNMA’s; for example, 
both protect investors against credit risk but not interest rate risk. . . . Both 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fund a significant (about 40 percent) share of 
their mortgages with debt . . . .  
Id. at 236-37. 
 127. Id. at 236.  
GNMA was created in 1968 to handle Fannie Mae’s policy-related tasks and to 
provide a secondary market for government-insured loans. It is on the federal 
budget as part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD).   
  GNMA was responsible for promoting the major innovation in secondary 
markets, the MBS. . . . GNMA deals only in federally insured mortgages, pri-
marily those insured by the FHA and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 
which account for 10 to 15 percent of the market.  
Id.; see PETER J. WALLISON & BERT ELY, NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISK: THE GROWTH OF 
FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 7 (2000) (noting that because Ginnie Mae can obtain funds 
for FHA and VA loan purchases at lower rates than any of its competitors (including Fan-
nie and Freddie), “it faces no competition for these products”). 
 128. Roll, supra note 103, at 29. 
 129. See Van Order, supra note 35, at 237. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have both 
been rocked by accounting scandals in the last year; as a result, there are calls on many 
fronts to modify their regulatory status. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Limits Urged in Mort-
gage Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1 (describing attempts to increase oversight 
over the two companies). 
 130. See Carrozzo, supra note 120, at 768 (describing the enactment of the EHFA). 
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 A leading commentator describes two distinct stages in the devel-
opment of securitization.131 The first stage, in the 1970s, centered on 
the use of pass-through securities, but pass-through RMBS left pre-
payment, interest rate, and residual credit exposure risks with inves-
tors.132 These risks significantly limited the pool of potential inves-
tors.133 The second stage, which began in earnest in the 1980s, cen-
tered on the division of cash flows and/or credit risk into tranches134 
that met the specific needs of different classes of investors.135 
 In the late 1970s, “the primary condition” necessary for the explo-
sion of RMBS securitization came about: “a funding shortfall.”136 That 
is, the strong desire for home ownership and the rapid escalation of 
housing prices created a demand for residential mortgages that the 
S&Ls could not meet.137 Wall Street firms responded:  
[They were] successful over time in changing tax laws to permit 
the tax-free pass-through of cash flows from home loans to mort-
gage securities, thereby avoiding double taxation, in modernizing 
the investment powers of institutional investors and in developing 
the computer technology needed to create new securities out of 
cash flows and to track the cash flows.138 
 As investors needed to evaluate the risk of RMBS default, which 
is a difficult task, specialists stepped forward to provide such ser-
vices. The privileged raters became preeminent providers of evalua-
tions of the riskiness of mortgage-backed securities.139 Thus, the de-
velopment of credit ratings by agencies such as Standard & Poor’s 
and Moody’s became key elements in the effort to increase confidence 
that investors had in such securities.140 And as investor confidence 
grew, so did the rating business.141 
                                                                                                                     
 131. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 15-16. 
 132. Id. Typically, the term “pass-through securities” refers to those securities for 
which investors are paid out of their percentage ownership share of a securitized pool’s 
cash flow. See HILSON & TURNER, supra note 96, § 2:6.2, at 2-29. 
 133. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 15. 
 134. A “tranche” is a set of securities secured by a particular pool of collateral that has 
risk, reward, and/or maturity characteristics that differ from the other tranches secured by 
the same pool. See JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBÉ, STRUCTURED FINANCE § 10:1 (2005). 
 135. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 
21,306 (Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 136. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 6. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.; see also Ranieri, supra note 103, at 34 (providing firsthand account of early 
history of securitization). 
 139. Louis H. Ederington & Jess B. Yawitz, The Bond Rating Process, in HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 23-3, 23-4 (Edward I. Altman ed., 6th ed. 1987). 
 140. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 1.11. 
 141. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 14 (“The credit rating agencies welcomed the 
emergence of ratable securities as a new product line that would increase corporate reve-
nues through new issues and subsequent rating review fees.”); Roy C. Smith & Ingo Wal-
ter, Rating Agencies: Is There an Agency Issue?, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE 
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 The impact of securitization has been so great that it is no exag-
geration to say that it is:  
one of the most important and abiding innovations to emerge in fi-
nancial markets since the 1930s. It is changing the face of American 
and world finance. A revolution has occurred in the way the borrow-
ing needs of consumers and businesses are met. The historic use of 
financial intermediaries to gather deposits and lend them to those 
seeking funds is being supplemented and even replaced by securiti-
zation processes that bypass traditional intermediaries and link 
borrowers directly to money and capital markets.142 
 During the 1970s, the primary purchasers of RMBS were Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac as well as the thrifts.143 Since the funding 
shortfall of the late 1970s, commercial banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds and mutual funds, among other investors, have be-
come large, frequent and active investors in that market.144 Invest-
ment in RMBS took off after those institutional investors entered the 
market: indeed, the RMBS market has increased by more than 500% 
from 1984 through the early 2000s.145 
 Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, non-federal-related issuers 
such as commercial banks and mortgage companies began to issue 
residential mortgage-backed securities.146 These “private label” 
RMBS are issued without the governmental or quasi-governmental 
guaranty that a federally related issuer, such as a GSE, would give, 
and they are typically backed by nonconforming loans.147 The devel-
opment, however, of private label RMBS was “hampered by credit 
risk concerns.”148 Private label securitization gained momentum dur-
ing the savings and loan crisis in the early 1980s, when Wall Street 
firms identified “a unique opportunity to profit from the thrift crisis 
by proffering the securitization exit strategy as the solution to the 
thrifts’ residential portfolio dilemma.”149 
 By the 1990s, the types of mortgage-backed securities that were 
offered in the private-label mortgage market became increasingly 
complex, moving from single-class mortgage-backed securities to 
                                                                                                                     
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 289, 291 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (“The rating 
business has grown with the process of financial disintermediation, as bank debt has been 
replaced by securities issued in one financial market after another . . . .”). 
 142. Kendall, supra note 103, at 1. 
 143. LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 1.3. 
 144. Id.; Bruskin, supra note 121, at 9 (providing the history of nonagency securitiza-
tion from late 1970s through mid-1980s). 
 145. LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, §§ 1.3, 2.23. 
 146. Forte, supra note 92, at 4-6. 
 147. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 2.23. 
 148. Forte, supra note 92, at 4-6. 
 149. Id. 
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multiclass Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO)150 and Real Es-
tate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) structures.151 Then, 
starting in the mid-1990s, a significant number of home equity lend-
ers began to securitize their loans as “AAA” MBS.152 The net result of 
this growth is that “by the end of 2002 more than [fifty-eight] percent 
of outstanding U.S. single-family residential mortgage debt was fi-
nanced through securitization.”153 
 One cannot fully understand the RMBS market without under-
standing the role of GSEs in creating, stabilizing, and growing that 
market.  So, I now turn to them. 
C.   The Ongoing Role of GSEs in the Secondary Market 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac participate in the secondary market 
in two ways: (1) by issuing and guarantying RMBS and (2) by pur-
chasing mortgages and RMBS for their own accounts.154 Indeed, they 
are monstrously large, together having $1.81 trillion in assets and 
$1.76 trillion in liabilities at the end of 2003.155 GSEs, as the domi-
nant purchasers of residential mortgages, have effectively standard-
ized prime residential mortgages by promulgating buying guide-
lines.156 Such standardization has led to increases in the liquidity and 
attractiveness of mortgages as investments to a broad array of inves-
tors.157 The GSEs themselves have seen their purchases of residential 
mortgages rise dramatically “from $69 billion in 1980 to more than 
                                                                                                                     
 150. A Collateralized Mortgage Obligation is “a pay-through bond that directs the total 
payment of principal and interest of the collateral pool to structure different types and ma-
turities of securities in order to meet investor requirements and reduce overall borrowing 
costs.” LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, § 3.12. 
 151. See id. § 2.23. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed CMOs to elect the favored tax 
status of a REMIC, and “[s]ince 1986, most new CMOs have been issued in REMIC form to 
create tax and accounting advantages for the issuers.” BOND MARKET ASS’N, AN 
INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO PASS-THROUGH AND COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE SECURITIES 3 
(2002), http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/about_mbs.pdf. 
 152. Sunil Gangwani, MBS Structuring: Concepts and Techniques, 1 SECURITIZATION 
CONDUIT 26, 35 (1998). 
 153. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 72; see LORE & COWAN, supra note 
8, § 1.2 (listing additional factors in rapid growth of mortgage securitization). 
 154. See Fannie Mae, The Industry, http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/industry/  
index.jhtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2006); Freddie Mac, Our Business, http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
corporate/about/what_we_do/business.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
 155. Carnell, supra note 7, at 578. As of that date, they also guaranteed $2.05 trillion 
in outstanding MBSs. Id. 
 156. See id.; infra note 176. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have also increased the 
safety of RMBS investments by offering credit guaranties, “which involves guaranteeing 
the credit performance of single-family and multifamily loans for a fee.” Fannie Mae, Under-
standing Fannie Mae as a Securities Issuer, http://www.fanniemae.com/mbs/understanding/ 
index.jhtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2006) (describing mortgage-backed securities). 
 157. See Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of Eco-
nomics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397, 400 
(1972) (noting that Fannie Mae created a task force to identify “substantive mortgage clauses 
which would be essential to make the [uniform form of] mortgage saleable to investors.”). 
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$700 billion in 1999.”158 By 2003, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is-
sued $1.91 trillion of RMBS, and their total outstanding RMBS 
amounted to $3.01 trillion.159 The net result of this growth is that the 
GSEs’ combined share of total bond market debt was 36% in 2003.160 
 The GSEs’ charters restrict the mortgages they may buy.161 In 
general, they must buy loans with loan-to-value ratios of 80% or 
less162 and may not buy mortgages with principal amounts greater 
than an amount set each year and fixed at $359,650 for a single-
family home for 2005.163 Loans that comply with the restrictions 
placed on Fannie and Freddie are known as “conforming” loans. 
Those that do not comply with either of these restrictions are known 
as “nonconforming” loans.164 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are now publicly traded corpora-
tions, “but they both have nebulous, implicit guarantees, a perception 
by the financial markets that the [federal] government stands behind 
their debt, which allows them to borrow (or sell [R]MBS) at interest 
rates lower than they would otherwise.”165 In return for this guaran-
tee (one not available to any other private secondary market entity) 
and certain other benefits that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
granted, they were expected to grow and stabilize the secondary 
market, and it is generally agreed that they achieved these goals.166 
They were also expected to lower the cost of credit for borrowers, al-
                                                                                                                     
 158. Van Order, supra note 35, at 236; see also Wayne Passmore et al., GSEs, Mortgage 
Rates, and the Long-Run Effects of Mortgage Securitization 1 n.2 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Work-
ing Paper No. 2001-26, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=275008 (“During the 
1990s, their yearly securitization rate is estimated to have fluctuated between 45 percent 
and 78 percent of conventional conforming mortgage originations.”). 
 159. Carnell, supra note 7, at 579. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Passmore et al., supra note 158, at 3. 
 162. Id. This limitation may be lifted if other measures are taken to limit the mort-
gage’s credit risk. Id. 
 163. Holden Lewis, CONFORMING MORTGAGE LOAN LIMITS RISE FOR 2005, BANKRATE, 
Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20041203a1.asp (stating the 
annual adjustment is based on the annual increase in the cost of the average house, as 
measured by the Federal Housing Finance Board). 
 164. Passmore et al., supra note 158, at 5 (“Most private-sector securitizations are 
backed by jumbo mortgages or mortgages held by ‘sub-prime’ borrowers, the bulk of which 
have blemished credit histories but adequate assets or income to support a mortgage.”); 
Bruskin et al., supra note 121, at 6-7 (identifying major categories of nonconforming loans 
as jumbos, B/C quality (which includes subprime and low-doc and no-doc loans)). Those 
loans that comply with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac requirements except for the restric-
tion on loan amount are typically referred to as “jumbo” mortgages. Passmore et al., supra 
note 158, at 5. 
 165. Van Order, supra note 35, at 237; see also Edward L. Toy, A Credit Intensive Ap-
proach to Analyzing Whole Loan CMOs, in HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 219, 219 (“Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac supported securities are also treated by many as having the equiva-
lent of U.S. government backing.”). 
 166. Passmore et al., supra note 158, at 3 (asserting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
“objectives have been largely achieved”). 
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though there is significant dispute as to how much they have 
achieved this goal.167 
 Over half of all residential mortgages are sold into the secondary 
market.168 Of those, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now own or securi-
tize more than 80% of the outstanding stock of single-family mort-
gages.169 The remaining 20% of the secondary market (other than the 
portion originated by Ginnie Mae) comes from the “private label” 
firms, a large component of which is composed of jumbo mortgage se-
curitizations.170 
 Private-label firms are not in a position to compete head on with 
GSEs because their cost of capital is greater.171 Because of this ad-
vantage, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can price their securities 
more attractively than private label issuers, and they therefore have 
nearly the entire “conforming” market to themselves.172 The fact that 
private-label firms cannot compete with GSEs is of key importance in 
the subprime market, because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are be-
ginning to enter it.173  
 Freddie Mac began purchasing subprime loans in 1997, and Fan-
nie Mae began in 1999.174 Both “have moved slowly and have limited 
their purchases to the most creditworthy segment of the subprime 
market with the most creditworth[iness].” They are believed to own a 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Id. at 2 (“[W]e find that GSEs generally—but not always—lower mortgage rates, 
particularly when the GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs’ implicit government 
backing allows them to sell securities without the credit enhancements needed in the pri-
vate sector.”). 
 168. Van Order, supra note 35, at 237. 
 169. See Roll, supra note 103, at 32-33 (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have supplied a 
large part of the growth in demand for mortgage debt via two distinct channels. First, their 
traditional securitization activity increased in relative importance from 1990 through 1993 
and now accounts for roughly 25% of all mortgage debt. Second, their retained portfolios of 
directly purchased whole loans and MBSs rose steadily during the past decade from about 
5% to more than 16% of total mortgage debt.”). 
 170. See Van Order, supra note 35, at 237.  
 171. Forte, supra note 92, at 4-6; see also WALLISON & ELY, supra note 127, at 1 (“The 
lower interest rates that Fannie and Freddie can command because of their government 
backing permit them to out-compete any private-sector rival and to dominate any market 
they are permitted to enter.”). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have a number of other com-
petitive advantages over other RMBS issuers. Carnell, supra note 7, at 580-83; see Pass-
more, supra note 158, at 4. 
 172. See STANDARD & POOR’S, PRICING AND PREPAYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF 
NONCONFORMING MORTGAGE POOLS 1 (2000). The nonconforming rate is usually twenty-
five to fifty basis points higher than the conforming rate. Id. 
 173. See WALLISON & ELY, supra note 127, at 8 (“In the past, the GSEs purchased al-
most exclusively conventional/conforming loans, because those are the best credits avail-
able in the middle-class market. But increasingly in recent years—as they have foreseen 
that their need for assets will outstrip the conventional/conforming market—the GSEs 
have entered the market for subprime, home equity, and multifamily housing loans.”); Van 
Order, supra note 35, at 236-37.  
 174. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 74.  
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relatively small portion of outstanding subprime securities.175 None-
theless, GSEs have had and will have an extraordinary impact on the 
subprime secondary market as they become more comfortable operat-
ing in the subprime market. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have issued buying guidelines, indicat-
ing the types of subprime loans that they are willing to purchase. Given 
their dominant role in the secondary market, their buying guidelines 
will likely affect the terms of the mortgages offered by many originators, 
so as to ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are potential buyers 
of those mortgages. What is most striking about the GSEs’ guidelines is 
that they are much more lenient than those that are found in the privi-
leged raters’ pronouncements described below.  
 The only general category of mortgages regulated by state preda-
tory lending laws that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac indicated that 
they would not purchase are “high-cost home loans.”176 As we shall 
see below, the privileged raters, which have far more power than the 
GSEs to impact the entire subprime market, took a far more conser-
vative approach to loans regulated by state predatory lending laws. 
IV.   THE ROLE OF RATING AGENCIES IN THE SECURITIZATION OF 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
 All rating agencies derive their power in the secondary market 
from the value that investors place on the informational content of 
the ratings that they provide.177 Nearly every securitization of mort-
                                                                                                                     
 175. Id. Fannie Mae “introduced a new and improved automated underwriting system 
in 1995 and began to accept higher risk loans. Subsequently, Fannie Mae began to vary 
some of the terms with the loan’s level of risk.” Wendy Edelberg, Risk-Based Pricing of In-
terest Rates in Household Loan Markets 3 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2003-62, 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=484522. 
 176. Fannie Mae, Announcement 04-06, at 3 (Sept. 28, 2004), http:// 
www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2004/fannie-04-06.pdf; Fannie Mae, Announcement 
03-12, at 1 (Nov. 21, 2003),  http://mbaa.org/resident/2003/fannie03-12.pdf; Fannie Mae, 
Announcement 03-02, at 1 (Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/ 
2003/fannie03-02.pdf; Letter from Michael C. May, Senior Vice President, Freddie Mac, 
to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers (Nov. 26, 2003), http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
sell/selbultn/112603indltr.html. Fannie also indicated that it would not purchase 
HOEPA “high-cost” home loans and loans with mandatory arbitration clauses. Fannie 
Mae, Announcement 04-06, supra, at 3-4. Freddie Mac indicated that it would not buy 
“[m]ortgages originated with single-premium credit insurance; [m]ortgages with terms 
that exceed either the Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”) or the points and fees threshold 
under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1999 (“HOEPA”); or subprime 
[m]ortgages with prepayment terms that exceed three years.” Letter from Michael May 
to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Services, supra. 
 177. Many commentators see this rating agency role as the dominant one. See Partnoy, 
supra note 33, at 633 n.62 (cataloging articles arguing that ratings have informational con-
tent). Such articles ignore or discount the obvious privileged regulatory status of the 
NRSROs as well as the consistent finance literature that argues that “credit ratings are of 
scant informational value.” Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, 
RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note 141, at 65. 
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gage-backed securities is rated by one, and often two, of the three 
dominant rating agencies.178 The rating that the agency provides “is 
an assessment of the likelihood of timely payment on securities.”179 
The function of the rating agencies is to reduce “the information 
asymmetry between issuers of securities and investors.”180 
 The three dominant rating agencies derive additional power be-
cause they are granted a privileged status by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and other financial services regulators. 
This privileged status results from the incorporation of the privileged 
raters’ ratings into government regulation of other companies. For 
their labors, the privileged raters are compensated by fees from issu-
ers of securities that solicit ratings from them.181 
 While regulators have incorporated the ratings of the privileged 
raters into their regulations, the privileged raters themselves are not 
regulated in any meaningful way. Thus, to the extent that they make 
systemic mistakes or demonstrate systemic biases, they are not ac-
countable to anyone—unless their failings are significant enough to 
threaten investor confidence in their work product. 
A.   How Rating Agencies Rate 
 The rating process is typically initiated by or on behalf of a securi-
ties issuer.182 The issuer then provides the rating agency with informa-
                                                                                                                     
 178. See Luke & Burke, supra note 95, at 221; G. Rodney Thompson & Peter Vaz, Dual 
Bond Ratings: A Test of the Certification Function of Rating Agencies, 25 FIN. REV. 457, 457 
(1990) (suggesting that typically two ratings significantly decrease the yield of a security, 
thereby increasing issuer’s return); Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, Multiple Ratings and 
Credit Standards: Differences of Opinion in the Credit Rating Industry 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank 
of N.Y., Research Paper No. 9527, 1995), available at http://www.newyork.org/research/ 
staff_reports/research_papers/9527.pdf (arguing that additional ratings “are likely to be most 
desirable when the degree of uncertainty about a firm’s prospects is large and when the 
amount of funds to be raised . . . is substantial”). 
 179. Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 6. 
 180. Id. at 10; see also Partnoy, supra note 33, at 632 (“Information asymmetry exists 
in markets where sellers have superior information to buyers about product quality, yet 
cannot costlessly convey this information to buyers. If buyers are economically rational, 
prices in a market with information asymmetry will reflect the average quality of a prod-
uct, and sellers with superior products will bear the cost of the information asymmetry. 
Consequently, sellers in such a market will have an incentive to disclose the superior na-
ture of their product so that they can receive the highest price.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 181. See GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 52; infra note 209 and accompa-
nying text. For example, the SEC relies heavily upon the services of NRSROs in Rule 3a-7, 
relating to the 1940 Investment Company Act. See Amy K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC in 
the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or Free-Market Interference?, 
20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 293, 345 (1996). Pursuant to Rule 3a-7, “a favorable rating by 
only one NRSRO of an asset-backed securities issuance exempts the transaction from the 
regulatory scheme” of that Act. Id. It is in this manner that the NRSRO rating reduces the 
transaction costs and provides other benefits to issuers of RMBS while also providing a 
benefit to the NRSRO itself because of the fees that it can charge to the issuer for the rat-
ing analysis prescribed by Rule 3a-7. 
 182. See SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 9.01, at 9-3. 
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tion regarding the issuer’s background, strategy, operations systems, 
historical performance data, and any other information that may be 
relevant.183 The issuer then typically meets with the rating agency to 
explain the proposed structure of the deal, the nature of the underly-
ing assets, and the operations of the originator of the assets.184 
 In order to evaluate the “loss potential” of nonagency mortgage 
pools (nonagency RMBS are those that are not issued by GSEs nor by 
government agencies, like Ginnie Mae, and are also referred to as 
private-label RMBS),185 rating agencies need to evaluate four key as-
pects of a securitization transaction: (1) frequency of default, (2) se-
verity of loss given default, (3) pool characteristics, and (4) credit en-
hancement and the structure of the security.186 
 In order to understand these four key aspects of the transaction, 
rating agencies conduct four types of analyses: (1) qualitative, (2) 
quantitative, (3) servicing, and (4) legal risk.187 
 Qualitative Analysis. “Qualitative analysis involves a review of 
those items that could result in a delay or failure of payment to the 
investors.”188 A primary concern here is the risk profile of the origina-
tor.189 The rating agency will also review the assets to be contributed 
into the collateral pool supporting the securities to be issued to de-
termine, among other things, the predictability of their cash flow.190 
For real property transactions,  
rating agencies review a host of issues relating to the underlying 
property including, for example, the location and accessibility of 
the property, the diversity and number of tenants of the property, 
local and regional vacancy rates and rents, the property’s physical 
condition, the property’s management, the terms of the leases of 
the property’s tenants, the credit ratings of the property’s principal 
                                                                                                                     
 183. Id. at 9-4. 
 184. Id. at 9-3. While RMBS issuers typically solicit a rating, it is also standard prac-
tice for Moody’s and S&P to rate a security even where an issuer has not solicited (and 
paid for) a rating. Such ratings are based solely on public information. Alexander W. But-
ler & Kimberly J. Rodgers, Relationship Rating: How Do Bond Rating Agencies Process In-
formation? 1 (EFA 2003 Annual Conference, Paper No. 491, 2003), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=345860 (reviewing Moody’s unsolicited ratings practices). 
 185. Lea, Sources of Funds, supra note 34, at 143. 
 186. Douglas L. Bendt et al., The Rating Agencies’ Approach, in HANDBOOK, supra note 
15, at 191, 192; see Plank, supra note 95, at 1667 n.42 (“For example, if securities backed 
by a pool of receivables need loss coverage or credit enhancement equal to seven percent of 
the original principal balance of the receivables to achieve the desired rating, this loss cov-
erage could be in the form of additional collateral: An issuance of $100 million of debt secu-
rities backed by a pool of $107 million receivables . . . .”). 
 187. SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 9.01, at 9-5.  
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 9-6. 
 190. Id.  
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tenants, the strength of the local economy, and possible hazards 
(such as earthquakes), among other things.191 
 Quantitative Analysis. Quantitative analysis involves a review of 
the cash flow aspects of the transaction.192 This quantitative analysis 
is a key part of valuating the collateral and determining the credit 
enhancement levels; it also is key to determining “the sizing of the 
principal amount of the securities to be issued” and determining 
whether the issued securities will be able to make timely payment of 
the rated securities.193 
 Underwriting Criteria and Servicer Characteristics. Rating agen-
cies review the originators’ underwriting criteria as well as the capa-
bilities of the servicers of the loans that are placed within the pool.194 
Rating agencies will review individual loans to ensure that they 
comply with the originators’ stated underwriting criteria.195 The rat-
ing agency will independently review the servicer when the origina-
tor is not acting as servicer; this is undertaken to evaluate the risk of 
delays in payments due to operational problems of the servicer or its 
own credit problems.196 
 Legal Analysis. Legal analysis involves a review of the legal risks 
associated with the proposed transaction.197 These legal risks, also 
called “litigation risks,” include the risk that RMBS investors will be 
liable for violations of predatory lending laws by the originators of 
the mortgages in any given RMBS pool.198 Other legal risks evaluated 
by the rating agencies include the following: 
                                                                                                                     
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.; see also GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 470 (“Accounting for the 
potential variability of collateral losses is important in the structured finance rating proc-
ess because more variable pool losses, with constant expected pool losses, generally implies 
higher expected losses for investors.”). 
 194. SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 9.01, at 9-11; Schorin et al., supra note 79, at 83 
(“Loan servicers who have extensive experience with A borrowers have found that their 
expertise in that arena does not necessarily, or even generally, carry over into the B and C 
sector. The cost of servicing B and C loans could easily double that of servicing A loans.”).  
 195. SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 9.01, at 9-11. 
 196. Id.; Bruskin et al., supra note 121, at 29 (“Many of the servicer’s functions are 
critical to the credit quality of a transaction. In addition to collecting the monthly pay-
ments and passing the cash flows to the trustee, the servicer handles delinquent loans, ini-
tiates foreclosure procedures, and liquidates properties when necessary.”). 
 197. SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 9.01, at 9-10. 
 198. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 723 (“Litigation risk is the possi-
bility that borrowers will bring predatory lending claims or, when charged with nonpayment, 
raise predatory lending defenses against the trusts that own their loans.”); LORE & COWAN, 
supra note 8, § 9.6 (“Another legal consideration that can be expected to affect the rating of a 
mortgage-backed security relates to what legal remedies and procedural rules are available to 
the issuer under state and local laws to enforce mortgage loan covenants, particularly upon 
default in payment of principal and interest of the mortgages. Usury statutes may operate to 
limit enforcement of interest rate provisions of mortgage loans in default; foreclosure laws 
(such as homestead laws and statutory rights of redemption) and local procedural rules may 
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(1) the effects of a bankruptcy of the issuer on the 
structure and cash flows,199 
(2) the regulatory issues of the issuer/industry, 
(3) the legal structure of the sale (that is, true sale or a 
loan), 
(4) the requirements necessary for a perfection of secu-
rity interests, 
(5) contractual restrictions (such as negative pledge 
covenants), and  
(6) the tax implications on the Special Purpose Entity 
and investors.200 
 This Article focuses on the legal risk that investors in an RMBS 
pool will be held liable for violations of predatory lending laws by the 
originators of the mortgages in any given pool. 
B.   The Dominant Rating Agencies Enjoy Privileged Regulatory     
Status as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
 For the purposes of this Article, the term “privileged regulatory 
status” refers to the role of the privileged raters as gatekeepers to 
other private financial entities which are attempting to access the fi-
nancial markets.201 This status results from the favorable treatment 
                                                                                                                     
prevent the holder from obtaining title to property securing defaulted mortgage loans in a 
timely manner; and anti-deficiency laws effectively may preclude the possibility of timely re-
sale of foreclosed property by the issuer. Additional protection may be required to achieve a 
desired securities rating, depending upon the terms of the collateral instruments and the ju-
risdictions where the mortgaged properties are located.”). 
 199. Historically, “[t]he main legal and regulatory considerations in structured financ-
ings are concerned with the potential insolvency of the issuer or other participants in the 
transaction.” GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 497. 
 200. See David W. Forti & Blasé B. Iaconelli, Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities 
and the Rating Agency Process, in SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES § 
19.05 (Patrick D. Dolan & C. VanLeer Davis III eds., 2005). 
 201. Richard Cantor, Moody’s Investors Service Response to the Consultative Paper Is-
sued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision “A New Capital Adequacy Framework,” 
25 J. BANKING & FIN. 171, 179 (2001) (“By using ratings as a tool of regulation, regulators 
fundamentally change the nature of the rating agency product. Issuers pay rating fees, not 
to facilitate access to the capital market, but to purchase a privileged status for their secu-
rities from the regulator. As a result, licensed rating agencies will have a product to sell 
regardless of the analytic quality of their ratings and their credibility with the investor 
community.”); Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 2 (“To a large extent, the almost universal de-
mand by investors for ratings makes rating agencies gatekeepers of the types of securities 
that investors will buy. . . . This unprecedented power, combined with their de facto control  
over international debt markets, makes the issue of whether rating agencies should re-
main unregulated more urgent.” (footnotes omitted)); see Paul Robbe & Ronald Mahieu, 
Are the Standards Too Poor?: An Empirical Analysis of the Timeliness and Predictability 
of Credit Rating Changes 1 (Jan. 31, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=648561 (“In the United States, banks and other financial institu-
tions have only been allowed to hold bonds of investment grade quality (i.e., bonds that are 
rated BBB- or better) ever since 1936. As a consequence, having a credit rating has become 
a necessity in order to acquire external debt capital.”). 
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that government regulators grant to securities issued by private 
companies and other entities that are highly rated by the privileged 
raters. This privileged regulatory status is granted by various gov-
ernment bodies in exchange for the quasi-public responsibilities the 
privileged raters take on by providing ratings to the investment 
community but is not paired with any commensurate monitoring of 
the privileged raters themselves. Thus, the privileged raters them-
selves are privileged because regulators have incorporated the ser-
vice (ratings) that they sell into the regulatory structure of the capi-
tal markets. In addition, the investment-grade ratings that the privi-
leged raters issue are themselves equivalent to a “regulatory license” 
that confers a significant financial benefit on its recipient. 202 
 Rating agencies have been actively rating securities in the United 
States since the beginning of the twentieth century.203 The main 
source of the privileged regulatory status of the privileged raters, 
that select subset of rating agencies, derives from the SEC, which 
had granted them (or their predecessors-in-interest) nationally rec-
ognized statistical rating organization status (an NRSRO) in 1975.204 
NRSRO status initially referred to those rating agencies whose rat-
ings could be used in implementing the net capital requirements for 
broker-dealers, the first instance of a high rating by a rating agency 
resulting in favorable regulatory treatment.205 At that time, the SEC 
essentially grandfathered three rating agencies: Fitch, Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s.206  
 Currently, a credit rating agency must request a no-action letter 
(the means by which the SEC makes a case-by-case regulatory de-
termination) from the SEC before that agency attains NRSRO status, 
presumably until that agency ceases to exist.207 While six such no-
action letters have been granted by the SEC since 1975, only five 
NRSROs remain due to consolidation: A.M. Best Company, Inc. 
(“A.M. Best”), Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited (DBRS), Fitch, 
Inc. (“Fitch”), Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”), and the 
Standard & Poor’s Division of the McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. 
                                                                                                                     
 202. Frank Partnoy uses the term “regulatory license” to describe “the valuable prop-
erty rights associated with the ability of a private entity, rather than the regulator, to de-
termine the substantive effect of legal rules.” Partnoy, supra note 33, at 623. 
 203. See Rhodes, supra note 181, at 300-02 (discussing the growth of rating agencies in 
the United States).  
 204. Hill, supra note 33, at 44; see Rhodes, supra note 181, at 321-22; see also 
Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 5 (“Rule 3a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 exempts 
certain financings from registration and compliance with that Act if, among other re-
quirements, the securities are rated ‘investment grade’ by at least one NRSRO.”). 
 205. Rhodes, supra note 181, at 321.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 
21,306, 21,307-08 (Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
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(“Standard & Poor’s”).208 The first two are very small and have only a 
tiny impact on the RMBS market.209 
 The SEC did not define an NRSRO in 1975 and has intermittently 
attempted to do so since then.210 The lead-up to the current rule pro-
posal to define the term NRSRO began when the SEC issued its “1994 
Concept Release” requesting comments on the Commission’s use of 
NRSRO ratings.211 The 1994 Concept Release was followed by a “1997 
Rule Proposal” to define the term NRSRO.212 The proposal would have 
established a formal application process for recognizing NRSROs in 
lieu of the no-action letter process.213 The 1997 Rule Proposal contin-
ued the reliance on market-based acceptance of a rating agency 
through a criteria requiring national recognition “by the predominant 
users of securities ratings.”214 However, the SEC did not act upon the 
proposal, and by 2002 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
launched investigations into the Enron collapse that questioned why 
the NRSROs had “continued to rate Enron a good credit risk until 
[only] four days before the firm declared bankruptcy.”215  
 Additionally, in November 2002 the SEC conducted public hear-
ings on the use of credit rating agencies in the U.S. securities mar-
                                                                                                                     
 208. Id.; see also Letter from Kent Wideman, Group Managing Dir., Dominion Bond 
Rating Ser. Ltd., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 1 (June 10, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/s70405/dbrs061005.pdf; Letter from Larry G. Mayewski, Executive Vice 
President & Chief Rating Officer, A.M. Best Comp., Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 
1-2 (June 9, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ s70405/ambestco060905.pdf.  
 209. Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited was recently granted NRSRO status on Feb-
ruary 23, 2003. See Letter from Kent Wideman to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 208, at 1.  
A.M. Best specializes in ratings of insurance-related organizations. See A.M. Best Company, 
Best’s Ratings and Analysis, http://www3.ambest.com/ratings/default.asp (last visited Mar. 
10, 2006). The Egan-Jones Ratings Company has been the most forceful of the currently non-
NRSRO rating agencies in pressing the SEC to grant it NRSRO status, but it has not pre-
vailed as of yet. See Letter from Sean J. Egan & W. Bruce Jones to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, 
SEC 3 (Nov. 10, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm. 
 210. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 
21,306, 21,307. 
 211. Id. at 21,308 (discussing the recent attempts to define the term NRSRO and the proc-
ess by which credit rating agencies are designated NRSROs); see also SEC, REPORT ON THE 
ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES 
MARKETS 10-25 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf [hereinafter 
SEC, REPORT] (describing the use of NRSRO ratings in government regulations and legislation). 
 212. Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers, Exchange Act, Release No. 34-39457, 
62 Fed. Reg. 68,018 (proposed Dec. 30, 1997); see also SEC, REPORT, supra note 211, at 12-15.  
 213. See SEC, REPORT, supra note 211, at 13.  
 214. See id. Other criteria included organizational structure, adequate staffing, financial 
resources, use of systematic procedures to ensure credible and accurate ratings, contacts with 
the management of issuers, and internal procedures to prevent misuse of nonpublic informa-
tion. Id. The rule asked for comments on prohibition of charging issuers fees based upon the 
size of a transaction, whether a time period should be required for action on an application for 
an NRSRO designation, whether NRSROs should make their ratings publicly available, 
whether objective criteria should be used for NRSRO recognition, and whether statistical 
models could serve as substitutes for NRSRO credit ratings. Id. at 13-15.  
 215. Id. at 16. 
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kets.216 Furthermore, in January of 2003 the SEC submitted a report 
required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the role and function 
of rating agencies that addressed the outstanding issues from the 
1997 Rule Proposal and the 2002 hearings.217 In June, the SEC is-
sued the 2003 Concept Release “seeking comment on a number of is-
sues relating to credit rating agencies.”218 Among many other issues, 
most commenters supported the concept of regulatory oversight of 
NRSROs to determine whether an agency continues to meet the 
NRSRO criteria on an ongoing basis.219 Internationally, in December 
2004, the Technical Committee of the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a “Code of Conduct Fun-
damentals for Credit Rating Agencies” that provided a voluntary 
code of conduct for rating agencies that addressed how to manage or 
eliminate conflicts of interest, help prevent misuse of nonpublic in-
formation, and protect agency analytical independence.220 
 In 2005, the SEC has again released a rule proposal to define 
NRSRO.221 In the proposed new definition, the Commission stated  
“An entity that meets the proposed definition would be an NRSRO,” 
clearly describing a self-designating process, absent affirmative 
Commission action.222 The Commission’s proposal also notes that its  
staff will be available to provide no-action letters as appropriate to 
rating agencies that choose to seek them.223 
 Public response regarding a renewal process for NRSRO no-action 
letters has varied as to whether requiring a renewal of NRSRO 
status is a positive development. Unsurprisingly, Standard & Poor’s 
found a renewal requirement for existing NRSROs to be an addi-
tional, unneeded cost because of a potential agreement between ex-
                                                                                                                     
 216. Id. at 18. Topics addressed included (1) the current role and functioning of rating 
agencies, (2) informational flow in the rating process, (3) concerns regarding potential con-
flicts of interests or abusive practices, and (4) the regulatory treatment of rating agencies, 
including concerns regarding barriers to entry. Id. at 21-25. 
 217. Id. at 3-4. 
 218. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 
21,306, 21,309 (Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 219. Id. at 21,309-10. 
 220. Id. at 21,310; see TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC., CODE OF CONDUCT 
FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2004), http://www.bafin.de/internationales/ 
iosco/cc_0410.pdf. 
 221. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 
21,306. 
 222. Id. at 21,318; see also Letter from Charles S. Morrison, Money Mkt. Group Leader, 
Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC (June 23, 2005),  
http://www.sec.gov/ rules/proposed/s70405/s70405-8.pdf; Letter from Amy B.R. Lancellotta, 
Senior Counsel, Inv. Co. Inst., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 2-3 (June 9, 2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/ici060905.pdf.  
 223. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed. Reg. 
21,306, 21,318. In addition, due to the possibility of “changing market conditions,” the SEC 
proposal calls for the staff to include “expiration dates” in NRSRO no-action letters that it 
issues. Id. at 21,319. 
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isting NRSROs and the Commission to require a detailed compliance 
report on an ongoing basis.224  
 On the other hand, the Investment Company Institute agrees that 
no-action letters should only be granted for a specified period of time, 
after which a renewal process or otherwise reconsideration of the 
agency should be required in order to ensure the NRSRO still satis-
fies the criteria necessary for such status.225 The Association for Fi-
nancial Professionals also supports expiration dates on no-action let-
ters through periodic reviews to ensure that NRSROs continue to 
meet the initial recognition criteria no less than every five years.226 
The Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals 
supports an annual affirmation by the NRSRO that it continues to 
meet the definitional requirements.227 
 The fact that the pool of NRSROs was capped is of great signifi-
cance because in order to be sold, residential mortgage-backed secu-
rities must have a rating from one or more of them.228 This is because 
financial institutions that purchase asset-backed securities require 
the rating “to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, investment 
guidelines, covenant restrictions [and/]or internal policies.”229 Indeed, 
“[a]s a practical matter, securitizations cannot be completed without 
rating agency approval.”230 
 Since the SEC anointed the chosen NRSROs in 1975, federal and 
state financial regulators have “found that ratings may serve a vari-
ety of uses.”231 The current regulatory environment “requires or en-
courages various entities—broker-dealers, banks, money-market 
funds, insurance companies, trust companies, pension funds, and 
                                                                                                                     
 224. See Letter from Kathleen A. Corbet, President, Standard & Poor’s, to Jona-
than G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 13 (June 9, 2005),  http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/ 
standardpoors060905.pdf. No additional information regarding this “framework” is avail-
able. The Dominion Bond Rating Service states that the NRSRO designation “should re-
main in effect unless and until it is withdrawn for cause.” Letter from Kent Wideman to 
Jonathan Katz, supra note 208, at 9 (emphasis added). 
 225. Letter from Amy Lancellotta to Jonathan Katz, supra note 222, at 2-3. 
 226. Letter from James A. Kaitz, President & CEO, Ass’n for Fin. Prof., to Jonathan G. 
Katz, Sec’y, SEC 6 (June 7, 2005),  http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/afp060705.pdf. 
 227. Letter from Sec. Law Comm., Soc’y of Corp. Sec’ys and Governance Prof., to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 3 (June 2, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s70405/slcscsgp060205.pdf.  
 228. See Luke & Burke, supra note 95, at 221. 
 229. Id.; see Partnoy, supra note 33, at 690 (“[C]redit ratings have been incorporated 
into hundreds of rules, releases, and regulations, in various substantive areas, including 
securities, pension, banking, real estate, and insurance regulation.”); Rhodes, supra note 
181, at 314 n.116 (cataloging statutory and regulatory references to ratings). 
 230. Luke & Burke, supra note 95, at 221; see Kendall, supra note 103, at 4 (“Since 
most securitized assets are sold with double-A or triple-A ratings from a national credit-
rating agency, the rating agencies are involved in the securitization process.”). 
 231. GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 59; see Partnoy, supra note 33, at 690-
703 (listing eight places in the U.S.C. and references 60 places in the C.F.R. where NRSRO 
status is referenced). 
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many others—to purchase financial instruments rated investment 
grade” by an NRSRO.232 While the NRSROs thereby bestow signifi-
cant regulatory benefits upon issuers of securities, they themselves 
“are not subject to substantive monitoring.”233 The privileged raters 
have been described as operating a “regulation-induced oligopoly.”234 
The privileged raters have been criticized for a range of wrongs that 
relate both to their function as providers of information and to their 
privileged regulatory status. Many of these criticisms appear war-
ranted, although it is unclear how they can be resolved. 
 The most vehement criticism is that the privileged raters do not 
provide accurate and valuable information to the markets. The most 
commonly cited evidence of this is that the privileged raters often 
disagree in their ratings.235 One rating agency critic has noted that it 
is unclear “what kind of information rating agencies intend to sum-
marize” and whether ratings “efficiently aggregate this informa-
tion.”236 At a minimum, the financial markets perceive Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s “as conservative, and comparably so, in their rat-
ings practices. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that the two 
have become more conservative over the years.” 237 
 One leading rating agency scholar argues that the privileged rat-
ers have survived not: 
because they produce credible and accurate information. They 
have not maintained good reputations based on the informational 
content of their credit ratings. Instead, the credit rating agencies 
have thrived, profited, and become exceedingly powerful because 
they have begun selling regulatory licenses, [that is], the right to 
be in compliance with regulation. Credit ratings therefore are an 
excellent example of how not to privatize a regulatory function. 
                                                                                                                     
 232. Hill, supra note 33, at 44; see Partnoy, supra note 33, at 692 n.349 (charting his-
tory of increasing use of ratings in legislation and regulation). 
 233. Hill, supra note 33, at 44. 
 234. Butler & Rodgers, supra note 184, at 16; see William H. Beaver et al., Differential 
Properties in the Ratings of Certified vs. Non-Certified Bond Rating Agencies 8 (Sept. 
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596626 (“Moody’s is 
protected from most competition and is practically guaranteed business by virtue of legal 
requirements for all public bond issuances to be rated by an NRSRO.”). 
 235. See, e.g., Larry G. Perry, The Effect of Bond Rating Agencies on Bond Rating Mod-
els, 8 J. FIN. RES. 307, 313 (1985) (noting that S&P and Moody’s disagree fifty-eight per-
cent of the time).  
 236. Gunter Löffler, An Anatomy of Rating Through the Cycle, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 
695, 695-96 (2004) (“[T]here is plenty of academic and anecdotal evidence which suggests 
that agency ratings do not fully reflect available information.”); Perry, supra note 235, at 
307 (“One of the problems associated with predicting bond ratings is that the rating ser-
vices often disagree when assigning ratings. Since the rating is a reflection of the risk, 
which affects price, rating errors can affect investors and the issuing firms.”).  
 237. Hill, supra note 33, at 44; see also Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 22 (“[T]he rating 
agency system, as presently constituted, is conservatively biased against innovation.”). 
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Those who advocate privatizing other regulatory functions should 
heed this warning.238 
C.   Ratings by the Privileged Raters Are Biased Against the       
Public Interest 
 Privileged raters claim to sell their independent judgment.  In the 
words of a senior Moody’s employee, “it is widely recognised that a 
rating agency and its analysts should be independent–not subject to 
influence by interested market forces, such as financial intermediar-
ies, governments, or issuers themselves.”239 But it appears that 
NRSRO ratings are subject to biases that are not consistent with the 
public interest. This is borne out both by empirical research as well 
as by admissions of NRSRO employees. 
 A recent study (the “Beaver Study”) has demonstrated that 
Moody’s approach to ratings is (and has suggested that all NRSRO 
ratings are) conservative when compared to that of the Egan-Jones 
Ratings Company, a credible non-NRSRO rating company.240 The 
Beaver Study argues that there is an incentive for privileged raters 
to “be more conservative because there is greater cost to losses due to 
overvalued assets than foregone gains because of undervaluation” 
and that this incentive results from their quasi-regulatory role.241 For 
the purposes of the Beaver Study, this means that NRSRO ratings 
are “more stable to minimize unnecessary consequences.”242  
 While the conservatism found in the Beaver Study was related to 
the timing and frequency of rating changes by Moody’s, the Beaver 
Study offers evidence that privileged raters are quasi regulators 
mindful of the impact their gatekeeping function has on the capital 
                                                                                                                     
 238. Partnoy, supra note 33, at 711; see Dieter Kerwer, Standardising as Governance: 
The Case of Credit Rating Agencies 3 (MPI Collective Goods, Preprint No. 2001/3, 2001), 
available at http://ssrn.com/absract=269311 (“[D]espite the fact that rating agencies have 
become increasingly influential in global financial markets, it is very hard to hold them ac-
countable for their action: rating agencies almost never have to justify their decisions, let 
alone provide compensation to others for the adverse consequences of their mistakes.”). 
 239. GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 52. 
 240. Beaver, supra note 234, at 5. In particular, the Beaver Study found that Egan-
Jones provided more timely and accurate information when changing ratings. Id.; see also 
Robbe & Mahieu, supra note 201, at 28 (finding that ratings are accurate but not timely). 
 241. Beaver, supra note 234, at 2. The Beaver Study compared the performance of 
NRSROs with another reputable non-NRSRO rating agency, Egan-Jones Rating Company, 
and found that Egan-Jones provided more timely and accurate information when changing 
ratings. Id. The study could not conclude that the difference is attributable to a conflict of 
interest by the privileged raters. It attributed the difference to the privileged raters’ con-
servative approach to ratings changes. Id. at 3-4. In contrast to the privileged raters, Egan-
Jones charges investors, rather than issuers, for its services. Thus, it has an incentive to 
provide investors with timely information. Regardless of whether the NRSROs’ bias is con-
sciously attributable to their issuer-paid fee business model, the ratings are inaccurate 
consistent with their clients’ best interest and not those of investors. 
 242. Id. at 2. This contrasts with the Egan-Jones ratings which are generally more 
timely and more responsive to new information. Id. at 3.  
2006]                         SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION 1023 
 
markets.  In addition, the privileged raters take that impact into ac-
count, demonstrably more so than Egan-Jones, when setting their 
ratings policy. In other words, they are not merely providers of inde-
pendent information but are also quasi regulators subject to institu-
tional pressures.243  
 In addition to this empirically demonstrated bias, the privileged 
raters often describe themselves as “advocate[s]” for investors.244 In-
deed, Standard & Poor’s has made this point explicitly in the context 
of antipredatory lending laws: “Absent clarity on these issues, in or-
der to best protect investors in rated securities, Standard & Poor’s 
may adopt a conservative interpretation of an antipredatory lending 
law and may, in instances where liability is not clearly limited, ex-
clude mortgage loans from transactions it rates.”245 
 While it is unclear the extent to which privileged rater biases im-
pact their predatory lending law guidelines, it is clear that their rat-
ings policies are not the independent Delphic pronouncements that 
they represent them to be. And their treatment of state predatory 
lending laws, particularly when contrasted with that of the GSEs, 
shows how the privileged raters benefit investors at the expense of 
subprime borrowers. This offers a case study of how the public inter-
est suffers from the biases of the privileged raters. 
 As discussed in Part VI.C below, the privileged raters, whether 
driven by bias or merely by their own mandate to protect investors 
first and foremost, have come to control a veto over state legislators 
who are attempting to stop predatory lending in their jurisdictions. 
This veto by unelected, unaccountable, profit-driven corporations is 
highly disturbing, to say the least. 
V.   PRIVILEGED RATERS GUT STRONG STATE PREDATORY LENDING 
LEGISLATION 
 In 2004, New Jersey felt compelled to amend one of its premier 
consumer protection laws, the Home Ownership Security Act, even 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Egan-Jones argues that one such form of institutional pressure results from the 
compensation structure that privileged raters have developed: “If rating firms are depend-
ent on issuers for support, they will bow to the wishes of those issuers . . . .” Letter from 
Egan-Jones Ratings Comp. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 1 (May 26, 2005),  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/eganjones052605.pdf. While there is no empiri-
cal evidence that the privileged raters have succumbed to such pressure in the develop-
ment of their predatory lending legislation guidelines, it is also unquestionably true that 
the interests of the privileged raters and issuers of RMBS both benefit from less state 
regulation and from a strong holder in due course doctrine. 
 244. See SECURITIZATION, supra note 36, § 9.01, at 9-3.  
 245. Promoting Home Ownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the Subprime Mortgage 
Market: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit and the Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fi-
nancial Services, 108th Cong. 14 (2004) (statement of Frank Raiter, Managing Director, 
Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services) (emphasis added). 
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though it was enacted with broad partisan support only one year 
prior.246 The New Jersey law was designed to control a small number 
of unscrupulous brokers and lenders that originate predatory 
loans.247 That same year, Georgia found itself doing the same thing—
amending its own antipredatory lending law, the Fair Lending Act, 
that it had enacted mere months before.248  
 These changes are cause for great concern as they were driven in 
large part by the privileged raters which had decided, in effect, that 
the laws had to change. And change they did. The privileged raters, 
which promote themselves as no more than information-analyzing 
handmaidens to the invisible hand of the market, have taken it upon 
themselves to prevent states from regulating in their traditional 
spheres of authority: mortgage and consumer protection laws.249 As a 
result of these actions by the privileged raters, the judgment about 
the suitability of such laws is becoming less and less the domain of 
the duly elected representatives of state citizens; rather, it has 
shifted into the domain of financial services firms that are advocates 
for investors, not the public. 
 Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch each have their own ap-
proach to rating RMBS pools, but they all pay particular attention to 
the impact of predatory lending statutes on such pools. All of the 
privileged raters review such statutes in order to determine whether 
they are (1) ambiguous, (2) allow for assignee liability,250 and (3) al-
low for unquantifiable damages.251 
 While the privileged raters differ in their approaches to assessing 
the risk in the RMBS market, they eventually arrived at similar con-
clusions regarding antipredatory lending laws. The privileged raters 
rate RMBS transactions by categorizing each state statute based 
upon the nature and degree of the assignee liability and damages 
provisions of its antipredatory lending law. Based on those evalua-
tions, the privileged raters decide whether the transaction can be 
rated and, if it can be rated, how much credit enhancement is neces-
sary to achieve the desired rating. In states where there is both as-
signee liability and unquantifiable damages, some of the privileged 
raters have refused to rate transactions containing mortgage loans 
from such jurisdictions.252 Moreover, they have determined that the 
                                                                                                                     
 246. See infra Part V.F. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See infra Part V.D. 
 249. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 723 n.12 (“The ratings agencies 
have interposed themselves as the ultimate arbiters of these laws by refusing to rate sub-
prime RMBS in jurisdictions whose assignee liability provisions they deemed too harsh.”). 
 250. That is, the law allows for liability for a wrong perpetrated by the originator of a 
note to attach to an assignee of the note. 
 251. See infra Parts V.B, V.D-F.  
 252. See infra Parts V.D-F. 
2006]                         SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION 1025 
 
legal risks in certain states (as well as in certain municipalities that 
have enacted antipredatory lending legislation) require that RMBS 
transactions either bar loans originating from such jurisdictions, or if 
a pool does contain loans from such jurisdictions, the privileged rat-
ers implement expensive credit enhancements to achieve the ratings 
desired by the securitizers of such pools.253 That is, these actions can 
effectively shut down the entire mortgage market of a state that 
passes strong predatory lending legislation. 
 A result of the privileged raters’ analysis has been that they 
have pushed states to standardize their predatory lending laws. 
This standardization benefits secondary market players because it 
reduces their risks and tends to increase the size of the RMBS mar-
ket by reducing transaction costs. However, unlike the standardiza-
tion that took place in the prime market in the 1970s, this stan-
dardization is not implemented with the needs of homeowners in 
mind. The evidence of this is clear from the discussion that follows 
in this Part regarding the Georgia and New Jersey predatory lend-
ing laws. It is also clear that key players in the more than twenty 
other states that passed predatory lending legislation watched the 
interplay between the privileged raters and these two state gov-
ernments254 and modified their own bills to comply with the stan-
dardization that the privileged raters imposed in those two cases. 
A.   The Home Ownership Equity Protection Act Provides Limited 
Protection 
 In addition to state predatory lending laws, there have been many 
attempts to respond to the explosion of predatory lending. State at-
torneys general have initiated lawsuits,255 regulators have taken 
                                                                                                                     
 253. See infra Part V.F. 
 254. See, e.g., Diane Velasco, Others Have Tried Something Similar, ALBUQUERQUE J., 
Jan. 26, 2004, at 9 (noting that a spokesman for ACORN, which was instrumental in drafting 
New Mexico’s predatory lending legislation, stated that “[d]uring the last (legislative) session, 
we made sure that the [secondary market’s] problems with the Georgia law were not dupli-
cated in the New Mexico law so we wouldn’t have the same difficulties”); see also Jack 
Milligan, Learning the Hard Way, MORTGAGE BANKING, Sept. 2004, at 26, 32 (“There are 
three important lessons that can be learned from the Georgia experience, and states that 
have yet to pass their own predatory lending law would do well to pay heed.”). For a thorough 
review of the legislation in those other states, see Azmy, supra note 5, at 361-78. See also 
Giang Ho & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Impact of Local Predatory Lending Laws (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2005-049A, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=761106 (quantifying differences among predatory lending laws).  
 255. In one such settlement, coordinated by over a dozen state attorneys general, House-
hold International and its affiliates, all major mortgage lenders, agreed to pay tens of thou-
sands of borrowers up to $484 million. Michael Slackman, Borrowers to Share Mortgage Set-
tlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at B4, available at 2003 WLNR 5651215. 
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administrative action,256 and Congress has passed new laws.257 These 
efforts have had varying success, with the holder in due course258 doc-
trine frequently standing in the way of remedies for predatory lend-
ing’s victims. This is because the holder in due course doctrine pro-
tects the ultimate funders of predatory practices, secondary market 
investors who purchase mortgage notes.259 The holder in due course 
doctrine immunizes them, as good faith purchasers, from liability for 
any fraud perpetrated by the originator of a loan.260 The net result of 
the application of the doctrine is that a borrower who has been the 
victim of a fraud not only cannot be compensated for the harm 
caused by the fraud, but even more, cannot assert the existence of 
the fraud as a defense against payment on the mortgage note.261 
 Federal law does not provide much by way of protection for home-
owners seeking to secure a mortgage. The federal Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA), originally enacted in 1968, requires certain important 
disclosures to a borrower by a lender in connection with the origina-
tion of a home loan.262 TILA, however, has not been successful in 
stemming the tide of predatory lending practices.263 The Home Own-
ership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), an amendment to TILA, 
enacted in 1994, went beyond disclosure requirements and placed di-
rect limits on certain practices if made in connection with “high cost 
loans.”264 HOEPA’s protections are triggered by either a (1) “rate 
trigger” or an “APR trigger,” where the annual percentage rate (APR) 
of the loan exceeds by 8% the yield on Treasury securities of compa-
rable maturity265 for first lien loans (or above 10% for subordinate 
lien loans), or (2) a “fee-trigger,” where the total of the loan’s points 
and fees exceeds 8% of the loan total or $400 (adjusted for inflation), 
whichever is greater.266 HOEPA prohibits the inclusion of certain 
loan terms in high-cost loans that are considered abusive: negative 
                                                                                                                     
 256. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 23-24 (listing major regulatory en-
forcement actions). 
 257. See infra pp. 1027-28. 
 258. The holder in due course doctrine has been codified in section 3-302 of the U.C.C. 
U.C.C. § 3-302 (2005). Article 3 has been adopted, albeit with some variations, in all fifty 
states as well as the District of Columbia. Gregory E. Maggs, Determining the Rights and 
Liabilities of the Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument, 36 B.C. L. REV. 619, 626 (1995). 
 259. Eggert, Predatory Lending, supra note 32, at 571 (describing the link between se-
curitization in subprime market and predatory lending). 
 260. See generally id. at 607-40 (discussing impact of holder in due course doctrine on 
the subprime market).  
 261. See id. at 612-14.  
 262. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2000). 
 263. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: 
The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 898 (2003). 
 264. 15 U.S.C. § 1639. 
 265. That is, if a loan had a fifteen-year term, the relevant comparable Treasury would 
be one with a fifteen-year term as well. 
 266. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1), (3); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii) (2006). 
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amortization;267 balloon payments where a loan has a term of less 
than five years;268 increases in the interest rate in the event of a de-
fault;269 and, in certain cases, prepayment penalties.270 Moreover, a 
lender originating a HOEPA loan cannot engage in a pattern and 
practice of asset-based lending, that is, lending without regard to a 
borrower’s ability to pay.271 The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation 
Z, which implements HOEPA, also places limits on loan flipping: 
lenders and their affiliates cannot refinance a HOEPA loan within a 
year unless the refinance is “in the borrower’s interest.”272  
 HOEPA has not materially reduced predatory lending because of 
two major shortcomings. First, it does not apply to purchase money 
mortgages (those used to purchase homes) or open-end lines of credit 
(such as home equity lines of credit).273 Second, it only covers a small 
portion of the mortgage market because its triggers are set very 
high.274 Thus, many states have enacted predatory lending laws to 
                                                                                                                     
 267. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2). “Negative amortization” refers to 
loans for which the principal amount of the loan increases (rather than decreases, as with 
the typical loan) over the term of the loan. See JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 
57, at 91. 
 268. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3), (d)(1). For loan terms that exceed five 
years, balloon payments are permissible, but must be disclosed. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3). 
 269. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(4).  
 270. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(1)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(6). 
 271. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h). HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit “based on the 
consumers’ collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the con-
sumers’ current and expected income, current obligations, and employment.” Id. 
 272. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3). In considering whether a refinancing is in the borrower’s 
interest, Regulation Z instructs lenders to consider the totality of the borrower’s circum-
stances at the time the credit was extended. Id.  
 273. Open-end credit is a credit extension where the exact amount of money lent or ad-
vanced at any given time is not fixed. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i). It is, in short, a line of credit. 
Open-end lines of credit are replacing traditional home equity loans in part to avoid 
HOEPA regulation. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, TRUTH IN LENDING § 
5.18.1 (4th ed. 1999). 
 274. GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 42, at 7 (“It appears that HOEPA cov-
ers only a limited portion of all subprime loans.”). Notwithstanding HOEPA’s abrogation of 
the holder in due course doctrine, Moody’s has rated transactions that contain loans that 
trigger HOEPA. See, e.g., Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Expands Con-
sideration of Assignee Liability Residential Mortgages in Securitizations (Jan. 30, 2003) 
(indicating that Moody’s has rated pools containing HOEPA loans). Standard & Poor’s, on 
the other hand, does not rate HOEPA loans. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, S&P Com-
ments on High-Cost Residential Mortgage Loans (Aug. 16, 2001), http://www.rebuz.com/ 
research/0801-real-estate-research/standard-&-poors.htm. Additional federal statutes pro-
vide other grounds for liability for predatory practices. Lenders may be liable for violations 
of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2000), by engaging 
in kickback schemes. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2000). Certain predatory practices that are tar-
geted based on age, race, national origin, gender, or other prohibited characteristics can 
also result in violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 (a)-(f) 
(2000), or the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000). Finally, “unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices” by predatory lenders may expose them to liability under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (2000). See generally Advisory Letter from 
David Hammaker, Deputy Comptroller for Compliance, Comptroller of the Currency, 
Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, to CEOs of All Nat’l Bank Operating Subsidiaries (Feb. 21, 2003). 
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compensate for these and other shortcomings in the federal response 
to predatory lending.275 
 In the last few sessions, Congress has considered a predatory 
lending bill first introduced by Representative Robert Ney (R-OH) 
and now cosponsored by Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) that 
seeks to preempt state predatory lending laws and enact a uniform 
federal law in their place.276 This bill contains consumer protections 
that are considerably weaker than those found in the leading state 
laws and is seen as a proindustry initiative.277 As I argue in Part 
VI.A, it is premature to replace these state efforts to address a new, 
complex, and rapidly evolving problem with an untested uniform fed-
eral standard.278 
B.   North Carolina Enacts a Predatory Lending Law That Builds 
Incrementally on Federal Law 
 North Carolina enacted the first state predatory lending law on 
July 22, 1999, effective July 21, 2000. The North Carolina law is 
closely modeled on the federal HOEPA.279 It also builds upon protec-
tions in North Carolina’s usury statute280 by prohibiting specific 
types of loan provisions and lending practices for two categories of 
loans:  “consumer home loans”281 (“North Carolina home loans”) and 
“high-cost home loans” (“North Carolina high-cost home loans”).282 A 
                                                                                                                     
 275. See supra note 254. 
 276. Legislative Update, AM. BANKER, June 9, 2005, at 5; see RESPONSIBLE LENDING 
ACT, H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. (2005) (The Ney Bill). 
 277. See Azmy, supra note 5, at 389 (arguing that the Ney Bill “fails to address many 
predatory lending practices that states regulate, including balloon payments, negative amor-
tization loans, loan flipping, asset based lending, and others. . . . Not surprisingly, the lending 
industry supports preemption efforts in general, and the Ney bill in particular . . . .”). 
 278. Id. (“Forestalling preemption of these important state laws will assist federal and 
other state regulators to better understand and address the predatory lending problem.”). 
 279. 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2000). 
 280. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-2 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.). 
 281. Id. § 24-10.2(a) (defining “consumer home loans” to include all mortgage loans that 
are made to natural persons, primarily for personal, family and household purposes, and 
are loans secured by liens on one- to four-family residences that are or will become the bor-
rower’s principal dwelling). Prohibited practices for North Carolina home loans include fi-
nancing (directly or indirectly) any credit life, disability, or unemployment insurance, or 
any other life health insurance premium; flipping is also prohibited. Id. §§ 24-10.2(b)-(c). 
 282. Id. § 24-1.1E(a)(4) (defining “high cost home loans” to include loans, reverse mort-
gage loans, for which (1) the principal amount of the loan does not exceed the lesser of the 
Fannie Mae conforming loan size limit for a single-family dwelling or $300,000, (2) made to 
a natural person, (3) incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes, (4) se-
cured by either a security interest in a manufactured home or a mortgage or deed of trust 
on real property upon which is located a structure designed principally for occupancy by 
one to four families, either of which is or will be occupied by the borrower as his or her 
principal dwelling, and (5) meeting one or more of the “thresholds” included in the act). 
The statute prohibits the following provisions in North Carolina high-cost home loans:  call 
provisions, balloon payments, negative amortizations, increased interest rates, advance 
payments, and modification or deferral fees. Id. § 24-1.1E(b). Certain lending practices are 
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recent empirical study has found that the NC Law operates as de-
signed: predatory loan terms were reduced without materially reduc-
ing the supply of subprime credit to low-income borrowers.283 
 A review of the North Carolina law reveals that it (1) clearly de-
lineates between these two categories of loans, (2) does not provide 
for assignee liability,284 and (3) limits damages such that they are a 
quantifiable liability.285 These three aspects of the North Carolina 
law are of primary concern for the privileged raters as they rate 
RMBS transactions containing North Carolina loans. 
C.   The Privileged Raters Initially Underestimate the Impact of State 
Predatory Lending Legislation 
 As discussed above, when rating mortgage pools, privileged raters 
typically undertake four distinct analyses: qualitative, quantitative, 
underwriter and servicer characteristics, and legal risks.286 The privi-
leged raters have significantly adjusted their legal risks analysis of 
RMBS transactions to account for the new predatory lending laws.  
 On April 28, 2000, Moody’s became the first privileged rater to 
publicly address the phenomenon of predatory lending, nine months 
after North Carolina passed its law and three months before that law 
                                                                                                                     
also prohibited for such loans, including lending without regard to ability to repay, financ-
ing points and fees, charging refinancing fees with the same lender, and the direct pay-
ment of home improvement contractors. Id. § 24-1.1E(c).  Additionally, all North Carolina 
high-cost home loan borrowers must receive home ownership counseling. Id. 
 283. Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of North Carolina’s Anti-Predatory Lending 
Law: A Descriptive Assessment (2003), available at http://www.planning.unc.edu/pdf/ 
CC_NC_Anti_Predatory_Law_Impact.pdf. An earlier study had concluded that the North 
Carolina law reduced the supply of credit to low-income borrowers, but the Quercia Study 
appears to have been better designed and to have relied on superior data.  See Azmy, supra 
note 5, at 380-81 (criticizing study by Gregory Elliehausen & Michael E. Staten, Regulation of 
Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina’s Predatory Lending Law, 29 
REAL EST. FIN. & ECO. 411 (2004)).  A report by the Center for Responsible Lending that was 
released as this Article went to press supports the findings of the Quercia study. LI & 
ERNST, supra note 24, at 12-13, 17. It found that North Carolina subprime loans with abu-
sive terms fell over 32% since the North Carolina law was enacted, while interest rates 
remained flat.  Id. at 12. 
 284. But see Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Addresses North 
Carolina Anti-Predatory Lending Law (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.mbaa.org/state_update/ 
states.asp (arguing that, under North Carolina case law, mortgage holders may have as-
signee liability); see also Overton v. Tarkington, 249 N.C. 340, 344 (1959) (holding that de-
fendant had right to assert usurious interest payments as affirmative defense against as-
signee of mortgage). 
 285. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-2 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.) (usury 
statute permits damages of “twice the amount of interest paid in an action in the nature of 
action for debt”); id. § 75-1.1 (unfair and deceptive practices act authorizes treble damages 
and attorney’s fees); id. § 24-10.2(e) (“Any person seeking damages or penalties under the 
provisions of this section may recover damages under either this Chapter or Chapter 75, 
but not both.”). Since the damages are not applied cumulatively and are statutorily de-
fined, they are a quantifiable liability. 
 286. See supra Part IV.A. 
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was to take effect. Moody’s initially concluded that allegations of 
predatory lending practices by mortgage originators would not affect 
most subprime securitizations, regardless of litigation outcomes, 
since the transactions are monoline-insured,287 meaning that the 
company that has insured a pool of given mortgages would bear the 
risk of adverse litigation outcomes.288 Moody’s also suggested that a 
senior-subordinated securitization structure289 would limit potential 
liability to issuers who (1) engage regularly in predatory lending 
practices, (2) are subject to well-publicized allegations,290 and (3) have 
geographically concentrated loan pools.291 Based on this analysis, 
Moody’s concluded, “The economic consequences of predatory lending 
accusations for securitization investors will be limited.”292 This con-
clusion was based in part upon assumptions as to the limited reme-
dies available to borrowers, should a court find that a lender’s prac-
tices were predatory.293 Indeed, Moody’s predicted that a borrower’s 
remedies would be limited to rescission of the loan contract and/or 
                                                                                                                     
 287. A monoline insurer is an 
insurance company that is restricted, by the terms of its charter, to writing in-
surance policies related to a single type of risk. In a financial context, the mono-
line insurer unconditionally guarantees the repayment of certain securities is-
sued in connection with specified types of transactions, usually a securitization 
. . . in return for the payment of a fee or premium. 
Standard & Poor’s, Structured Finance: Glossary of Securitization Terms (2003), http:// 
www.securitization.net/pdf/sp_gloss_060103.pdf. 
 288. KEITH WOFFORD & DAVID BURKHALTER, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, PREDATORY 
LENDING AND HOME EQUITY SECURITIZATIONS 2 (2000), available at http://moodys.com 
(“First, a large number of deals are fully insured by a monoline bond insurer. In these trans-
actions, the risk of a litigation outcome that impairs the loans in a securitization rests solely 
with the insurer, not with the security holders. Insured deals constitute 53.25% of the sub-
prime mortgage-backed securities issued during the period from 1997 through the end of 
1999.”). 
 289. Id. (“[A]mong the approximately 46.75% of securities issued in transactions that 
used the senior-subordinate manner of credit enhancement, there is protection in the sub-
ordination levels to withstand some unexpected litigation. At the Aaa level, in particular, 
there is a cushion to protect investors from unforeseen difficulties like lawsuits. Only wide-
spread and concerted litigation against an issuer and its practices, that focuses on a large 
proportion of that originator’s production, would be broad enough to imperil the rating of a 
Aaa-rated class of securities.” (emphasis omitted)). Senior-subordinated securities as a 
pass-through mortgage issue with two classes, with the subordinated class absorbing the 
payment risks for both classes. LORE & COWAN, supra note 8, at 742, app. A. 
 290. WOFFORD & BURKHALTER, supra note 288, at 2. (“[T]he complexity of reconstruct-
ing the past practices of challenged lenders is likely to lead banking regulators and attor-
neys general to focus on modifying lenders’ future conduct to comply with applicable laws, 
rather than pursuing claims relating to past acts.”). 
 291. Id. (“[P]otential plaintiffs in any given loan pool are often geographically dis-
persed, which makes coordinated, widespread litigation difficult. Originators benefit from 
this difficulty, because many borrowers will not risk losing their homes without the safety 
of a large and organized effort to challenge a lender.”). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 3. 
2006]                         SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION 1031 
 
recoupment of any damages from the loan amount owed.294 These 
remedies in individual actions would not pose a significant concern to 
investors.295 Given the limited remedies, sufficient bond insurance, 
and appropriate structuring of a securitization, Moody’s predicted 
that the effect of antipredatory lending laws on RMBS transactions 
would be minimal. It appears that Moody’s underestimated the ex-
tent to which other states would follow North Carolina’s lead and en-
act their own predatory lending laws, because it dramatically 
changed its analysis in eighteen months.296 
 Nearly two years later, Fitch became the next privileged rater to 
address the impact of predatory lending on the RMBS market.297 
Fitch reviewed the assignee liability sections of newly enacted 
predatory lending statutes and identified the legal risks posed by 
certain ambiguous provisions in antipredatory lending laws.298 Fitch 
found that such ambiguity “may negatively impact mortgage markets 
and their participants.”299 Despite these risks, Fitch concluded, in 
large part based on discussion with originators, that there were no 
inherent increased risks to the RMBS market posed by the newly 
enacted predatory lending laws.300  
 Moody’s and Fitch were soon to change their relatively sanguine 
legal analysis of predatory lending legislation. Moody’s came to put 
more weight on the statutes’ punitive damages provisions.301 Fitch 
appeared to reduce its reliance upon statements by subprime lenders 
as to their own practices and align itself with the more critical voices 
of the privileged raters.302 And Standard & Poor’s, while last to ad-
dress state predatory lending laws, was the first to come out highly 
critical of their impact on RMBS investors.303 
                                                                                                                     
 294. Id. (“Set-off or recoupment is the reduction of the loan amount owed by the bor-
rower by the amount of any claims for damages of the borrower against the lender. The 
borrower would simply reduce the amount owed on his loan by the amount of any damage 
claims relating to unlawful (predatory) acts. The resulting reduction in the loan amounts 
would be a loss to the subordinate securities.”). 
 295. Id. 
 296. See generally Azmy, supra note 5, at 361-78 (2005) (describing more than two dozen 
state and local predatory lending laws enacted since the North Carolina law was enacted). 
 297. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Comments on Recent Predatory 
Lending Legislation (Dec. 24, 2002), http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/ 
rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2&detail=&body_content=pred_lend. 
 298. Id. (referring to the “reasonable tangible net benefit” test contained in HOSA). 
 299. Id. Fitch’s opinion was based on “discussions with the majority of the subprime 
mortgage loan originators who have confirmed that they do not originate or purchase high 
cost loans.” Id. 
 300. Id. (“Fitch will continue its discussions with various market participants, includ-
ing originators, sellers and servicers, to confirm its current belief that risks to transactions 
have not increased.”). 
    301.  Compare text accompanying note 287 supra, with text accompanying note 320 infra. 
    302.  Compare text accompanying notes 291-94 supra, with text accompanying notes 327-
35 infra. 
    303.   See infra Part V.D.2. 
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D.   The Georgia Experience: Pushing Forward, Pulled Back 
 Georgia attempted to take a more aggressive tack than the one 
taken by North Carolina. It is highly unlikely that they were aware of 
how the privileged raters would respond. The privileged raters effec-
tively shut down the Georgia mortgage market because they found the 
Georgia legislation to be too much of a risk to the secondary market 
because it threatened the standard application of the holder in due 
course doctrine to RMBS transactions, thereby exposing investors to 
new forms of potential liability. Not until Georgia amended its law to 
meet the privileged raters’ concerns did the Georgia market reopen. 
1.   The Georgia Fair Lending Act Provides for Assignee Liability 
and Unquantifiable Damages 
 The Georgia Fair Lending Act (the “Georgia law”) became effective 
on October 1, 2002.304 Below is a brief description of its provisions. Of 
particular relevance are the provisions for assignee liability305 and for 
punitive damages.306 
 The Georgia law created three categories of loans: “home loans” 
(“Georgia home loans”), “covered home loans” (“Georgia covered home 
loans”), and “high-cost home loans” (“Georgia high-cost home loans”).307 
Georgia home loans, the broadest category, covered all loans secured 
by mortgage, security deed, or secured debt within the Fannie Mae 
conforming loan size.308 Georgia covered home loans included all (1) 
first lien loans with interest rates that are greater than four percent-
age points above the prime rate or two percentage points above the 
comparable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac; (2) junior liens five and a half 
percentage points above the prime rate or three percentage points 
above the comparable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac rates, loans in 
which the total points and fees, excluding bona fide discount points,309 
exceed three percentage points; and (3) all Georgia high-cost home 
                                                                                                                     
 304. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1 to -13 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Spec. Sess.). 
 305. Id. § 7-6A-6(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, where a home loan 
was made, arranged, or assigned by a person selling home improvements to the dwelling of 
a borrower, the borrower may assert . . . all affirmative claims and any defenses that the 
borrower may have against the seller or home improvement contractor . . . .”). 
 306. Id. § 7-6A-7(a)(3) (“Any creditor found by a preponderance of the evidence to have 
violated this chapter shall be liable to the borrower for  . . . [p]unitive damages . . . .”). 
 307. Id. §§ 7-6A-2(7)-(8). 
 308. Id. § 7-6A-2(8). 
 309. Id. § 7-6A-2(4) (“ ‘Bona fide discount points’ means loan discount points knowingly 
paid by the borrower for the express purpose of reducing, and which in fact do result in a 
bona fide reduction of, the interest rate applicable to the home loan; provided, however, that 
the undiscounted interest rate for the home loan does not exceed by more than one percent-
age point the required net yield for a 90 day standard mandatory delivery commitment for a 
home loan with a reasonably comparable term from either the Federal National Mortgage 
Association or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, whichever is greater.”). 
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loans.310 Georgia high-cost home loans were those loans that exceed ei-
ther an annual percentage rate tied to the HOEPA interest rate trig-
ger311 or a fees trigger that is typically five points.312 
 The Georgia law prohibited fifteen specific practices for Georgia 
high-cost home loans313 and four prohibited lending practices for all 
Georgia home loans, including a ban on loan flipping.314 Loan flipping 
had been the most contested of these prohibitions, since it required 
that all Georgia covered loans that were refinanced from an existing 
Georgia home loan provide a “reasonable tangible net benefit” to the 
borrower.315 
 The Georgia law granted remedies that may be asserted against 
assignees for violations of the statute; in particular, it granted a bor-
rower the right to assert all affirmative claims and defenses against 
assignee purchasers of Georgia high-cost home loans.316 For Georgia 
covered home loans, it offered a more limited right: borrowers could 
assert claims against assignees to offset the outstanding debt.317 The 
damages included actual damages, treble damages, punitive dam-
ages, and reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, each of which could be 
applied cumulatively or individually.318 The Georgia law’s assignee 
liability and damages provisions caused the privileged raters to re-
think their positions on predatory lending legislation. 
2.   The Privileged Raters Exclude Georgia Loans from Their Rated 
Transactions Because of Concerns That Investors Will Be 
Liable for Uncapped Damages 
 Just a few months after the Georgia law became effective, the 
privileged raters concluded that Georgia’s assignee liability provi-
                                                                                                                     
 310. Id. § 7-6A-2(7). 
 311. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2000). 
 312. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(18)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Spec. Sess.). The fee 
trigger is different for loans that are for the principal amount of less than $20,000; in that 
case, the fee trigger is the lesser of 8% or $1,000. Id. 
 313. Id. § 7-6A-5. The fifteen prohibited practices are prepayment penalties greater 
than 2% of the outstanding balance, balloon payments, negative amortization, default in-
terest rates, advance payments, limitations on access to legal remedies, lending without 
counseling, lending without regard to borrower’s ability to repay, direct payment to home 
improvement contractors, loan modification fees, foreclosure without certified notification 
fourteen days prior to initiating proceedings, limits on the right to cure default prior to an 
acceleration clause, foreclosure without notice of the right to cure default, acceleration 
clauses at the lender’s sole discretion, and finally, making loans without disclosure of the 
assignee liability of the Georgia law. Id. 
 314. Id. § 7-6A-4.  The four prohibited practices are the selling of single premium credit 
insurance, encouraging default, imposing late penalties greater than 5%, and charging 
more than $10 for transmitting information on the balance due. Id. § 7-6A-3. 
 315. Id. § 7-6A-4(a). 
 316. Id. § 7-6A-6(b). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. § 7-6A-6(c). 
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sions created potentially unlimited damages for purchasers of Geor-
gia high-cost home loans, and thus pools containing them were too 
risky to be rated.319 The privileged raters’ announcements caused 
turmoil among Georgia lenders who depended heavily on their ability 
to sell loans on the secondary market; a number of these lenders in-
dicated that they were on the verge of abandoning residential lend-
ing in Georgia.320 Standard & Poor’s first addressed the Georgia law 
on January 16, 2003, stating that it would not rate transactions that 
contained GA home loans.321  
 Moody’s staked out a similar position on January 30, 2003, stating 
that the inclusion of GA home loans in securitization transactions was 
too risky.322 Moody’s position marked a change of course from its origi-
nal position that predatory lending laws would not severely impact the 
secondary market.323 Fitch also retreated from its original position on 
predatory lending legislation on February 4, 2003, stating that it 
would not rate transactions with uncapped assignee liability, disallow-
ing the Georgia law loans from its rated transactions.324 By refusing to 
rate transactions containing Georgia home loans and thereby blocking 
access to the secondary market, the privileged raters forced the Geor-
gia legislature to reevaluate and amend the Georgia law. 
 While Standard & Poor’s was concerned to some extent with am-
biguities in the Georgia law, its main concern was the assignee liabil-
ity that could attach to the secondary market parties to a securitized 
transaction containing Georgia home loans.325 Moody’s echoed Stan-
dard & Poor’s position, stating that since there was no cap on puni-
tive damage awards,326 the potential unlimited liability that might 
                                                                                                                     
 319. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS 
Pools & Considers Impact to Other Predatory Lending Legislation (Feb. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.fitchratings.com; Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, supra note 274; Press 
Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s to Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans 
(Jan. 16, 2003), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/030116b.html. 
 320. See GA. BANKER’S ASS’N, GEORGIA FAIR LENDING ACT: THE UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 2 (2003), http://www.gabankers.com/issuespredatorylendingwhitepaper.pdf.  
 321. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 319.  
 322. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, supra note 274.  
 323. See supra text accompanying note 288. 
 324. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, supra note 319 (“Fitch has concluded that it will not 
rate transactions with uncapped assignee liability as detailed in the current Georgia Fair 
Lending Act (GFLA), as it stands today.”). 
 325. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 319 (“[T]ransaction parties in securi-
tizations, including depositors, issuers and servicers, might all be subject to penalties for 
violations under the GFLA.”); see also Milligan, supra note 254, at 30 (“Susan Barnes, a 
managing director in S&P’s residential mortgage group, said the agency was concerned 
that originators wouldn’t be able to adequately determine the threshold between normal 
home, covered and high-cost loans because of some fuzziness in the language of the law. 
But the law’s unlimited assignee liability was S&P’s ‘foremost concern,’ says Barnes.”). 
 326. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, supra note 274 (“The risks are theoreti-
cally immeasurable because there is no cap on punitive damage awards. Further, the stat-
ute extends liability to loan assignees, which would include securitization trusts.”). 
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attach to assignees under the Georgia law prevented the inclusion of 
such loans in rated transactions.327 Moody’s also reversed its position 
that securitizations could be structured to limit the litigation risks.328  
 Moody’s gave direction to the legislature, stating that any Moody’s 
analysis of an amended Georgia law would focus on the risk of as-
signee liability.329  Moody’s was particularly concerned with the risks 
associated with the accidental misclassification of loans (that is, mis-
classifying a high-risk Georgia high-cost home loan as a low-risk 
Georgia home loan),330 the difficulty of lender compliance with the re-
strictions on loans in each category,331 and above all else, the unlim-
ited liability of the assignee.332 
 Fitch stated that it would not rate transactions with uncapped as-
signee liability.333 Fitch based its position on surveys of RMBS issu-
ers and on an analysis of twenty settled predatory lending cases.334 
Fitch’s method was to examine the frequency and severity of loss for 
each loan that is subject to a predatory lending statute, such as the 
Georgia law, to identify the risk that it poses to the RMBS transac-
tion.335 Analysis of the twenty settled cases showed an average award 
of $76 million per case, although they were primarily class action 
suits.336 Of particular interest to Fitch was a recent action for 
$100,000 in compensatory damages for which the court awarded $6 
million in punitive damages.337 
 Fitch recommended that rated securitization trusts remove any 
exposure to loans that were subject to assignee liability provisions in 
predatory lending statutes, since compliance procedures alone are 
not enough to eliminate the risk of loss.338 The existence of an as-
                                                                                                                     
 327. Id. (“[T]he potential unlimited trust liability makes the risk posed by those Geor-
gia loans inconsistent with Moody’s standards for rated securities.”). Like Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s stated it would continue to rate nonconforming Georgia loans. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. (“Because some of the criteria for categorizing loans into these tiers may be dif-
ficult to measure (e.g., determining indirect compensation to a broker from any source), 
satisfactory compliance procedures for properly categorizing each loan would prove bur-
densome and would unlikely be foolproof.”). 
 331. Id. (“[T]he restrictions on ‘covered’ loans include qualitative elements (i.e., provid-
ing a tangible net benefit to the borrower) that raise burdensome compliance issues. Fur-
thermore, the even more onerous additional restrictions on ‘high-cost’ loans likely present 
an insurmountable burden to including such loans in a rated securitization.”). 
 332. Id. 
 333. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, supra note 319. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. (“The current legal issue concerning predatory lending presents unique chal-
lenges to adequately assess the frequency and severity, and ultimately the risk, to a securi-
tization. For example, certain legislation provides an assignee liability clause that adds all 
parties associated with the trust to the list of potential defendants in a litigation case.”). 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id.  
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signee liability clause represents a meaningful risk to the transac-
tion. And so Fitch stated it would not rate any transaction where as-
signee liability is combined with unlimited liability, such as is the 
case with the Georgia law.339 To rate a transaction, Fitch requires 
that it be able to quantify the potential losses.340 Antipredatory laws 
with assignee liability clauses but capped liability allow Fitch to 
quantify such losses.341  Fitch refused to rate all Georgia loans sub-
ject to the Georgia law as long as there was a potential for uncapped 
assignee liability.342 
 The privileged raters all refused to rate RMBS pools containing 
Georgia loans. This response by the privileged raters evoked harsh 
criticisms from consumer advocacy groups, the mainstream media, 
and some academics.343 Nonetheless, a number of lenders indicated 
that they were preparing to pull out of the Georgia residential lend-
ing market within days of the privileged raters’ announcements.344 
And the Georgia legislature found that it had to act to meet the privi-
leged raters’ concerns as mortgage originators in Georgia stated that 
they would not be able to make any more mortgage loans.345 
 Georgia had to act notwithstanding the fact that the GSEs dis-
agreed with the privileged raters’ assessment of the risks that inves-
tors faced from the Georgia law.346 The GSEs’ assessment appears to 
have been borne out by (1) the fact that no investor has suffered the 
effects that the privileged raters had predicted would result from the 
purchase of loans that were subject to the Georgia law347 and (2) the 
legal analysis of scholars that study predatory lending laws does not 
                                                                                                                     
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. See infra note 350. 
 344. Milligan, supra note 254, at 30 (“ ‘Of course, cutting off Georgia mortgage origina-
tors from the secondary market could have led to a catastrophic situation. It was going to 
cause a collapse of the mortgage market in Georgia, and it came very close to happening 
before the law was amended,’ says [mortgage broker industry representative] Rose. ‘We 
had over 40 lenders send us letters saying they would no longer do business in the state of 
Georgia, except for jumbo loans.’ ”). 
 345. Id. (“Adds Allen KenKnight, president of the Mortgage Bankers Association of 
Georgia, Macon, Georgia, and vice president in charge of production at Dunwoody, Geor-
gia-based Prestige Mortgage Co., ‘We were within days of not being able to write mortgage 
loans.’ ”). 
 346. See, e.g., Kelly K. Spors, Subprime Bill Aims to Mute State Laws, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 14, 2003, at A4 (noting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to buy some 
loans made in Georgia); Fannie Mae, Announcement 03-02, supra note 176; Letter from 
Michael May to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers, supra note 176 (stating that 
Freddie Mac would continue to buy all loans made in New Jersey other than New Jersey 
high-cost home loans). 
 347. This evidence is far from compelling on its own because there are only a small 
number of loans that are subject to the unamended Georgia law. 
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bear out the Chicken Little interpretation of the privileged raters, 
but rather is in line with that of the GSEs.348 
3.   As Its Mortgage Market Dries Up, Georgia Acquiesces to the            
Demands of the Privileged Raters 
 Notwithstanding the weak analysis of the privileged raters, the 
Georgia legislature quickly responded to the privileged raters by in-
troducing an amendment to the Georgia law, which was enacted on 
March 7, 2003.349 In the months prior to the enactment of the 
amendment, there were fruitless negotiations between consumer ad-
vocacy groups and privileged raters as well as continuing disagree-
ment among legislators regarding how to respond to the privileged 
raters’ concerns.350 Notwithstanding this debate, the Georgia legisla-
ture amended the Georgia law on March 7, 2003 (the “amended 
Georgia law”). In order to address the concerns of the privileged rat-
ers, the amended Georgia law specified “when and against whom” 
claims may be asserted, limited the liability that attached, and re-
moved the “covered-loan” category.351 The amended Georgia law pro-
vides a safe harbor to its assignee liability provision, allowing as-
signees to avert liability by a showing of “reasonable due diligence” to 
prevent the acquisition of Georgia high-cost home loans.352 Assignee 
liability is capped at the remaining indebtedness of the loan plus 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and may only attach from an individual 
lawsuit, not a class action.353 
4.   The Privileged Raters Allow Georgia Loans to Be Securitized 
Under an Amended Georgia Law 
 The amended Georgia law would prove to be more investor 
friendly, as the privileged raters readmitted Georgia home loans to 
                                                                                                                     
 348. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 738 (“Costly litigation and sig-
nificant judgments arguably could have an adverse impact on the value of a loan pool. The 
reality, however, is that the risk that a securitized loan pool will actually suffer losses from 
predatory lending litigation is quite small. This is because there are practical impediments 
to bringing predatory lending claims and also because securitization deals are intention-
ally structured to reduce such risk.”); see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 49, at 704-11 
(questioning the assumption of “harmful effects” of the New Jersey Home Owner Security 
Act made by the privileged rating agencies through analysis of continued availability of 
credit within New Jersey after the law became active). 
 349. Georgia Fair Lending Act, 1 Ga. Laws. 1 (2003). 
 350. See, e.g., Ernest Holsendolph & Robert Luke, Mortgage Lenders Push to Rewrite 
Fair Lending Act, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 23, 2003, at A1; Henry Unger & Rhonda Cook, 
Predatory Lending Law to Be Tweaked, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 24, 2003, at F1; Henry 
Unger & Robert Luke, Compromise Reached on Ga. Lending Law, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 
1, 2003, at F1. 
 351. Georgia Fair Lending Act, 1 Ga. Laws 1 (2003) 
 352. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6(b) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Spec. Sess.). 
 353. Id. § 7-6A-6(c). 
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their rated transactions within days of the amendment.354 Standard 
& Poor’s responded on March 11, 2003, stating it would rate transac-
tions including Georgia home loans originated after March 7, 2003.355 
It would selectively allow Georgia high-cost home loans, since the li-
ability was capped, so long as there was some credit support in 
place.356 This credit support could take the form of, for instance, an 
agreement by a creditworthy institution to repurchase loans that 
were made in violation of the law, to limit a securitization trust’s ex-
posure to liability.357 Standard & Poor’s also requires a compliance 
representation, a statement by a third party verifying the Georgia 
home loan originators’ compliance with the statute, as part of its re-
quirement to rate a transaction containing such loans.358 
 Moody’s acted two days later, also finding that the risks associ-
ated with Georgia home loans were permissible within its rated 
transactions.359 Moody’s discussion of the statute identified practices 
that lenders and securitizers could implement to protect securitiza-
tion trusts from liability.360 Since the amended Georgia law includes 
disclosure requirements,361 reasonableness standards,362 and imposes 
the strictest requirements on “high-cost” home loans only,363 the 
privileged raters found that it gave adequate direction to lenders.364 
The amended Georgia law also addresses Moody’s concerns regarding 
miscategorization of loans by removing the “covered-loan” category, 
thus making it easier to identify the risks associated with individual 
loans.365 Even more important to Moody’s is the limitation on as-
signee liability to the remaining indebtedness and reasonable attor-
                                                                                                                     
 354. Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s both announced that they would rate all pools that 
do not contain Georgia high-cost home loans. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & 
Poor’s Will Admit Georgia Mortgage Loans into Rated Structured Finance Transactions 
(Mar. 11, 2003), http://www.bondmarkets.com/regulatory/s_and_p_georgia_amendment.pdf; 
Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s to Rate RMBS Backed by Georgia Home 
Loans (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://www.moodys.com/. Indeed, Standard and Poor’s 
preapproved the amended Georgia law. Erick Bergquist, Ga. Amended Predator Law After 
Pre-approval by S&P, AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 2003, at 1, 1, available at 2003 WL 4174771. 
Fitch announced that it would rate all residential mortgage pools, including those that con-
tained Georgia high-cost home loans, if they also included additional credit enhancements. 
See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch to Rate RMBS After Amendment to Georgia Preda-
tory Lending Statute, GFLA (Mar. 14, 2003). 
 355. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 354.  
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, supra note 354. 
 360. Id. 
 361. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(12)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2005 Spec. Sess.). 
 362. Id. § 7-6A-4. 
 363. See generally Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, supra note 354. 
 364. Id.  
 365. Id. 
2006]                         SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION 1039 
 
neys’ fees.366 Under the amended Georgia law, Moody’s permits Geor-
gia home loans in rated transactions so long as the issuer did the fol-
lowing: gave representations and warranties that the loans were 
originated in compliance with the law; gave a warranty to repurchase 
any loans that were, in fact, originated in violation of the statute; 
and created due diligence procedures to satisfy the safe harbor provi-
sions of the law.367 
 Like Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s stated that it would selectively 
rate pools containing Georgia high-cost home loans, so long as such 
pools had no more than 2% of the total loans in the pool and so long 
as such loans were within the clear, objective standards of the stat-
ute. For instance, refinanced Georgia high-cost home loans that could 
run afoul of the law’s antiflipping “reasonable tangible net benefit” 
test would not fall within a clear, objective standard.368 While, in the-
ory, Moody’s would rate pools with more than 2% Georgia high-cost 
home loans, it indicated that the credit support required to rate such 
pools would be of prohibitive cost.369 
 On March 14, 2003, closely following the path taken by Standard 
& Poor’s and Moody’s, Fitch announced that it would rate pools in-
cluding Georgia high-cost home loans, subject to additional credit 
enhancements.370 Fitch indicated that the changes to the assignee li-
ability provisions and limitations on damages assessed against as-
signees prompted its change of position.371 Fitch did differ from the 
analysis of the other privileged raters to some extent: it found that 
while the addition of the safe harbor provision for “reasonable due 
diligence” reduces the risk of assignee liability, the safe harbor provi-
sion was subjective because it did not define what “reasonable due 
diligence” was.372 Nonetheless, because the law’s liability is, in any 
case, capped at the remaining indebtedness of the loan plus reason-
able attorney’s fees, Fitch stated it would rate pools with Georgia 
home loans, subject to appropriate credit enhancements. 
                                                                                                                     
 366. Id. (“Finally, and perhaps most importantly to MBS investors, the Amended Act 
limits assignee liability to the remaining indebtedness on the loan and reasonable attor-
ney’s fees, and limits class actions against assignees.”).  
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. (“Solid representations from financially strong issuers would take on increased 
importance where high cost loans are included. Transactions containing more than two 
percent of such ‘high cost’ loans, or which contain any ‘high cost’ loans where statutory 
compliance is a matter of judgment, may be subject to additional protections that have a 
prohibitive cost. Ultimately, the risk to investors will vary depending on the amount of 
‘high cost’ loans in question and the issuer’s financial strength.”). The cost of including 
loans originated prior to the enactment of the amended Georgia law but after the enact-
ment of the Georgia law would also likely be prohibitively high since the amendment is not 
applied retroactively. Id. 
 370. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, supra note 354. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
1040  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:985 
 
 While the privileged raters’ decisions to rate transactions contain-
ing post-amended Georgia law loans resolved Georgia’s funding cri-
sis, they also bring to a head questions as to the role that these pri-
vate actors should have in setting standards for local regulations of 
property and consumer finance transactions. In particular, to the ex-
tent that the privileged raters are advocates for investors and 
thereby inaccurately evaluate the risk posed by state predatory lend-
ing laws,373 it is important to ask whether privileged raters should 
have the power to veto laws enacted by the several states. 
E.   The Privileged Raters Take a Stance Against Strong Predatory 
Lending Legislation 
 Shortly after admitting Georgia loans into securitization transac-
tions, each of the three privileged raters issued reports detailing rat-
ing criteria for transactions containing loans subject to antipredatory 
lending laws. These reports put state legislatures on notice as to the 
privileged raters’ requirements and effectively set a framework for 
standardizing predatory lending legislation that followed. 
 Moody’s was first to issue such a comprehensive report on March 
26, 2003. Moody’s released a special report regarding the impact of 
predatory lending on RMBS transactions, changing its position from 
that of its April 2000 report in light of recently enacted antipredatory 
lending laws “without well-defined compliance procedures” and which 
“entail unlimited potential liability.”374  Moody’s report stated that 
such problematic statutes cause difficulty in the securitization process 
because violations of antipredatory lending statutes reduce the 
amount of available cash to pay investors.375 Although it acknowledged 
that there were measures that lenders could take to reduce their po-
tential liability, Moody’s stated it would not rate transactions unless 
certain additional conditions for securitization were met.376 Those con-
ditions included (1) sufficiently clear statutes so that the lender may 
comply and (2) limited statutory penalties for noncompliance.377 Even 
with such conditions, Moody’s indicated that there remains a risk to 
                                                                                                                     
 373. See supra Part V.D.2.  
 374. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s Reports on Impact of Predatory 
Lending Laws on RMBS (Mar. 26, 2003). 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. The other conditions included the lender’s demonstration of effective compli-
ance procedures, lender representations that loans comply with statutory requirements, 
lender agreement to repurchase loans that do not comply with statutory requirements, 
lender indemnification for damages from the statute under certain circumstances, lender’s 
demonstration that it has the “financial resources and commitment to the business” to 
demonstrate willingness and ability to honor its repurchase and indemnification obliga-
tions, and agreement to concentration limits where the penalties are great or the statutes 
are ambiguous. Id. 
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investors, because lenders may, in certain circumstances, choose to de-
fault rather than repurchase afflicted loans.378  
 Standard & Poor’s released its report on April 15, 2003, stating 
that it would subject RMBS pools containing loans from jurisdictions 
with antipredatory lending laws to a legal evaluation of the statute of 
each state.379 Its legal evaluation methodology was quite similar to 
that of Moody’s. It first considered whether a state’s antipredatory 
lending statute provides for assignee liability.380 Where predatory 
lending laws do provide for assignee liability, Standard & Poor’s 
would look for clearly delineated loan categories, analyzing whether 
a purchaser (or servicer) can reasonably determine the category of 
loan.381 Standard & Poor’s then would analyze the severity of penal-
ties, including monetary damages, though even capped categorical 
damages may pose unlimited liability under the cumulative effect of 
some laws, such as those that allow for class actions suits.382 Stan-
dard & Poor’s would not rate transactions containing loans that fall 
into statutory categories that allow for assignee liability combined 
with uncapped damages.383 Standard & Poor’s would, however, rate 
loans with capped liability, though the cost of required credit en-
hancements for some capped liability categories of loans could be 
prohibitive of securitization.384 
 Fitch responded with its own document on May 1, 2003, which 
announced changes to its rating methodology.385 Fitch maintains the 
position, like the other privileged raters, that it would not rate pools 
containing loans subject to unlimited assignee liability.386 Fitch also 
                                                                                                                     
 378. Id. 
 379. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard & 
Poor’s Explains Its Approach (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/ 
srchindex.html.  
 380. Id. Loans subject to predatory lending laws that do not provide for assignee liabil-
ity will not raise rating difficulties for Standard & Poor’s. Id. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id. A statute’s clarity in its provisions for violations and safe harbor practices may 
mitigate the required credit enhancements. Id. Standard & Poor’s also stated that ratings 
of pools subject to predatory lending laws must include a qualitative determination of a 
seller’s compliance procedures and the ability to identify predatory loans and loans subject 
to assignee liability. Id. Standard & Poor’s also requires a determination of the seller’s 
creditworthiness, to establish “if a seller is willing and financially able to repurchase any 
predatory loan for a purchase price that would make a securitization trust whole for any 
costs incurred in connection with the predatory loan.” Id. This rating methodology would 
determine what credit enhancement was necessary for a particular securitization. Id. 
 385. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Revises Rating Criteria in Wake of Preda-
tory Lending Legislation (May 1, 2003), http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/events/ 
press_releases_detail.cfm?pr_id=85826&sector_flag=3&marketsector=2&detail.  
 386. Id. 
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required warranties of compliance,387 and if no high-cost home loans 
are in the transaction, a representation and warranty of such.388 
Fitch reserved the right to rate RMBS transactions in jurisdictions 
where there is assignee liability where that liability is “reasonably 
limited.”389 Where a breach of those warranties takes place, Fitch re-
quires a repurchase of the affected loan.390  
 Like the other privileged raters, Fitch may require credit enhance-
ments based upon measurements of the severity and frequency of loss 
for loans covered by predatory lending statutes contained within a se-
curitization trust.391 Frequency of loss considers three factors: the 
number of prohibited acts under the statute,392 safe harbor provi-
sions,393 and statutory clarity.394 Fitch’s credit-enhancement analysis 
will also include a legal and qualitative analysis of the applicable stat-
ute by jurisdiction, the type of loans included in the transaction, com-
pliance procedures by the originator or servicer, and the due diligence 
review by the relevant parties, such as the originator.395 
 These reports represent the most comprehensive statements by 
privileged raters regarding predatory lending legislation. Each took 
                                                                                                                     
 387. Id. (“Fitch expects the representation and warranty from the issuer to identify the 
loans by: (1) type (high cost, covered, etc.), (2) quantity, (3) aggregate dollar amount, and, 
(4) jurisdiction.”). 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. (“In the event of a breach of any such representation or warranty, Fitch will 
expect a repurchase of the affected loan at the applicable repurchase price. The repurchase 
price should be equal to: (1) the outstanding indebtedness of the loan (including, but not 
limited to late fees), plus accrued interest, plus, (2) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 
and all other damages which may be incurred by an RMBS transaction under any applica-
ble predatory or abusive lending law. Since the repurchase of the loan will not necessarily 
insulate an RMBS transaction from assignee or purchaser liability, credit enhancement 
levels may be adjusted for those RMBS transactions which contain loans originated in ju-
risdictions with laws that contain such provisions.”). 
 391. Id. Loss severity is calculated by determining the maximum recovery allowed by 
law under a worst-case scenario. Id. 
 392. Id. (“[L]oans subject to a high number of prohibitive acts (e.g. ‘high cost’ or ‘cov-
ered’ loans) result in an increased likelihood of a violation. These loans are subject to a 
higher frequency than loans which are subject to a low number of prohibitive act violations 
(e.g. ‘home’ loans).”). 
 393. Id. (“Fitch believes that assignee ‘safe harbor’ clauses may reduce the ability of a 
borrower to recover from an assignee or purchaser of a loan. Therefore, if the legislation 
contains safe harbor provisions which limit the exposure of the RMBS transaction to the 
borrower and if Fitch is comfortable that the safe harbor provisions are available to the 
RMBS transaction, the additional frequency assigned to a particular loan in that jurisdic-
tion may be significantly reduced.”). 
 394. Id. (“Due to potential errors, such as APRs being calculated incorrectly for loans 
in certain categories, lenders may unintentionally code a loan as a ‘home loan’ that is later 
determined to be a ‘high cost’ or ‘covered’ loan—which may ultimately subject the RMBS 
issuer to assignee liability. In order to protect against this risk, Fitch may assign an added 
frequency factor to loans originated in jurisdictions with laws that contain assignee or pur-
chaser liability provisions.”). 
 395. Id. 
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issue with specific types of provisions: subjective standards, statutory 
clarity, assignee liability and unlimited liability. It is of note that the 
privileged raters acted within five weeks of each other and issued 
mostly parallel guidelines as to the treatment of predatory lending 
laws that allowed for assignee liability and unquantifiable damages. 
These parallel moves could be troubling, given that the privileged 
raters do not face any competition in the grant of regulatory rating 
licenses. As a result, if the three privileged raters mistakenly inter-
pret the predatory lending laws, there is little hope that market 
pressures will make them correct themselves. 
F.   The New Jersey Experience: Testing the Privileged Raters’ Resolve 
 New Jersey’s Home Ownership Security Act (the “New Jersey 
law” or “HOSA”) became effective on November 26, 2003 after the 
three privileged raters issued their comprehensive guidelines on 
predatory lending statutes.396 New Jersey amended HOSA (the 
“amended New Jersey law”) on July 6, 2004, after the privileged rat-
ers decided not to rate pools containing certain types of New Jersey 
loans.397 Like the Georgia law, the New Jersey law prohibited specific 
lender practices for three categories of loans and it included assignee 
liability398 and punitive damages provisions because they expose in-
vestors to unlimited liability.399 These two provisions were most prob-
lematic for the privileged raters.  
 The New Jersey original statute attempted to hew its own path on 
solving the problem of predatory lending, but the privileged raters 
ultimately forced New Jersey back to the standardized path that 
they had promulgated in their guidelines when New Jersey amended 
its law the year after it was first enacted. 
1.   The Original New Jersey Law 
 The New Jersey law, like the Georgia law, created three catego-
ries of loans which were subject to increasing levels of regulation and 
followed similar thresholds to define its categories. New Jersey 
“home loans” were the broadest category, applicable to one- to six- 
family principle dwelling secured by a mortgage or deed of trust, or 
“[a] security interest in a manufactured home.”400 Unlike the compa-
                                                                                                                     
 396. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-35 (West, Westlaw through L.2006, c. 17). 
 397. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 49, at 712-13.  
 398. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27 (West, Westlaw through L.2006, c. 20) (setting forth 
assignee liability for certain types of loans). 
 399. Id. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(b) (allowing for “[p]unitive damages, when the violation was 
malicious or reckless in appropriate circumstances as determined by the fact-finder”). 
 400. Id. § 46:10B-24. The New Jersey law prohibits, as economically unjustifiable, the 
same practices as the Georgia law for all New Jersey home loans. Those practices include 
the following: packing single premium credit insurance into fees, encouraging default; late 
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rable Georgia law category, “New Jersey covered home loans” were 
defined by points and fees trigger only; that is, it does not have an 
APR trigger. New Jersey covered home loans included loans that had 
points and fees greater than 4% for loans greater than $40,000, and a 
higher trigger for other loans.401 Like the Georgia law, the New Jer-
sey law incorporated HOEPA’s APR trigger to define “New Jersey 
high-cost home loans.” The New Jersey law also set a points and fees 
trigger on a sliding scale, all lower than HOEPA’s standards:  for to-
tal loan amounts of $40,000 or greater, 4.5% or more of the total loan 
amount and higher proportions for smaller loans.402 The New Jersey 
law also added two new subcategories of home loans: “home im-
provement loans” and “manufactured housing loans.”403 
 Like its Georgia law counterpart,404 the “New Jersey covered home 
loan” category had only one limitation particular to that category of 
loan: it banned loan flipping where there was no “reasonable tangible 
net benefit.”405 The New Jersey high-cost home loan category also incor-
porated similar prohibitions as the comparable Georgia law category.406 
 The New Jersey law’s assignee liability provision allowed New 
Jersey high-cost home loan borrowers to assert all affirmative claims 
                                                                                                                     
payment fees outside set limitations; discretionary loan acceleration; and charging fees for 
a payoff letter. Id. § 46:10B-25(a), (c)-(f). Of course, these prohibitions also apply to all New 
Jersey covered home loans and New Jersey high-cost home loans, as such loans are types 
of the New Jersey home loans. Id. § 46:10B-25(e).  
“High-cost home loan” means a home loan for which the principal amount of 
the loan does not exceed $350,000, which amount shall be adjusted annually to 
include the last published increase of the housing component of the national 
Consumer Price Index, New York-Northeastern New Jersey Region, in which 
the terms of the loan meet or exceed one or more of the thresholds as defined in 
this section. 
Id. § 46.10B-24. 
 401. Id. § 46:10B-24. The points and fees trigger is 4.5% for loans that have principal 
amounts of less than $40,000 or if insured by the Fair Housing Administration (FHA) or 
guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 
 402. Id. The thresholds for smaller loans are as follows: for total loan amounts of 
$20,000 to $39,999, 6% of the total loan amount; and for total loan amounts of $1 to 
$19,999, the lesser of $1,000 or 6%. Id. 
 403. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 49, at 712 n.316 (describing treatment under New Jer-
sey law of home improvement loans and manufactured housing loans). Manufactured 
homes include the following: modular homes, panelized homes, pre-cut homes, and mobile 
homes. See § 46:10B-24. 
 404. See supra Part V.D. 
 405. § 46:10B-25(b). 
 406. § 46:10B-26. These prohibitions include those on balloon payments, negative am-
ortization, increased default interest rates; § 46:10B-26(c), prepaid finance charges, limita-
tions on access to legal remedies, the making of loans without mandatory notices, § 46:10B-
26(f), the making of loans without mandatory counseling, the direct payment to home im-
provement contractors (i.e., the bypassing of the borrower when lender makes payments on 
home improvement loans), § 46:10B-26(h), loan modification fees, same-creditor refinances 
of existing New Jersey high-cost home loans, § 46:10B-26(i) and the financing of fees 
greater than 2% of the total loan balance. Id. 
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and defenses against purchasers and assignees.407 The New Jersey 
law did provide a safe harbor provision for unwary secondary market 
purchasers who could show that they exercised due diligence in iden-
tifying and avoiding the purchase of “high-cost home loans.”408 Like 
the Georgia law, the New Jersey law limited assignee liability for the 
“covered home loan” category to the outstanding obligation plus costs 
and attorneys’ fees.409 Remedies under the act included statutory 
damages, punitive damages, reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, 
and injunctive, declaratory and equitable relief.410 
2.   The Privileged Raters Quickly Respond 
 Although it did not go into effect until November 26, 2003, Gover-
nor McGreevey signed the New Jersey law on May 1, 2003.411  The 
day after the Governor signed HOSA, Standard & Poor’s announced 
that it would not rate pools that contain certain New Jersey residen-
tial loans.412 In contrast, Moody’s and Fitch quickly concluded that, 
despite some ambiguities in the Act’s damages provisions, the risks 
to assignees were low enough that they would continue to rate pools 
containing most types of New Jersey residential loans.413 Thus, de-
spite similarities between the original Georgia law and the New Jer-
sey law, Moody’s and Fitch reacted differently to New Jersey’s law, 
appearing to prevent a repeat of the funding crisis that occurred in 
Georgia despite Standard & Poor’s more restrictive position. 
 Standard & Poor’s reported its position regarding the New Jersey 
law more than six months before the law would become effective.414 
Standard & Poor’s stated that it would not allow several categories of 
New Jersey loans within securitizations that it rated, claiming that 
several of the Act’s damages provisions were unclear and, therefore, 
might expose assignees to unlimited liability.415 Those categories in-
clude high-cost home loans, covered home loans, home improvement 
                                                                                                                     
 407. § 46:10B-27(a). 
 408. § 46:10B-29(c).  
 409. § 46:10B-29(b). 
 410. Id. 
  411. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 49, at 669.  
 412. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, S&P Report Addresses New Jersey State Preda-
tory Lending Law (May 2, 2003); see Randy Diamond, Mortgage Reform Law in Trouble 
from Start; Rating Service Raises Worries About Liability, REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), May 
3, 2003, at A1 (“S&P said it was concerned the law would hold issuers, and in some cases 
buyers, of mortgage-backed securities liable for violations.”). 
 413. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Responds to New Jersey Preda-
tory Lending Legislation (June 5, 2003), http://fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/ 
rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2&detail=&body_content=pred_lend. 
 414. The law went into effect on November 26, 2003 and Standard & Poor’s released 
their press release on May 2, 2003.  See Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 412. 
 415. Id. 
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loans, and manufactured housing loans.416 Standard & Poor’s stated 
it would allow “home loans,” reverse mortgages and loans on non-
primary residences in its rated transactions.417 
 Even though Moody’s and Fitch indicated that they would still 
rate transactions containing New Jersey mortgage loans, Standard & 
Poor’s position threatened to destabilize the New Jersey mortgage 
market and motivated the lending industry in New Jersey to lobby 
for a significant dilution of the New Jersey law’s assignee liability 
provisions.418 However, many of Standard & Poor’s concerns were 
unmerited. For example, Standard & Poor’s asserted, without clear 
explanation, that the Act creates unlimited liability for assignees of 
“covered home loans.”419 However, assignee liability for New Jersey 
covered home loans is specifically limited by the Act (1) to suits 
brought in an individual capacity and (2) for damages that cannot 
exceed the borrower’s “remaining obligation under the loan plus costs 
and [reasonable] attorneys’ fees.”420 
 Fitch took a more accepting opinion of the New Jersey law on 
June 5, 2003, following its revised criteria.421 In contrast to Standard 
& Poor’s position, Fitch stated it would rate covered loans, manufac-
tured home loans, and home improvement loans in its rated transac-
tions, subject to the appropriate credit enhancement.422 Fitch be-
lieved that the risks posed by New Jersey were less than those posed 
by Georgia because the New Jersey law allows for mitigating fac-
tors.423 Predictably, Fitch declined to rate New Jersey high-cost home 
loans since the combination of unlimited liability and assignee liabil-
ity present an unquantifiable liability to investors.424  
 While New Jersey high-cost home loans can be part of a rated 
transaction due to errors in the origination process, Fitch recognized 
the adequacy of New Jersey’s safe harbor provisions which limit the 
exposure of lenders with reasonable compliance procedures in 
                                                                                                                     
 416. Id.   
 417. Id. 
 418. S&P Surprises Lenders; Decision Not to Rate Certain Pools Cuts New Predatory 
Law Support, BROKER MAG., June-July 2003, at 30, 30 (quoting E. Robert Levy, Executive 
Director, Mortgage Bankers Association of New Jersey/League of Mortgage Lenders, “We 
obviously are not going to be able to live with the bill in [the] present form, unless S&P 
changes their position.”).   
 419. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 412. 
 420. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 49, at 702; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27(c) (West, 
Westlaw through L.2006, c. 20). 
 421. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, supra note 413. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Richard Newman, Fitch Won’t Rate High-Cost Loans in New Jersey; Predatory 
Lending Law Causing Concern on Wall Street, REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), June 6, 2003, at 
B1 (“ ‘Georgia had unlimited liability that could not be mitigated,’ said Fitch’s senior direc-
tor, Michael Nelson.”). 
 424. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, supra note 413. 
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place.425 Fitch determined that a third-party certification of the loan 
pool, which includes recalculation of the APRs based on information 
taken from the loan documents would be sufficient to satisfy Fitch’s 
due diligence requirements.426 While Fitch questioned what “reason-
able due diligence” would suffice to invoke the New Jersey law’s safe 
harbor provisions, it stated that it would not rate any transactions 
where sellers could not show evidence that its compliance procedures 
fall within the safe harbor provisions, as those provisions were inter-
preted by Fitch.427 
 Unlike Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, Moody’s stated on September 
22, 2003 that it would rate pools containing New Jersey high-cost 
home loans and covered home loans.428 While recognizing that these 
two categories pose greater risk to investors than ordinary “home 
loans,” Moody’s stated that few of those loans would be securitized 
based on that inherent risk.429 New Jersey high-cost home loans bear 
the risk of damages including the outstanding balance of the loan 
plus costs, as well as the potential for class action lawsuits.430 Refi-
nanced New Jersey high-cost home loans pose even greater risk to 
the investor based on the requirement that the refinance provide a 
“reasonable tangible net benefit.”431 Because of the subjective stan-
dard, Moody’s stated it would exclude refinanced high-cost home 
loans from its rated transactions.432 Otherwise, Moody’s will rate 
pools that have less than 2% purchase money (for example, not refi-
nanced) New Jersey high-cost home loans.433 Moody’s will allow up to 
5% refinanced New Jersey covered home loans even though such 
loans are subject to the “reasonable tangible net benefit” require-
ment, because New Jersey covered home loans are not exposed to 
                                                                                                                     
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. (“The Act is unclear as to what will be considered reasonable due diligence in 
New Jersey under the limited damages provision of the Act.”). 
 428. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Moody’s to Continue to Rate RMBS 
Backed by New Jersey Home Loans (Sept. 22, 2003). 
 429. Id. (Moody’s “believes that two categories of loans defined in the New Jersey Act—
‘high cost home loans’ and refinanced ‘covered home loans’—represent increased risks to 
RMBS securitizations. Thus, the agency expects that few of the ‘high cost home loans’ and 
refinanced ‘covered home loans’ originated in New Jersey will be securitized.”). 
 430. Id. 
 431. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West, Westlaw through L.2006, c. 20) (“Covered 
Home Loan”) (no longer in the statute). 
 432. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, supra note 428 (“Among other things, 
the New Jersey Act requires ‘high cost home loans’ that refinance existing loans to provide 
a ‘tangible net benefit’ to borrowers. Christine Lachnicht, a Moody’s vice president-senior 
analyst, indicated that because the New Jersey Act does not provide an objective standard 
for what constitutes a ‘tangible net benefit,’ it will be more difficult for lenders and issuers 
to implement and demonstrate effective compliance and due diligence procedures for refi-
nanced ‘high cost home loans.’ Therefore, Moody’s anticipates that the risk of including re-
financed high cost loans in RMBS deals will eliminate their inclusion in future deals.”). 
 433. Id. 
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unlimited liability and are not subject to class action lawsuits.434 
Moody’s placed no limit on purchase money “covered home loans.”435 
Moody’s also requires the repurchase of loans that violate its guide-
lines and indemnification of the securitization trust for any losses in-
curred because of the inclusion of such a loan.436 All other loans may 
be included in rated transactions as long as the issuer demonstrates 
strong compliance procedures with the New Jersey law437 and due 
diligence procedures to avail themselves of the safe harbor provi-
sion.438 While Standard & Poor’s stated that the loan categories were 
unclear,439 subjecting assignees to potential liability, Moody’s stated 
that the New Jersey law provided clear and defined thresholds which 
permit effective compliance procedures.440 Consumer advocates 
lauded Moody’s position, stating that it correctly balanced the needs 
of consumers and investors.441 And indeed, this seemed to be the case. 
But just getting Moody’s on board would not be enough to satisfy sec-
ondary market players; given that RMBS transactions typically need 
a rating from both Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s,442 Standard & 
Poor’s actions were closely watched. 
3.   Standard & Poor’s Backs Down 
 H. Robert Tillman, head of the New Jersey Department of Banking 
and Finance, commented on the relative positions of the privileged 
raters, stating, “All of the major rating agencies do not have to agree 
on how to treat New Jersey loans. The market can function with 
Moody’s and Fitch.”443 This proved to be an optimistic assessment. 
 From the day after the law was signed to the day before it came 
into effectiveness, Standard & Poor’s maintained its position that the 
New Jersey law lacked clarity and, as such, New Jersey loans could 
not be included in their rated transactions. Then, Standard & Poor’s 
backed down from its original position on the New Jersey law two 
                                                                                                                     
 434. Id.  
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. See supra text accompanying notes 415-416. 
 440. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, supra note 374. 
 441. See, e.g., Richard Newman, Moody’s Differs on Predatory Lending Law; Will Rate 
Pools Including High-Cost Mortgages, REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), Sept. 23, 2003, at L8 
(quoting Debbie Goldstein, a consumer advocate, as saying, “Moody’s successfully balanced 
the needs of consumers in protecting their homes from foreclosure and in protecting inves-
tors against ‘unintended consequences’—such as catastrophic liability for an inadvertent 
purchase of a loan that’s in violation of the law.”). 
  442. See supra note 176. 
 443. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 412. 
2006]                         SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION 1049 
 
days prior to its effective date.444 Notwithstanding its denial, it ap-
pears that Standard & Poor’s purpose in responding so quickly to the 
New Jersey law was to push New Jersey to amend the law prior to 
its effective date while ensuring that it could keep this business if the 
New Jersey law was not amended. 
 As it appeared that the New Jersey law would not be amended, 
Standard & Poor’s released a report on the role of predatory lending 
laws in RMBS transactions on October 7, 2003.445 The report specu-
lated generally on the effect of laws, such as the New Jersey law, on 
lender’s practices, stating that lenders may reduce lending in a par-
ticular state to protect themselves, the increased compliance cost 
may make such loans unprofitable, and that a decreased purchase 
market may prompt a reduction in originations.446 Standard & Poor’s 
went on to state that predatory lending laws may reduce the funds 
available to pay investors in RMBS transactions that contain loans 
from jurisdictions with tough predatory lending laws, which is most 
relevant to Standard & Poor’s and is determinative of its ratings.447 
Standard & Poor’s then reiterated its previous issues with assignee 
liability and uncapped liability.448 Standard & Poor’s concluded by 
stating that while it is in favor of predatory lending laws, its role is 
to assess risk associated with RMBS transactions and not to make 
public policy.449 This statement is inconsistent with its actions. 
 While Standard & Poor’s October 7th report did not address the 
New Jersey law directly, it took a less restrictive position on anti-
predatory lending laws than that contained in its May 2, 2003 state-
ment on the New Jersey law.450 Interestingly, the report serves one of 
three conceivable purposes. First, it is possible that Standard & 
Poor’s expected an upcoming amendment to the New Jersey law but 
needed a basis to amend its previous report in case the law did not 
change. Second, it may have felt pressured to reaffirm its stance, 
                                                                                                                     
 444. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Permits Additional New Jer-
sey Mortgage Loans into Rated Single Family Transactions (Nov. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html.  
 445. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Anti-Predatory Lending Laws Assume a 
Prominent Role in the U.S. RMBS Market (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http:// 
www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. (“Standard & Poor’s has stated that, as a public policy matter, it is in favor of 
statutes that attempt to curb predatory lending. Standard & Poor’s also acknowledges, 
however, that its role is to evaluate the credit risk to investors associated with anti-
predatory lending legislation and not to recommend public policy. The making of public 
policy is the responsibility of elected officials.”). While facially attractive, there is some-
thing incoherent about this position: if Standard & Poor’s cannot consider public policy in 
its assessments, the fact that it favors something as a matter of public policy is of no prac-
tical effect. 
  450.   See Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, supra note 412. 
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separate from those of Moody’s and Fitch, after Moody’s September 
22, 2003 report directly contradicted Standard & Poor’s position that 
the statute was unclear as to the categorization of loans. Last, Stan-
dard & Poor’s, having faced scrutiny in the press from consumer ad-
vocacy groups, may have needed to assuage the tensions it generated 
by undercutting the effectiveness of a consumer protection law. 
 Standard & Poor’s revised its position on November 25, 2003, two 
days before the New Jersey law would go into effect, stating it would 
rate the formerly disallowed covered home loans, manufactured 
housing loans and home improvement loans.451 Like Fitch’s and 
Moody’s positions, Standard & Poor’s now required compliance rep-
resentations and demonstrated compliance procedures sufficient to 
identify New Jersey high-cost home loans, New Jersey covered home 
loans and whether such loans are in violation of the statute.452 Unlike 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s still excluded “high-cost home loans.”453 
To that extent, Standard and Poor’s requires an “Exclusion Repre-
sentation,” that is, representations of effective procedures to exclude 
New Jersey high-cost home loans so the loans in a pool can fall 
within the New Jersey law’s safe harbor provision.454 Finally, the 
party making compliance and exclusion representations must be fi-
nancially stable enough to repurchase loans that violate Standard & 
Poor’s guidelines and indemnify the securitization trust for losses in-
curred by such violations.455 
 As of the New Jersey law’s effective date, the New Jersey experi-
ence stands in stark contrast to the lending catastrophe that nearly 
occurred in Georgia.456 Differences in the laws arguably demonstrate 
an intent by New Jersey legislature to afford investors greater ability 
to avoid harsh penalties while remaining steadfastly opposed to preda-
tory lending practices. Yet, Standard & Poor’s markedly similar re-
sponses to the two laws, as compared to the more nuanced responses 
of its competitors, raise concerns as to whether it is biased. Standard 
                                                                                                                     
 451. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Permits Additional New 
Jersey Mortgage Loans into Rated Single Family Transactions (Nov. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html. 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. (“Standard & Poor’s will continue to exclude High-Cost Home Loans because of 
the potential for uncapped statutory and punitive damages.”). 
 454. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Statement of the Comptroller of the 
Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. Regarding the Issuance of Regulations Concerning Pre-
emption and Visitorial Powers 1 (Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
2004-3aComptrollersstatement.pdf (“[W]e have no evidence that national banks (or their 
subsidiaries) are engaged in such practices to any discernible degree. Virtually all State 
Attorneys General have more than once expressed the view that information available to 
them does not show that banks and their subsidiaries are engaged in abusive or predatory 
lending practices. On those limited occasions where we have found national banks to be 
engaged in unacceptable practices, we have taken vigorous enforcement action.”). 
 455. Id. 
 456. See supra Part V.D. 
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& Poor’s initial position highlights its interest in supporting secondary 
market investors rather than fair and equitable lending practices. 
Even so, New Jersey would not be able to withstand Standard & Poor’s 
next change of position which occurred on May 13, 2004.457 
4.   Standard & Poor’s Reverses Course and Imposes New 
Restrictions, Forcing New Jersey to Amend Its Law 
 On that date, Standard & Poor’s released its new evaluation crite-
ria for rating RMBS transactions.458 The new criteria subjected loans 
in each jurisdiction to a quantitative analysis to account for the clar-
ity of the statutory provision, the potential loss severity, and poten-
tial mitigating factors.459 “Standard & Poor’s believes that when the 
risk associated with violating an antipredatory lending law is quanti-
fiable, Standard & Poor’s will allow loans governed by that law in its 
rated transactions.”460 In jurisdictions with assignee liability and the 
potential for liability in excess of the original balance of the loan, it 
took the position that the risk assessment must be increased where 
the antipredatory lending laws have subjective standards. Standard 
& Poor’s requires credit enhancements to properly evaluate those 
risks in specific jurisdictions.461 
                                                                                                                     
 457. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Clarifies Credit Risk Posed by 
Anti-Predatory Lending Laws (May 13, 2004), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/ 
news/04/0518.html. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Implements Credit En-
hancement Criteria and Revises Representation and Warranty Criteria for Including Anti-
Predatory Lending Law Loans in U.S. Rated Structured Finance Transactions (May 13, 
2004), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/04/0518.html. 
The loss severity on each affected loan will be calculated based on the jurisdic-
tion, taking into account the principal balance of each loan, the interest rate, 
and the term of the loan. After calculating this loss severity, Standard & Poor’s 
will determine the number of defensive claims (claims raised by the borrower in 
a foreclosure action) by using the appropriate foreclosure frequency. It will then 
determine the frequency of affirmative claims (claims made against the lender 
prior to default of the loans) by assuming that a percentage of the nondefaulted 
loans are likely to be subject to affirmative claims. The total credit enhance-
ment for affected loans is then calculated based on the percentage of losses on 
affirmative and defensive claims. Therefore, the total credit enhancement will 
depend on the number loans in each pool, foreclosure frequencies, and the ju-
risdictional distribution of the loans. 
Id. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id.  
Standard & Poor’s credit enhancement is based on an assessment of potential 
losses to the securitization transaction. This calculation involves an evaluation 
of several factors, including the number of successful lawsuits likely to be as-
serted against the issuer based on the jurisdictions involved, statutory bor-
rower rights, the maximum potential damages that could be awarded, and an 
assessment of the likely amount of damages to be awarded. 
Id. 
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 In deciding that sellers of North Carolina high-cost home loans 
did not require further credit enhancements, Standard & Poor’s 
found that the North Carolina law had among the highest loss sever-
ity percentages among jurisdictions with quantifiable damages462 and 
subjective standards but also had sufficient mitigating factors which 
are determinative of the credit enhancement requirement for juris-
dictions with assignee liability and quantifiable damages.463 In con-
trast, Standard & Poor’s refused to rate both Georgia and New Jer-
sey high-cost home loans because of the lack of quantifiable damages 
and sufficient safe harbors, even though they had lower loss severity 
percentages.464 Because Standard & Poor’s required credit enhance-
ments would impose unacceptable costs on the New Jersey mortgage 
market, the New Jersey legislature was forced to acquiesce and 
amend its predatory lending law on July 6, 2004.465 
 There were three important amendments to HOSA in response to 
rating agency concerns.466 First, the covered home loan category was 
removed because the privileged raters found the loan flipping test too 
ambiguous.467 Second, the amendment limited plaintiffs from seeking 
HOSA’s remedies in class actions; this change (in addition to reduc-
ing potential recoveries for plaintiffs) allowed the privileged raters to 
more easily quantify potential damages under the law.468 Finally, the 
amendment granted New Jersey’s Department of Banking and In-
surance the power to promulgate regulations to effectuate the intent 
and purpose of all of the provisions of HOSA (as opposed to the hand-
ful of provisions that the Department had authority over in the 
original statute), a change that would again reduce ambiguity for the 
                                                                                                                     
 462. Id. (noting that loans with unquantifiable liability are excluded from Standard & 
Poor’s ratings).  
 463. Id. Compare Cleveland Heights, Ohio’s statute with a loss severity percentage of 
37% and no mitigating factors that requires credit enhancements with North Carolina’s 
statute with a loss severity of 275% and mitigating factors that does not require credit en-
hancements. Id. Also, remember that loans with unquantifiable liability are excluded from 
Standard & Poor’s ratings. 
 464. Id.  Georgia’s loss severity percentage was set at 110%; New Jersey’s loss severity 
percentage was 110%, much lower than North Carolina’s 275%. Id. 
 465. See, e.g., Erick Bergquist, Predatory Laws: S&P’s Awkward Position, AM. BANKER, 
May 18, 2004, at 1, 1 (finding that Standard & Poor’s credit enhancements for New Jersey 
loans would be “high enough to scare lenders away”). It is important to note that lenders 
operating in New Jersey were continuing to lobby the New Jersey legislature to weaken 
HOSA after it went into effect. See, e.g., Coalition for Fair Lending, Predatory Lending 
Law Deserves Time to Work (undated) (on file with author). 
 466. Act of July 6, 2004, Ch. 85, 2004 N.J. Laws 874. 
 467. Id. As an apparent compromise for eliminating the covered home loan category 
the amended law broadened the scope of the New Jersey high-cost home loan category to 
include more loans. Another important, pro-lender change was the exclusion of prepay-
ment penalties from the “points and fees calculation” when a refinancing occurs by the 
same broker but with a different lender. Id. 
 468. Id. 
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privileged raters.469 While these changes were not uniformly bad, 
they tended to be pro-lender and were adopted largely to satisfy the 
demands of Standard & Poor’s. 
VI.   THREE FORCES MAY STANDARDIZE THE OPERATIONS OF THE 
SUBPRIME MARKET 
 In addition to privileged rater predatory lending law underwriting 
guidelines, there are two other forces that may impose greater stan-
dardization upon the subprime mortgage market: (1) federal preemp-
tion by legislation and/or regulation and (2) GSE buying guidelines. 
Standardization can take many forms and can vary in scope. Each 
push to standardize must be independently evaluated to determine 
whether it is desirable. 
A.   Federal Preemption Is Premature 
 The United States has a dual banking system, one in which both 
states and the federal government charter and regulate banks and 
other savings institutions. Within this dual system, the federal gov-
ernment has the power to preempt state lending regulations. Indeed, 
federal regulators have already preempted the application of state 
predatory lending laws to a broad array of lending institutions and 
Congress is considering legislation to preempt their application to 
the remaining financial institutions that are still regulated by such 
laws. Professor Azmy has exhaustively reviewed these efforts and 
they merely require summarizing and updating for my purposes.470 
1.   Regulatory Preemption 
 The Office of Thrift Supervision, which regulates savings and loan 
and savings banks, has preempted state predatory loans as to those 
entities and their operating subsidiaries.471 The Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency has also preempted state predatory lending 
laws as to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.472 
                                                                                                                     
 469. Id. 
 470. See generally Azmy, supra note 5, at 382-90; see also Christopher L. Peterson, 
Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 
1 (2005); Julia P. Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Pre-
emption, and Federally-Supported Lenders (ExpressO Preprint Series, Working Paper No. 
879, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/879/. 
 471. O.T.S. Chief Couns. Op. P-2003-6 (Sept. 2, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/ 
r.cfm?56306.pdf; O.T.S. Chief Couns. Op. P-2003-5 (July 22, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/ 
docs/r.cfm?56305.pdf; O.T.S. Chief Couns. Op. P-2003-2 (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.ots.treas.gov/ 
docs/r.cfm?56302.pdf; O.T.S. Chief Couns. Op. P-2003-1 (Jan. 21, 2003), http:// 
www.ots.treas.gov/docs/r.cfm?56301.pdf. 
 472. 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2006). The National Credit Union Administration has also 
preempted HOSA as to federal credit unions, N.C.U.A. Assoc. Gen. Couns. Op. 03-1106 
(Jan. 28, 2004), http://www.ncua.gov/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/opinion_letters/2003_letters/      
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 These preemption actions will only have a modest effect on the ef-
ficacy of predatory lending laws; it is generally agreed that federally 
regulated lenders do not engage in much predatory lending.473 The 
only aspect of these preemption rulings that will significantly impact 
predatory lending is that they also apply to the state-chartered oper-
ating subsidiaries of nationally chartered lenders. Major nationally 
chartered lenders have purchased subprime lenders that have been 
accused of predatory behaviors474 which will not be subject to state 
predatory lending laws. But there is reason to believe that nationally 
chartered lenders will not tolerate predatory behaviors in their oper-
ating subsidiaries because of reputational concerns475 and existing 
regulation.476 
 It is difficult to answer two important questions that arise from 
the federal preemption of these laws: How many subprime lenders 
are impacted and what share of the market do they have? But I pre-
liminarily conclude that this preemption, while unwise in our dual 
banking system, will only have a moderately negative impact on the 
effectiveness of state predatory lending laws because few predatory 
lenders and only a small portion of predatory loans are originated by 
entities that benefit from preemption. 
                                                                                                                     
03-1106.htm, and has promulgated regulations that preempt a broad swath of state lending 
laws. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(b) (2005). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is also consid-
ering a Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain State Laws, which may preempt state 
predatory lending laws as to the interstate operations of state-chartered members of the 
FDIC. Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain State Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,413-01 (Mar. 
21, 2005). But again, FDIC-insured entities do not appear to be among the main predatory 
lenders. See STEPHEN M. BEARD FOR RUSSELL A. RAU, FDIC, THE DIVISION OF SUPERVISION 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION’S EXAMINATION ASSESSMENT OF SUBPRIME LENDING 2 (Audit 
Report No. 03-019) (2003) (estimating that less than 2% of all FDIC-insured institutions had 
significant holdings of subprime assets). 
 473. The OCC has determined that as far as national banks are concerned, “there were 
178 lenders whose business focus was subprime mortgage lending in 2001. The majority, or 
112 (63%), were independent mortgage companies. Of the remaining lenders, 30 (17%) 
were non-bank affiliates and only 36 (20%) were depository institutions or their direct sub-
sidiaries.” Comptroller of the Currency Adm’r of Nat’l Banks, Economic Issues in Predatory 
Lending 4 (Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Working Paper, 2003), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf; see also WEICHER, supra note 59, at 30. 
 474. See, e.g., Chiwon Yom, Limited-Purpose Banks: Their Specialties, Performance, 
and Prospects, 17 FDIC BANKING REV. NO. 1, at 19, 30 (2005) (describing First Union Na-
tional Bank’s acquisition of subprime lender The Money Store); Citigroup Closes Associates 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at C12 (describing Citigroup’s acquisition of subprime 
lender Associates First Capital Corporation); HSBC Holdings PLC: Regulators, Sharehold-
ers Clear Household International Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at B4 (describing 
HSBC’s acquisition of subprime lender Household International). 
 475. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, HSBC to Buy a U.S. Lender for $14.2 Billion, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at C1 (suggesting that most banks are concerned with reputational 
risks); Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Patrick McGeehan, Along with a Lender, Is Citigroup Buy-
ing Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 3, at 1 (describing Citigroup’s reputational con-
siderations upon entering subprime field). 
 476. Advisory Letter from David Hammaker to All CEOs, supra note 274, at 1-2. 
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2.   Possible Congressional Preemption 
 Two bills introduced in the 2005 congressional session address 
predatory lending. The Ney/Kanjorski Bill makes minor modifica-
tions to HOEPA that, while apparently consumer-friendly, come at 
the price of complete preemption of state predatory lending laws.477 
In the same session, Representatives Barney Frank (D-MA), Brad 
Miller (D-NC) and Melvin Watt (D-NC) introduced an alternative bill 
that expressly does not preempt state predatory lending laws and 
models its substantive provisions on the stringent North Carolina 
predatory lending law.478 There is no evidence that either of these 
bills is likely to be passed this year. 
 Preemption, either regulatory or congressional, is premature, as 
Professor Azmy argues.479 Because predatory lending is difficult to 
define, the trial-and-error approach of the states has provided a fer-
tile “laboratory” of experimentation.480 The Frank/Miller/Watt Bill 
recognizes this by adopting the useful provisions of the North Caro-
lina law without preempting ongoing innovations by the states. 
B.   GSEs Will Have an Incremental Impact 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the largest purchasers of resi-
dential mortgages on the secondary market and are becoming more 
significant players in the subprime market. Building on their buying 
guidelines for prime, conforming mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac have issued guidelines so that subprime originators can design 
their loans to comply with their requirements. 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have indicated that they will not 
purchase high-cost home loans and other loans with certain terms 
that they deem to be abusive, such as harsh prepayment penalties.481 
They have also indicated that they will not purchase high-cost home 
loans, as defined in the HOEPA.482 Fannie Mae has also indicated 
that it will not buy loans with mandatory arbitration clauses, and 
Freddie Mac has indicated that it will not buy loans originated with 
single-premium credit insurance.483 
                                                                                                                     
 477. H.R. 1295, 109th Cong. § 102 (lowering HOEPA points and fees trigger to five per-
cent, albeit with a less restrictive definition of points and fees); id. § 106 (preempting state 
laws). 
 478. Prohibit Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1182, 109th Cong. (2005); Legislative Up-
date, supra note 276, at 5.  
 479. See Azmy, supra note 5, at 382-90.  
 480. See id. at 393; see also LI & ERNST, supra note 24, at 19 (discussing the flaws in-
herent in the Ney-Kanjorski Bill and the similarity of the Miller-Watt-Frank Bill to exist-
ing successful state laws). 
 481. See sources cited supra note 176. 
 482. See supra note 176. 
 483. Id.  
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 The GSEs’ buying guidelines are far less restrictive than the poli-
cies of the privileged raters. Because GSEs impact a smaller portion 
of the subprime market than the privileged raters do and because 
GSEs are only imposing incremental standardization on the sub-
prime market, their impact should probably be more beneficial than 
not.484 Their impact will be beneficial not only because it is limited, 
but also because they have made good choices in drafting their buy-
ing guidelines: drawn neither too restrictively nor too broadly, they 
have identified genuinely problematic practices and loan terms to ex-
clude. Whether the drafters of these guidelines were conscious of the 
GSEs’ public interest duty or not, they struck a balance that few 
found fault with. 
C.   Privileged Raters Are Standardizing the Subprime Market at the 
Expense of the Public Interest 
 The privileged raters have indicated that they will not rate securi-
ties backed by pools of residential mortgages if any of those mortgages 
violate their rating guidelines relating to predatory lending laws. Be-
cause the lack of a rating from at least one of these agencies is the fi-
nancial equivalent of a death sentence for a residential mortgage-
backed securities offering, the privileged raters are able to impose 
their own form of standardization on the entire subprime market. 
 The privileged raters make more money in a growing residential 
mortgage-backed securities market because they charge issuers for 
their work in rating new securities; thus, it is in the agencies’ self-
interest to keep states from passing laws that slow secondary market 
growth and cut into their income. Moreover, the privileged raters’ 
own statements provide evidence that they are biased in favor of in-
vestors.  
 In addition to the theory that privileged raters are biased against 
the public interest, there are other hypotheses, presented below, that 
may explain their behavior. But even if these theories more accu-
rately described the state of affairs, the history of the privileged rat-
ers’ reaction to state predatory lending laws indicates that there are 
systemic problems that result from the ability of the privileged raters 
to sell regulatory licenses.485 Fundamentally, these problems derive 
from the power of the privileged raters to standardize the subprime 
market on their terms and their terms alone.  
                                                                                                                     
 484. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for 
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home 
Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083 (1984) (arguing that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are in the best position to standardize loan terms and balance consumer pro-
tection with market needs). 
 485. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
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 In response to the critique outlined in this Part, privileged raters 
may argue that the tension between their actions and state preda-
tory lending legislation results from the fact that they are attempting 
to answer a different question than the one that the state legisla-
tures want them to answer. Privileged raters, in their capacity as 
advocates for investors, may be concerned with the incredibly remote 
possibility of a catastrophic loss to a mortgage pool caused by a 
mammoth award in a predatory lending suit. The state may just 
want them to address the average risk and severity of such occur-
rences, which appear minimal.486 Thus, the privileged raters may ar-
gue there is no bias, just different goals. 
 This argument is not compelling. First, ratings, even investment-
grade ratings, are not intended to provide complete assurance of 
payment to investors, just an accurate assessment of that risk.487 
Second, the risk of catastrophic loss is limited to the investors’ in-
vestment in a given pool.488 This type of risk of catastrophic loss is no 
different from the risk that nearly all other securities bear for one 
reason or another; it is just the particular potential cause, predatory 
lending laws, that differs. 
 Privileged raters may also argue that while I have accurately de-
scribed recent events and their negative consequences for the public 
interest, such localized consequences are acceptable “collateral dam-
age” as the capital markets promote globalized standardization and 
efficiency. For this argument to have merit, it should demonstrate 
that the standardization that it is imposing is (1) relatively cost free 
and (2) a material, even if just incremental, improvement in the effi-
ciency of the capital markets. The first prong is materially false: 
predatory lending costs consumers many billions of dollars a year 
and preliminary studies suggest that predatory lending laws reduce 
predatory lending.489 And there is no evidence that the second prong 
is true: lenders are already required to comply with an extraordinar-
ily complex set of regulations and the predatory lending statutes do 
not materially add to such compliance costs. Indeed, companies offer 
software packages to deal with the web of lending regulations.490 A 
related argument may be that the privileged raters should have the 
ability, at least more so than the states, to determine how the secon-
dary market functions because they are bigger stakeholders in that 
                                                                                                                     
 486. See supra note 348. 
 487. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 716. 
 488. See supra note 108. 
 489. See, e.g., Quercia et al., supra note 283 (arguing that the North Carolina law re-
duced predatory loans without materially reducing subprime loans generally). 
 490. See, e.g., Appintelligence, http://www.appintelligence.com/preventpredatory/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2006) (describing web-based predatory lending due diligence product for 
lenders); ComplianceEase, http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite (last visited Mar. 15, 
2006) (combining Internet-based compliance tool with insurance product). 
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market. This, of course, would be an extraordinary transfer of power 
to private actors and should be the subject of an explicit decision 
making process, not the result of a slow and unseen accretion of 
power over decades. 
 Privileged raters might also argue that standardization that bene-
fits investors ultimately benefits subprime borrowers because these 
two classes overlap, and the benefits to the former class negate the 
harm to the latter class. This argument, while somewhat intuitive, 
does not hold up at all. While there is, indeed, some overlap between 
the two classes, it is neither a significant overlap, nor is there a way 
to ensure that those harmed by the inappropriate standardization 
imposed by the privileged raters get a proportionate share of the 
benefits that accrue to the investor class generally. 
 Privileged raters might also argue that I am incorrect in describ-
ing their rating guidelines as inaccurate. They might argue that if 
that were so, others would be able to arbitrage loans governed by 
predatory lending statutes to their benefit. For instance, an investor 
might accept private placements of unrated pools containing loans 
governed by predatory lending statutes at a price that accurately re-
flects the risk of such statutes. While theoretically true, the fact is 
that the immense power of the privileged raters can dry up a mort-
gage market like Georgia’s so quickly that there is no time for such 
an alternate market to develop. 
 Finally, privileged raters may argue that while I have accurately 
described recent events, I have misinterpreted them. They might ar-
gue that their predatory lending law guidelines are appropriate and 
unbiased. This position does not seem to have merit, given the biases 
demonstrated in this Article and given the less restrictive positions 
taken by GSEs.491 
 Fundamentally, the arguments of the privileged raters are quite 
hollow. There is every reason—from their own statements, to the 
empirical evidence, to the structure of their business models—to 
think that they take a proinvestor and/or pro-issuer stance on the 
policies that they evaluate. There is no reason to believe that the 
privileged raters are constituted to address the concerns of subprime 
                                                                                                                     
 491. Moody’s and Fitch may also argue that I am tarring them with too broad a brush, 
by grouping them with Standard & Poor’s, which has taken the most draconian approach 
to state predatory lending laws. For my purposes, the differences among the privileged 
raters are not that important because the typical securitization has ratings by both 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, at a minimum. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
The failure to get a rating from Standard & Poor’s would signal something is amiss to in-
vestors. Thus, the nature of the privileged raters’ oligopoly is that the market and state 
legislatures must typically respond to the most draconian of Standard & Poor’s and 
Moody’s. And, much like a “good cop, bad cop” duo, they both benefit from the systemic di-
lution of state predatory lending laws, notwithstanding the fact that one of the partners 
presents a more kindly face. 
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borrowers, and there is no reason to believe that they consider the 
various sides of an issue as a legislature is likely (or, at least, more 
likely) to do. Thus, it appears that the standardization imposed upon 
the subprime market by the privileged raters is biased against the 
public interest and is not acceptable as “collateral damage” in the 
fight to create standardized capital markets. 
VII.   MAKING THE PRIVILEGED RATERS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
THEIR IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
 Rating agencies were historically considered to be mere commen-
tators on the comings and goings of the players in our free market 
economy while ensuring that objective information is widely dis-
seminated to all.492 This view, however, fails to take into account the 
privileged regulatory status that the SEC and other government 
regulators have granted to the privileged raters. And as the scope of 
that status increases, privileged raters have exploded in size and 
profitability.493 They now have a gatekeeper function in the secon-
dary market, and they can allow their bias in favor of a growing sec-
ondary market to influence decisions that also affect matters of great 
concern to the public. This state of affairs should be remedied. The 
existing rating agency literature provides a starting point for solving 
the problem of rating agency bias. 
 The existing rating agency literature does not look at them from 
the public’s perspective, this Article does. Rather, it looks at rating 
agencies from the perspective of investors and sometimes issuers. 
Nonetheless, the literature does suggest some ways to limit the ex-
cessive power of the privileged raters so as to protect the public in-
terest: 
(1) wait and see whether the subprime market stan-
dardizes in such a way as to make concerns about 
rating agency bias irrelevant, 
(2) deregulate the privileged raters so as to remove 
their regulatory privileged status, and 
(3) increase regulation of the privileged raters so as to 
ensure that they do not negatively impact the public 
interest. 
A.   Wait and See 
 If the history of the prime mortgage market is any guide, there is 
reason to believe that the subprime market will standardize over 
time and that many predatory behaviors will be driven from the 
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market by various forces. In addition to the privileged raters, this 
Article has identified two standardizing forces: proposed federal leg-
islation494 and the government-sponsored enterprises.495 
 Indeed, federal regulators are creating a unified regulatory regime 
that applies to many of the largest subprime lenders. This standardi-
zation, in itself, will not drive out predatory practices because the 
applicable federal standards are pro-issuer and because many of the 
predatory lenders are not subject to the federal regulatory regime.496 
The same holds true for the Ney/Kanjorski Bill.497 That is, the mere 
fact that the federal government is standardizing the subprime mar-
ket does not mean that it is doing it in a way that helps subprime 
borrowers.498 The Frank/Miller/Watt Bill, on the other hand, may 
promote proconsumer standardization because it creates a floor of 
protections without limiting states from building additional protec-
tions from that floor.499 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are also driving some of the stan-
dardization in the subprime market. They are doing this by refusing 
to purchase loans with certain terms that they consider to be abu-
sive.500 But while GSEs were able to impose standardization on the 
prime mortgage market, it is unclear that they will be able to do the 
same in the subprime mortgage market. The subprime market, 
unlike the early prime market, has a number of large lenders who 
need not follow the GSEs’ lead. The subprime market also has, by 
definition, less consistency among its loan products. Thus, GSE-
driven standardization, while potentially beneficial, does not offer a 
sure-fire way to end predatory behavior. The standardization im-
posed by the privileged raters is particularly troubling because they 
perform a gatekeeping function to the capital markets. This gate-
keeping function gives an inordinate amount of power to the privi-
leged raters and interferes with the market’s ability to correct for the 
privileged raters’ bias against the public interest. 
 Because no standardization push looks like it will standardize the 
subprime market in the near future and because predatory lending 
costs consumers billions of dollars each year, the wait-and-see ap-
proach does not offer much promise.501 
                                                                                                                     
 494. See supra notes 477-478 and accompanying text.  
 495. See supra Part VI.B. 
 496. See Azmy, supra note 5, at 358. 
 497. See infra note 477 and accompanying text.  
 498. Id. 
 499. See supra note 471 and accompanying text. 
 500. See infra note 478 and accompanying text.  
 501. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 32, at 744 (“Predatory lending con-
tinues to thrive despite claims that the market will correct the problem. Investors, who be-
cause of information asymmetries could potentially absorb some of the risks of predatory 
lending, are protected by pricing and securitization deals and, therefore, have no incentive 
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B.   Deregulation 
 There have been vociferous complaints that the SEC has created 
the privileged rater oligopoly.502 The SEC is in the process of issuing 
final, more transparent, rules regarding NRSRO designation.503 As 
noted above, the privileged raters have been criticized for a number 
of failings, not least of which is that they do not provide particularly 
accurate information. Some argue that increased competition from 
other rating agencies will increase the accuracy of the privileged rat-
ers’ pronouncements.504 Such competition could push the privileged 
raters to accurately evaluate the risks associated with state preda-
tory lending legislation, instead of adopting a biased view that helps 
secondary market players by reducing investors’ risks and standard-
izing the operation of the secondary market at the expense of sub-
prime borrowers. 
 Indeed, Professor Azmy has argued that experimentation by the 
states in the realm of predatory lending statutes has led to healthy 
innovation as states have struggled with the problem of predatory 
lending.505 A similar argument applies in the context of competition 
among rating agencies to provide the most accurate information to 
investors.506 The more rating agencies are involved in the assessment 
of the risks that predatory lending statutes pose to investors, the 
more likely that the secondary market will adopt appropriate stan-
dardization that would not be solely based on the terms of the privi-
leged raters, but would also consider the interests of subprime bor-
rowers. For this to occur, the pool of rating agencies must expand so 
that there is competition to provide the most accurate rating guide-
lines for predatory lending laws. 
                                                                                                                     
to police predatory lenders.”). There are plenty of examples of industries with predatory 
practices that survive for decades, which also speaks against a wait-and-see approach. See, 
e.g., Benjamin Haggott Beckhart, 54 POL. SCI. Q. 268 (1939) (reviewing ALPHEUS THOMAS 
MASON, THE BRANDEIS WAY:  A CASE STUDY IN THE WORKINGS OF DEMOCRACY (1938)) (de-
scribing long-term predatory practices in life insurance industry). 
 502. See supra Part IV.B. 
 503. Alec Klein, SEC Prepares to Change Rules for Credit Raters: Revision to Define 
National Designation, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2005, at E02.  
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 505. Azmy, supra note 5, at 391-94. 
 506. See Beaver et al., supra note 234, at 7 (noting that regulation can reduce rating 
agency incentives to provide good services). 
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 Some commentators, including Professor Partnoy, have suggested 
that rating agencies should be extricated from government regula-
tion altogether, leaving them as pure providers of information and 
ending their role as sellers of regulatory licenses.507 Partnoy has ar-
gued that regulators could substitute reliance on a rating with reli-
ance on a “credit spread,” which is “the difference between the yield 
on the bond and the yield on a risk-free bond of comparable structure 
and maturity.”508 Such a system would return the privileged raters to 
their roots as providers of information and leave the granting of 
regulatory licenses to regulators. No one, at least in the academic lit-
erature, has persuasively demonstrated why this proposal is un-
workable.509 Such a proposal would end the privileged raters’ oligop-
oly and should increase the number of rating agencies that consider 
the impact of predatory lending statutes. Just as experimentation by 
the states is valuable to arrive at a well-balanced predatory lending 
law, empirical and analytic experimentation by multiple rating agen-
cies will help the secondary market accurately evaluate the risk that 
such laws pose to investors. 
 Deregulating the privileged raters has much facial appeal,510 but 
ultimately, the problem with this proposal is that their ratings are 
deeply enmeshed with a broad array of regulatory regimes.511 De-
coupling them throughout the international capital markets in order 
to resolve the problems of the subprime mortgage market (a signifi-
                                                                                                                     
 507. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 33, at 624 (arguing that SEC and other regulators 
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 509. Cf. SEC, REPORT, supra note 211, at 39 n.106 (quoting Steven Schwarcz that 
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spreads) (alterations in original)). 
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 511. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE 
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004) (de-
scribing new international standards for risk-based capital requirements that heavily re-
lies on rating agencies). 
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cant, but small part of the entire international financial system) 
might amount to letting the tail wag the dog. If deregulation of privi-
leged raters is ultimately accomplished, it will be as a result of 
broader forces than those present in the subprime market. 
C.   Increased Regulation 
 Some have argued that rating agencies should be subject to 
greater regulation, as they are active participants in the secondary 
market underwriting process.512 Regulation can take a number of 
forms, including traditional oversight by means of inspections and 
record-keeping requirements, government input into the ratings 
process itself, and some kind of periodic public review of the per-
formance of the privileged raters. 
 There is general agreement that traditional regulation of rating 
agencies will not be helpful as it is in other industries, such as bank-
ing.513 Professor Steven Schwarcz warns that government input into 
the ratings process itself may impair the quality and perceived qual-
ity of agency ratings:  
[I]f rating agency regulation were based on factors other than eco-
nomic efficiency, ratings would to some extent reflect those other 
factors. Investors, who typically look for the highest economic re-
turn for a given level of safety, then would be misled, undermining 
their confidence in the rating system and their willingness to in-
vest in rated securities.514 
 Professor Schwarcz argues that, at least “[i]n an economic context, 
where health and safety are not at issue, regulatory policy generally 
views” efficiency as the most important concern of any given regula-
tory regime, although he does acknowledge that “[a]n exception 
might arise, however, where society has objectives in addition to eco-
nomic efficiency,” such as distributional objectives.515 Here, while 
there are no distributional objectives, there is a concern that the 
privileged raters have a negative impact on the public interest that 
must be addressed. Nonetheless, Schwarcz is right to warn regula-
tors not to kill the rating agency goose to get to the golden egg of 
                                                                                                                     
 512. See Gerard Uzzi, Note, A Conceptual Framework for Imposing Statutory Under-
writer Duties on Rating Agencies Involved in the Structuring of Private Label Mortgage-
Backed Securities, 70 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 779, 798 (1996) (arguing that rating agency regu-
lation is “inevitable”). 
 513. See Hill, supra note 33, at 87-88 (“Monitoring can fairly well be designed to catch 
egregious shirking or fraud. But monitoring with the end of making lax behavior less lax 
should be less successful. The result is likely to generate make-work, with no real im-
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 514. Schwarcz, supra note 33, at 13. 
 515. Id. at 10-11 (footnotes omitted). 
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bias-free ratings. The final possible type of regulation, increased pub-
lic comment, may help reduce that bias without interfering with the 
content of the ratings themselves. 
 There have been a variety of proposals for increased public scrutiny 
regarding the privileged raters, ranging from opportunities to com-
ment to the right to appeal rating decisions. One proposal has been to 
adopt a process like that used to renew broadcast licenses.516 Under 
this proposal, NRSRO status would be periodically reviewed and the 
public would be given the opportunity to comment. This proposal rests 
on the assumption that NRSRO status will not be threatened if there 
are public complaints, but rather that the privileged raters will (like 
broadcasters) seek to avoid public shaming for acting inappropri-
ately.517 While this proposal has merit, it is clearly no panacea. 
 The SEC’s 2005 Rule Proposal has made the increased regulation 
of privileged raters a timely proposal. The renewal of broadcasting li-
censes provides a good precedent for what that increased regulation 
can look like. And, while renewal proceedings will not be a panacea 
(keeping in mind that Standard & Poor’s withstood some virulent 
criticism for its actions in New Jersey), they should offer a forum for 
addressing the negative impact that the privileged raters have on the 
public interest. 
 Francis Bottini has proposed that the SEC be granted the power 
to issue a “Writ of Review” to a rating agency to suggest that the 
agency reconsider a rating.518 This proposal could be expanded to 
grant the SEC the power to suggest that a rating agency reconsider 
an underwriting standard that appears to be too conservative or bi-
ased against the public interest. If such a power were granted as part 
of greater regulatory oversight of NRSROs, it might be an effective 
means of ensuring that privileged raters did not let their biases in-
terfere with their predatory lending legislation guidelines. Working 
out the details of such a proposal must be left to another article and 
would probably only make sense as part of an overhaul of the entire 
regulatory scheme for NRSROs. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 Subprime lending has given low- and moderate-income homeown-
ers some of the same financial options and resources that had been 
previously reserved for prime borrowers. Unfortunately, this positive 
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development has been shadowed by the growing problem of preda-
tory lending. This Article builds on work of other scholars who have 
demonstrated how the structure of the secondary market has allowed 
predatory lending to explode in the subprime market. It ties this lit-
erature to the ratings agency literature which suggests that privi-
leged raters are biased against the public interest. 
 This Article demonstrates how privileged raters have allowed 
their biases to interfere with state efforts to end predatory lending in 
their jurisdictions. This Article then vets proposed privileged rater 
reforms and concludes that increased regulation of privileged raters 
is called for to ensure that there is a way to hold them accountable 
for their actions that negatively impact the public interest. 
 This Article has implications for two important and broader areas 
of study: (1) the gatekeeping function of privileged raters in the inter-
national financial markets519 and (2) the replacement of local property 
law regimes with international, investor-friendly regimes as globaliza-
tion increases.520 By making visible the impact of privileged raters on 
state predatory lending laws, this Article makes clear that the in-
creased standardization that benefits the international investment 
community comes at a cost to localized concerns like consumer protec-
tion. By doing so, it provides a theoretical basis for arguing that regu-
lators of rating agencies should consider the public interest when regu-
lating rating agencies. 
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